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Abstract 
Building on discourses on trust developed by other social sciences, this collective working paper aims 
to frame the meaning and reach of the notion of mutual trust as relied upon in the field of EU law with 
a view to contributing to its conceptualization. The structure of the paper reflects that ambition: 
starting with a rich contribution replacing mutual trust within the context of the history of ideas, 
followed by a critical reflection on the role of mutual trust in the EU market integration process, the 
working paper then carefully inquires into the role of mutual trust in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice – in particular in the fields of civil and criminal justice cooperation – where references to 
mutual trust have been the most apparent over the past decade, before attempting to understand the 
significance of mutual trust for the management of the Union as a polity. Albeit to varying extent, all 
legal contributions explore the potential and limits of mutual trust as a notion governing regulatory 
choices and judicial interpretations, if not the EU legal system as a whole, while being anchored in 
substantive law analyses. All contributions were finalized at the end of 2015. 
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 1 
Mapping Mutual Trust – an Introduction 
Damien Gerard and Evelien Brouwer* 
 
 
While mutual trust has been brought up with increased frequency in the European political and legal 
debate over recent years, the literature has repeatedly pointed to a lack of conceptualization of mutual 
trust as a significant lacuna. That lacuna reflects the difficulty of circumscribing a notion that appears 
to defy easy categorization. As a result, discussions of mutual trust in the current EU context tend to 
refrain from defining trust and instead focus on its apparent manifestations.  The lack of 
conceptualization of mutual trust is problematic because it prevents a systematic discussion of the 
significance and limits of that notion, whereas the Union has been keen to incorporate a conclusive 
presumption of mutual trust between Member States in various regulatory instruments adopted in 
recent years and mutual trust has been hailed by the Court of Justice as nothing other than a ‘raison 
d’être of the European Union’.  That uncertainty is also problematic for the practical implementation 
of EU law inasmuch as it leaves national courts without clear guidance on how to balance mutual trust 
against other interests. 
Expanding on the contributions of the authors to a research workshop organized at the 
European University Institute on 9 March 2015, with the participation of EUI Professors Diego 
Gambetta and Ann Thomson, as well as Ioannis Lianos from University College London, this 
collective working paper aims to engage in a process of ‘mapping mutual trust’ in order to allow for a 
possible rationalization of that notion in the current EU context.  At the outset, that initiative was 
prompted by a disconnection between the lack of conceptualization of mutual trust in EU law and the 
very significant body of social sciences literature on the notion of (mutual) trust.  In the field of 
sociology, for example, Luhmann is known for having formalized trust as a method to reduce 
complexity, enabling increased possibilities for experience and action, yet conditioned on learning 
mechanisms and reliant on safeguards, including legal norms.  A striking feature encountered in 
various socio-political accounts lies in the ubiquitous connection – and mutually reinforcing relation – 
between trust and cooperation.  From there, trust has been formalized as a key enabling factor of 
network interactions, equally critical to network performance and sustainability.  In their respective 
discipline, economists have also sought to conceptualize trust as a risk analysis, international relations 
scholars have conceived trust as a necessary condition for cooperation between States and 
psychologists have presented trust as a determining trait of personal interaction.   
Generally, as Fillafer explains in his contribution and while their historical pedigree is 
arguably much longer, conceptions of mutual trust have also played a role in many early modern 
schemes of the socio-political order from the sixteenth century onward and they cut across a variety of 
conceptual environments, from the foundations of contract law and the practices of credit, lending and 
liability over arguments in favour of altruism/supererogation and modes of social conduct.  The nexus 
between self-interest and mutual trust forms the centerpiece of the theory of moral sentiments as it 
developed in the eighteenth century, for example, and it gradually came to permeate the political 
economy, the study of natural religion, and the study of law.  With the advent of nineteenth-century 
sociology, trust-based societal relationships and the management of social expectations became 
significant areas of study in their own right.  During the twentieth century, theories of democratic 
representation focused equally on the psychosocial prerequisites of interpersonal trust and its 
incorporation into symbolic orders of the political. 
Building on discourses on trust developed by other social sciences, this working paper 
essentially aims to frame the meaning and reach of the notion of mutual trust as relied upon in the field 
of EU law.  Its structure reflects that ambition: starting with a rich contribution replacing mutual trust 
within the context of the history of ideas, followed by a critical reflection on the role of mutual trust in 
                                                     
* Damien Gerard is a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of 
Louvain.  Evelien Brouwer is Senior Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam.   
Evelien Brouwer and Damien Gerard (eds) 
2 
the EU market integration process, the working paper then carefully inquires into the role of mutual 
trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – in particular the fields of civil and criminal justice 
cooperation – where manifestations thereof have been the most apparent over the past decade, before 
attempting to understand the significance of mutual trust for the management of the Union as a polity.  
Albeit to varying extent, all legal contributions explore the potential and limits of mutual trust as a 
notion governing regulatory choices and judicial interpretations, if not the EU legal system as a whole, 
while being anchored in substantive law analyses.  They are therefore inductive in essence for they 
aim to draw normative insights from the praxis of mutual trust in the field of EU law.  In doing so, 
they each offer their own perspective while trying to give a certain coherence to the notion of mutual 
trust across specific sub-fields of EU law, thus endeavouring to move beyond the ‘malleability’ of that 
notion as a ‘moral-political iteration or vector’, as highlighted by Fillafer in his opening chapter.   
As a result, after reflecting on the role of mutual trust through the main stages of the market 
integration process, Snell comes to question the limits of mutual trust to achieve an effective economic 
union capable of supporting the single currency.  Instead, he suggests that going back to ‘the old 
fashioned business of harmonization’ might be requisite to fix the imperfections of the current single 
market, thus moving away from mutual trust as the dominant paradigm.  In the first contribution on 
mutual trust in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (‘AFSJ’), Storskrubb then focuses on the 
advent of mutual trust in civil justice cooperation.  Rooted in an analysis of the challenges raised by 
recent developments in legislative and case law, she also posits that ‘presumed’ mutual trust is a lure 
and that building ‘binding’ trust capable of balancing cooperation and fundamental procedural rights 
requires instead complex regulatory strategies associating other tools and support structures.   
In the first of three contributions on mutual trust in European criminal justice cooperation and 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Mitsilegas conducts a three-stage inquiry into the 
relationship between mutual trust and mutual recognition in European criminal law that entails a 
conceptualization of their connection with legal pluralism as an analytical framework to conceive of 
relations between legal systems, a reflection on their respective limits and a discussion of the measures 
implemented to address concerns for individual rights created by the uncritical acceptance of 
presumed mutual trust.  In her contribution, Moraru then delves into the difficulties faced by national 
courts in implementing the mutual trust paradigm, stemming from the need to develop an 
understanding of other legal systems, to cope with the different implications of mutual trust depending 
on the specific AFSJ sub-field in which it is applied and to accommodate national courts’ double 
loyalty towards the EU and the ECHR, respectively.  From there, she depicts the national courts’ 
responses to these challenges, ranging from blunt disobedience to innovative legal thinking, and 
studies the contribution of judicial interaction techniques to the solution of conflicts between mutual 
trust and individual rights in cross-border enforcement contexts.   
Dissatisfied with the EU Court of Justice’s apparent ignorance in Opinion 2/13 of the complex 
and differentiated substance of mutual trust as developed over 15 years, Brouwer engages in an 
‘anatomy of trust’ that distinguishes successively between the different objectives underlying mutual 
trust, the different subjects of trust, the different actors involved in trust-based interactions at EU level 
and the difference and interconnection between formal and material trust. From there, she devises a 
list of pressing questions to be answered by the Court of Justice in order to reach a balance in the tasks 
assigned to and expectations built into mutual trust within the EU legal system.  Eventually, reflecting 
on the coincidence between the growing prominence of loose references to trust in recent political 
discourses about the Union and the emergence of mutual trust as a ‘specific characteristic’ of Union 
law, Gerard seeks to apprehend the overall significance of trust for the management of the EU as a 
polity, i.e., its potential as a renewed constitutionalism for a modern Union.  In doing so, he 
successively attempts to uncover the actual meaning and scope of mutual trust as ‘raison d’être’ of an 
increasingly cooperative EU legal system and to appreciate how mutual trust both informs and 
supports the dynamics of EU law and of European integration in general. 
This introduction cannot do justice, of course, to the richness of the individual contributions 
included in this collective working paper, which you are now warmly invited to discover on your own.  
As noted, by ‘mapping mutual trust’, the overall ambition of this project has been to enrich the 
ongoing conversation about trust and the function(s) thereof in the EU legal system, possibly allowing 
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for the beginning of a conceptualization.  In the end, a common theme underlying the authors’ 
contributions associates the growing prominence of mutual trust with an evolution in the nature of the 
EU legal system and its development as a ‘system of systems’ predominantly concerned with the 
coordination of national substantive norms rather than the shaping of common solutions.  Hence, this 
project can be viewed as part of a wider conversation about the nature and shape of transnational law 
and thus potentially of interest to scholars beyond the field of EU legal studies.          
In closing, this project could not have materialized without the support of the Max Weber 
Programme of the European University Institute (EUI) and of the Veni-grant awarded to Evelien 
Brouwer by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research’s (NWO).  Likewise, we are grateful 
to Franz Leander Fillafer and Megan Andrew, both Max Weber Fellows at the EUI, for their active 
contribution to the organization of the workshop on which this paper elaborates.  The invaluable 
assistance of Ognjen Aleksic in handling the logistics of that event is also duly acknowledged, and so 
is the patience of Alyson Price (EUI) and dedication of Nadia Tielemans in editing and formatting this 
manuscript. We trust that they will all find here a genuine testimony of our profound gratitude. 
Finally, please note that all contributions to this working paper were finalized in December 2015. 
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Mutual Trust in the History of Ideas 
Franz Leander Fillafer 
 
 
While their historical pedigree is much longer, conceptions of mutual trust became essential to all 
early modern schemes of the sociopolitical order from the sixteenth century onward: they cut across a 
variety of conceptual environments, from the foundations of contract law and the practices of credit, 
lending and liability over arguments in favour of altruism/supererogation and modes of social conduct 
(dissimulazione onesta as in the title of Torquato Accetto's tract of 16411). The nexus between self-
interest and mutual trust forms the centrepiece of the theory of moral sentiments as it developed in the 
eighteenth century; it gradually came to permeate the political economy, the study of natural religion, 
and the study of law. With the advent of nineteenth-century sociology trust-based societal 
relationships and the management of social expectations became significant areas of study in their own 
right; during the twentieth century, theories of democratic representation focused on the psychosocial 
prerequisites of interpersonal trust and its incorporation into symbolic orders of the political. It should 
be added that mutual trust also remains a contested term in current political semantics and electoral 
campaining: the self-sufficient citizen needs neither to be spoonfed moral messages, nor is there a 
need for exhortations or government regulatory overkill. Emma Bonino, former EU commissioner and 
member of the Partito Radicale, made this the lead message of her campaign when she ran for the 
regional presidency of Lazio some years ago in a clever twist of politicians' trust-mongering: 'Ti puoi 
fidare.'2    
A look at the history of mutual trust reveals two developmental traits: first, the slow change 
regarding the question who is to be trusted, and second, the fact that the history of trust is a history of 
the containment of distrust. A look at the first layer shows that God loomed large here, that is: the 
reasonable expectation that God's ways were not inscrutable, that divine rewards and retribution were 
predictable, and hence that a life following divine commandments would lead to the recompense of 
salvation. This belief was a cornerstone both of moral theology and of the theories of the social realm. 
With the slow demise of theology, interpersonal relationships of trust came to challenge the 
supremacy of the trust in God, but this did not diminish the belief in the divine authorship of the 
ubiquitous and constant norms of these interpersonal trust-relationships.3 Hence it became an 
increasingly arduous task to relate divine design to social praxis, and this applied to both law and 
theology. A parallel sequence could be seen in the switch from relationships of fealty and protection 
that characterised the early modern relationship between lords and subjects4 to 'trust' among citizens 
conceptualised as equal before the law. The second component, the history of alleviating or confining 
distrust is a history of anticipation in the sense of recriprocal advanced credit, of what one might call 
crédit mutuel. 
                                                     
 Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute and Research Fellow, Leibniz Programme Global Processes, Universität 
Konstanz. 
1 Rosario Vilari, Elogio della dissimulazione. La lotta politica nel Seicento, Roma 2003. 
2 [http://archivio.panorama.it/italia/Regionali-Lazio-Emma-Bonino-apre-comitato-Ti-puoi-fidare] (12 June 2015) 
3 It would be rewarding to show in detail how the belief in the divine authorship of these trust relationships outlived the 
earlier conception about 'labour' as a divine chastisement of mankind, a byproduct of original sin. Here it would be 
crucial to clarify how the assumption that the regulated pursuit of wants followed only this-worldly lawful sequences of 
work, reward, and calculation, continued to hinge on older theological-anthropological presuppositions about human 
interaction. See the prompters in Bernhard Groethuysen, Die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensauffassung in 
Frankreich, 2 vols., Halle an der Saale, 1927–1930, II, pp. 93–104.    
4 See Gadi Algazi, Herrengewalt und Gewalt der Herren im späten Mittelalter. Herrschaft, Gegenseitigkeit und 
Sprachgebrauch, Frankfurt am Main 1996.  
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The two aspects of the theme are nicely linked in Thomas Hobbes' remark in his 1642 De 
Cive. Taking up a formulation from Plautus' Asinaria that had previously been restated by Erasmus, 
Francisco de Vitoria and John Owen, Hobbes observes: ‘Profecto utrumque verò dictum est, Homo 
Homini Deus & Homo Homini Lupus. Illud si concives inter se; Hoc si civitates comparemus.’5 
Hereby, Hobbes throws into relief the double meaning of trust, trust between citizens and trust 
between states, the principles governing interpersonal and international relations. Another emblematic 
fusion of both aspects is represented by the crest of the U.S. great seal emblazoned on the dollar notes. 
Twentieth-century dirges over the demise of interpersonal 'trust' in society unwittingly reproduce 
previous concerns. 
The core element of reciprocity in 'mutual trust' establishes a system of social expectabilities. 
It was either conceptualised as hinging on the liberum arbitrium, the freedom of choice, or on 
behavioural routines that ensure the predictability of modes of conduct (the latter can be regarded as 
resting on a social configuration, that is: they can be acquired through adaptation and learning, or they 
can be perceived as being religiously induced). Since antiquity, different conceptual solutions were 
offered to tackle this problem, among them the Stoic kathikonta/καθήκοντα and the mos majorum, 
ancestral custom, referred to both under the Roman Republic and under the principate. Structurally 
speaking, the conception of trust operates at the frontier between thysia logike/rationiabilis oblatio, an 
interiorised cult which serves to prescribe duties towards others on the one hand, and the expectability 
of modes of behaviour that are socially sanctioned or inculcated either by customs or by law. The 
latter component, the duties toward others, became a core element of the natural law tradition, 
enshrined in the concept officia erga alios. It functioned in a tripartite sequence of duties, together 
with the officia erga Deum and the officia seipsum.6 
Two main elements of early modern and modern conceptualisations of trust can be distilled 
out of these discussions: the tension between the principle of the will and the principle of trust in 
contract law, and the nature of law as a system of duties, or rather as a system of liberties.7 Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz's ideas on damage compensation, collusion, on the relationship between warrantor 
and warrantee as well as on elements of statutory acts and on the suability of a pactum nudum resonate 
with these questions. He redefined the Roman law-reliance on types and contracts, giving leverage to 
the principle of equity and proportionality. In maintaining that liability arose only from a contract, not 
from a mere promise (pactum nudum), Leibniz used Aristotle's notion synallagma 
(συνάλλαγμα/commutatio) as understood by the medieval theory of causae, to clarify that only the 
mutuality of a legal relationships could yield claims that had to be settled.8 
The confrontation between law as a system of liberties and law as a system of duties can be 
highlighted by looking at the epistemic culture that derived its cues from Christian Wolff, polymath 
professor in Halle and Magdeburg who had imbibed the pure milk of the scholastic tradition (sufficient 
reason, praedicatum inest subjecto, principle of non-contradiction).9 Post-Wolffian natural law 
redesigned the architecture of obligations in one crucial respect: whereas with Wolff legal guarantees 
had hinged on a citizens' justifiable expectations that his fellow citizens would abide by the reciprocal 
                                                     
5 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive [Paris 1642]. The Latin version entitled in the first edition Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia 
de cive and in later editions Elementa philosophica de cive, hg. v. Howard Warrender, Oxford 1983, 73; François 
Tricaud, 'Homo homini Deus', 'Homo homini Lupus': Recherche des Sources de deux Formules de Hobbes, in: Reinhart 
Koselleck, Roman Schnur (Hg.), Hobbes-Forschungen, Berlin 1969, pp. 61–70.   
6 C.f. for instance Christiani Wolffi Jus Naturæ methodo scientifica pertractatum pars sexta, de dominio utili in specie de 
feudo, accedit doctrina de interpretatione, De Jure ex Communione primæva residuo, de Officiis erga Mortuos, nondum 
Natos & Posteros noc Eruditorum, et nunc primum cum Viri Cl. De Vattel animadversionibus, editio novissima 
emendatior, et auctior, Francofurti–Lipsiae 1766, § 576, p. 204.   
7 Klaus-Peter Nanz, Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Vertragsbegriffs im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert, Munich 1985, pp. 67, 143. 
8 Klaus Luig, Leibniz und die Prinzipien des Vertragsrechts, in: Jean-François Kervegan, Heinz Mohnhaupt (eds.), 
Gesellschaftliche Freiheit und vertragliche Bindung in Rechtsgeschichte und Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 
75–93, 77. 
9 Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung von Seidenheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des 
Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Hamburg 1990, 297. 
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duties imposed by natural or positive law in their various pursuits, with Kantian lawyers the content of 
the law was changed to encompass guarantees of freedom and its realisation, interestingly tied up with 
the Kantian presumption of a constant and ubiquitous moral law that resembled the laws that allegedly 
ruled over nature.10 
The eighteenth century witnessed three further major complications when it came to the 
anthropological and economic elaboration of mutual trust:  
1.   The Augustinian-Jansenist tradition within the Christian confessions criss-crossed 
with the neo-Epicurean elaboration of the problem around 1700: Both held that man's depravity and 
instinctual yearning for self-gratification was incurable, but that there in fact existed an allocative 
'natural' scheme that coordinated the myriad pursuits of private vices so as to add up to a predictable 
final result.11 While the salvational or eschatological destinations this system was believed to lead up 
to differed – culminating in final retribution, 'public benefits', or just distribution respectively – they 
both implied that mutual trust had to be reconceptualised in a specific sense. These advances 
reinforced other simultaneously available idioms and together with them they resulted in shattering the 
Stoic-Christian belief in the universality and immutability of morality and in the social contract as 
foundation of the political order..12 If morality was an artificial, man-made contrivance, and if there 
was no irrepressible appetitus societatis (οἰκείωσις) that spurred men to form societies,13 the basic 
presuppositions for conceptualising trust had to be interrogated and reconceptualised.   
2.   Simultaneously 'trust' increasingly came to be regarded as a precious economic good14 
that was being traded in arbitrage deals, highly volatile future transactions, and fictitious barters. The 
fact that trust played a pivotal role in the marketplace, that the management of expectations became 
crucial to stock exchange speculation and investment calculations became obvious with the so-called 
South Sea Bubble of 1720. The British government had founded the South Sea company to 
consolidate its national debt. Despite there being no significant profit from its trade monopoly with the 
Caribbean granted by royal charter, the value of company stocks soared, and annuities created after the 
1710 state lottery were converted into South Sea company stock to diminish national debt. With the 
bankruptcy of the company whose purpose was revealed to have consisted in insider trading and 
advance purchases of national debts (company members used their knowledge of when debt was to be 
consolidated to fork out enormous profits), hopes set on this kind of investment scheme and 
refinancing model floundered.15 
                                                     
10 C.f. Franz Leander Fillafer, Franz von Zeiller und der Kantianismus in der Rechtswissenschaft, in: Violetta L. Waibel 
(ed.), Umwege. Annäherungen an Immanuel Kant in Wien, in Österreich und in Osteuropa, Vienna–Göttingen 2015, pp. 
101–112, 146–151.  
11 See Pierre Force, Augustinisme et libéralisme, in: Jean Dagen, Anne-Sophie Barrovecchio (eds.), Voltaire et le Grand 
Siècle [SVEC 10 (2006)], Oxford 2006, pp. 377–385; Henri Gouhier, La crise de la théologie au temps de Descartes, in: 
Revue de Théologie et Philosophie (sér. 3) 4 (1954), pp. 19–54; Dale van Kley, Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the 
Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest, in: Alan Kors, Paul Korshin (eds.), Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, 
France and Germany, Philadelphia 1987, pp. 69–85, 72; Ed Hundert, The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville 
and the Discovery of Society, Cambridge 2005. 
Dmitri Levitin recently formulated a tremendously well informed and trenchant critique of the overemphasis on 
Epicureanism as the only source of 'scepticism' and 'developmentalism' that is all too often dissociated sharply from 
allegedly 'pre-enlightened' beliefs in 'divine intervention'. See Dmitri Levitin, Egyptology, the Limits of Antiquarianism, 
and the Origins of Conjectural History, c. 1680–1740. New Sources and Perspectives,  
[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01916599.2014.989677] (12 June 2015), pp. 26–27. 
13 Compare Platon, Protagoras, 320d, [320δ] οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἱμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν 
αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς 
ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθέα δὲ 
παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, ‘νείμαντος δέ μου,’ ἔφη, ‘ἐπίσκεψαι:’ καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν 
ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν. C.f. Benjamin Straumann, Appetitus societatis and oikeosis: Hugo Grotius' Ciceronian 
Argument for Natural Law and Just War, in: Grotiana 24–26 (2003/2004), pp. 41–66. 
14 See Fn. 3 above.  
15 See John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, London 1983; Helen Julia Paul, The South Sea Bubble: An Economic History of 
its Origins and Consequences, London 2010.   
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At the same time the Paris Contrôleur Général des Finances, businessman John Law of 
Lauriston, the twelfth child of an Edinburgh goldsmith, set in motion in France his model which was 
to ensure trust, that is: public confidence (confiance) in the royal credit.16 A constant flow of credit 
schemes combined with the emission of paper money and the (intermittent) abolition of the gold coin 
ensued. Soon the panicky exchange of specie for notes, the excessive manipulation of the currency and 
the fluctuation of the value of the money led to the general inability of controlling prices and wages. 
This development was taken to dissolve all accountability, all public trust in the French body politic. 
Words and concepts themselves were divested of their meanings, and citizen-subjects were bereft of 
the means to make determinations of value themselves.17 The lawyer and littérateur Barthélémy 
Mouffle d'Angerville observed that Law's system had produced 'the desired effect, that of so upsetting 
all principles, obfuscating all lumières, changing all notions, that one no longer knew what to hold on 
to; one allowed oneself to act on the impulse of the government.'18 Hence Law's system with its 
destruction of trust became emblematic for the rule of despotic princely caprice. But it also elicited a 
new sense of the future, of anticipating value adjustments and of speculation.19 In 1726, soon after 
Law's experiment, Jonathan Swift published his Gulliver's Travels and made his protagonist encounter 
the academy of 'projectors', fumblers and dabblers who keep the island kingdom Lagado in a state of 
grinding poverty. This unflattering account was clearly inspired by the recent experience with bubble-
makers and cheats.20 
3.   Adam Smith is mainly known for his work on The Wealth of Nations. Smith was 
misconstrued as the saccharine hero of economic liberalism by his self-appointed legatees in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.21 The Theory of Moral Sentiments developed by Adam Smith is 
primarily concerned with questions of mutual trust, that is, with how the freedom of the members of 
society to form their own moral commitments can be reconciled with their responsibilities toward their 
fellow men. Evidently, Smith did not explain the origins and reproducibility of trust by decomposing 
social interaction into discrete games as contemporary social theory prefers to do. Smith, like his 
Scottish contemporary David Hume, was interested in how dispositions toward trust can be sustained 
among self-interested individuals. In his economic writings Smith deduced trust from the inviolacy of 
property which he saw as a prerequisite of the commercial society whose origins he traced back to 
cities. Smith opposed municipal self-government to the fickle and arbitrary rule in rural and feudal 
contexts. From this starting point Smith developed a notion of trust understood as reliability and 
expectability (of profit, that is) among self-interested actors engaged in the prudent pursuit of artificial 
wants. Yet this concept of trust was inextricably connected with the issue of social approval. Smith 
strongly emphasises the mutuality of the moral sentiment of trust: 'Frankness and openness conciliate 
confidence. We trust the man who seems willing to trust us. We see clearly, we think, the road by 
which he means to conduct us, and we abandon ourselves with pleasure to his guidance and 
direction.'22 This perspective has an eminently political gist, as Smith connects it to the ‘pleasure of 
conversation and society’ which in turn encourages the ‘free communication of sentiments and 
opinions.’23 Smith then goes on to link this to the overarching phenomenon of sympathy: ‘We all 
desire, upon this account, to feel how each other is affected, to penetrate into each other's bosoms, and 
                                                     
16 Thomas E. Kaiser, Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France: John Law and the Debate on 
Public Credit, in: Journal of Modern History 63 (1991), pp. 1–28. 
17 Kaiser, Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion, p. 22. 
18 Quoted in Kaiser, Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion, idem. 
19 Marcel Marion, Un essai de politique social en 1724, in: Revue du dix-huitième siècle 1 (1913), pp. 28–42. 
20 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels [1726], part III, intr. by Claude Rawson, expl. notes by Ian Higgins, Oxford 1986, pp. 
167–179. C.f. Thomas Brandstetter, Windmacherey. Frühe Dampfmaschinen als Projekte (1695–1725), in: Markus 
Krajewski (ed.), Projektemacher. Zur Produktion von Wissen in der Vorform des Scheiterns, Berlin 2004, pp. 79–94. 
21 See Duncan Forbes, Scientific Whiggism. Adam Smith and John Millar, in: Cambridge Journal 7 (1953-54), pp. 39–50; 
Donald Winch, Adam Smith's Politics. An Essay in Historiographic Revision, Cambridge 1978. 
22 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge 2002, p. 399 (Chapter II, 28) 
23 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, idem.  
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to observe the sentiments and affections which really subsist there.’ Reciprocity is key here because it 
allows us to infer from observation kindred sentiments in others and to then establish self-observation 
as a substitute for interpersonal approval and disapproval; this process of substitution, in turn, 
establishes human 'conscience'. 
The textbook narrative, prone as it is coarse over-simplification, posits that the nineteenth-
century discussion on mutual trust shifted the emphasis from 'nature' to 'society'.24 Yet the changes that 
gave rise to the 'sociology' of trust relations are more surreptitious. Early nineteenth-century students 
of society inflected and refracted previous preoccupations of the study of nature by modifying their 
scope and by nesting them in new environments of explication.25 A brief look at Auguste Comte's 
sociology shows that two issues loom large here: The role of 'natural' relationships, that is, the 
relations imparted or informed by 'nature' in the social realm on the one hand, and the model of the 
study of nature that served as a model of causational sequences and predictable results on the other. 
Comte, who clearly spelled out that there is no social life without trust, devoted notes on the matter 
that encapsulate both strands, but he also saw trust at work in three more respects. Comte deems trust 
indispensable for upholding the public prestige of the findings of the group entitled to lead society: the 
new clergy of positivist scientists that would replace the previous elite of theologians. According to 
Comte, the uneducated public 'trusts' science in the same way it trusted the old theologians and the 
truths they had in store; at the same time, for Comte trust permeated society in the sense that it made 
partition of labour possible because of the mutual expectation of proficiency that held sway. The third 
facet is the history of scientific enquiry: theology, while faulty in its conclusions, imbued men with 
trust, with the belief that the secrets of nature could be unravelled, that the apparently enigmatic world 
followed invariable, constant patterns of law-like regularities. As an unintended consequence, this 
development sparked modern science.26   
Let me conclude this very preliminary sketch of the problem of mutual trust in the history of 
ideas with a few general remarks. It has become clear that the historical perspective does not only lend 
further nuance to the talk about trust, it throws into sharp relief the malleability of the notion that 
should be conceived more as a moral-political iteration or vector than as a concept of ironclad 
coherence. The previous pages offered no more than a superficial foray whose main purpose was to 
highlight how 'trust' became connected to different anthropological equivalents, imputed naturalities 
and functional substitutes across history, as well as how it concomitantly came to carry rival 
conceptual freights. It befits the subject and the line of enquiry pursued in the preceding pages to 
choose a vignette from the 1960s as a concluding twist to the story whose barest outline I have tried to 
present.  
In 1965 philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, much fêted and maligned philosopher of the 
Frankfurt school, eminent theoretician of the 'culture industry' met the sociologist Arnold Gehlen in a 
radio studio. In this broadcasted conversation – a transcript is available in print – Gehlen, the theorist 
of safeguarding 'institutions' that were designed to mollify and de-escalate social frictions and 
tensions, maintained that only these Institutionen can ensure the existence of social ties in an otherwise 
atomised and technicised society. Gehlen emphasized that the value of the institution consisted in 
inculcating trust. In response to this Adorno contended that institutions as Gehlen conceptualised them 
merely perpetuated and camouflaged the underdiagnosed core problem, the universalisation of the 
barter principle (Tauschprinzip) in society that leads to commensurability and identicality.27 
                                                     
24 Critical prompters in Carlo Antoni, Dallo storicismo alla sociologia, Firenze 1940; idem, La lotta contro la ragione, 
Firenze 1942.  
25 See Carolina Armenteros, The French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and his Heirs, 1794–1854, Ithaca NY 2011, pp. 
262–263; Mary Pickering, Auguste Comte. An Intellectual Biography, II, Cambridge 2009, p. 71.  
26 Werner Fuchs-Heinritz, Auguste Comte: Einführung in Leben und Werk, Wiesbaden 1998, 224, 90–91, 101; Eckart 
Pankoke, Sociale Bewegung, sociale Frage, sociale Politik. Grundfragen der deutschen 'Socialwissenschaft' im 19. 
Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1973. 
27 Adalbert Stifter refered to this principle as 'Wechselmarter', the ineluctable, torturing curse of 'Erwerben' and 'Verzehren', 
Adalbert Stifter, Wien und die Wiener in Bildern aus dem Leben (1844). Zwölf Beiträge, edition and commentary by 
Elisabeth Buxbaum, Vienna 2005, 11.  
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Apparently innocuous and desirable 'mutuality' can therefore easily become a stepping stone for the 
uniformising 'totality' Adorno seeks to lay bare. This reduction of individuality is intimately connected 
to citizens' internalised expectations of sanctioned conduct and to their fears of being rendered 
dispensable in society. Thus the formalised, straitjacketing techniques of the 'institutions' are a 
problem that looms large in Adorno's reflections. Hence when Gehlen intimates that only 'institutions' 
can imbue us with trust and thereby safe us from alienation and dispair, Adorno wryly retorted with a 
quote from the nineteenth-century German playwright Christian Dietrich Grabbe: 'Only despair can 
safe us.'28 
 
                                                     
28 Ist die Soziologie eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen? Ein Streitgespräch zwischen Theodor W. Adorno und Arnold Gehlen 
vom Südwestfunk aufgenommen und vom Sender SFB (Sender Freies Berlin) am 3.2.1965 gesendet / vom 
Norddeutschen Rundfunk (NDR) in seinem dritten Programm am 21.3.1965 gesendet, in: Friedemann Grenz: Adornos 
Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme, Frankfurt am Main 1974, 224–251, 251. 
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The Single Market: Does Mutual Trust Suffice? 
Jukka Snell* 
 
 
In this paper, I am going to make the following argument: we have attempted to use mutual trust and 
the consequent principle of mutual recognition to build the EU internal market. However, it seems to 
me that this will only get us so far. If we wish to move from the internal market that frankly does not 
seem to be working terribly well to an economic union, we need to move beyond a model that is based 
on mutual trust and instead get back to the old fashioned business of harmonization. To make this 
argument, I will go through the main stages in the evolution of the single market of the European 
Union step by step, starting from the common market, moving on to the internal market and finishing 
with the notion of economic union. 
In the original common market model of economic integration of the 1950s mutual trust did 
not play any kind of major operational role. It was undoubtedly there in the background, for example 
explaining why integration was pursued among the six rather than on a broader, more global scale. In 
the words of the Spaak Report, ‘the common market can be only regional, i.e, established between 
States which feel themselves close enough to each other to bring into their legislation the appropriate 
adjustments and to insist upon the necessary solidarity in their policies’.1 Yet when it came to the 
actual achievement of the common market, it was all about detailed harmonization by the political 
institutions. There was an isolated reference to mutual recognition of diplomas in Article 57(1) EEC, 
but that was a footnote in the wider programme. 
In the 1970s the approach changed both institutionally and substantively.2 Following the 
demonstrated inability of the Community political institutions to create the common market, the Court 
of Justice took the institutional lead through its case law from Dassonville and van Binsbergen 
onwards.3 Substantively, it based the law on the idea of mutual recognition founded on mutual trust in 
cases such as Cassis de Dijon and van Wesemael, and later for example in Säger.4  
It is worth noting the kind of mutual trust and recognition the Court had in mind. Cassis de 
Dijon was of course about the import of French blackcurrant liqueur from France to Germany, where 
the product fell foul of the German law requiring at least 25 % alcoholic strength for fruit liqueurs.  
The question was whether this violated free movement of goods, given that there was no obvious 
discrimination, since the law imposed the same minimum alcohol requirements on both domestic and 
imported drinks. The Court said that this kind of obstacle resulting from differences between the 
national laws violated what is now Art 34 TFEU, unless there was a good and proportionate 
justification for the national rule, say due to the need to protect consumers. 
In Cassis, the Court imposed a qualified duty of mutual recognition, based on qualified mutual 
trust. On the one hand, Germany could not reject the French liqueur out of hand just because it was 
different. This would violate free movement of goods. On the other hand, Germany was not obliged to 
accept it without more either. If it had good cause, it could indeed reject the imported product. It was 
not allowed to automatically distrust the foreign but neither did it have to automatically trust it. 
Germany was under the duty to consider the foreign and then give reasons for a possible rejection, 
subject to judicial review. Some mutual trust yes, but in a highly qualified form. 
                                                     
*Professor of Law, University of Turku and Swansea University 
1 Report of the Heads of Delegation to the Foreign Ministers at the Messina Conference, 21 April 1956, translated by JP 
Farrar, at 5. 
2 See also AJ Menéndez, 'The Existential Crisis of the European Union' (2013)14 German LJ 453 at 471-484. 
3 Case 8/74, Dassonville, EU:C:1974:82 and Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, EU:C:1974:131. 
4 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, EU:C:1979:42, Joined Cases 110 and 111/78, 
Van Wesemael, EU:C:1979:8, Case C-76/90, Säger, EU:C:1991:331. 
Evelien Brouwer and Damien Gerard (eds) 
12 
The Cassis approach formed the basis of the 1980s Single European Act creation of the 
internal market.5 Unfortunately, we now know that this has not been terribly successful. When things 
such as convergence in labour productivity, wage dispersion, or trade within countries as opposed to 
between countries are measured, the European market does not look particularly well integrated.6 This 
is especially pronounced in services, which of course dominate modern economies but only occupy a 
small slice of intra-EU trade,7 and it seems that some of the advances have actually been rolled back 
during the eurocrisis.8 
Why the relative lack of success? There are undoubtedly ‘natural’ causes, such as spontaneous 
networks that have arisen domestically but do not stretch across borders, language barriers, transport 
costs, and so on. Yet it also seems likely that an approach founded on qualified mutual trust may only 
lead to limited market integration. In practice, many of the key stakeholders may be inclined to distrust 
and rely on the exceptions to mutual trust. 9 
First, from the business perspective the current approach is not optimal. While mutual trust 
leading to mutual recognition is fine in theory, in practice, its application leaves a lot to be desired. 
National authorities still act as guardians of market access, and can deny mutual recognition on the 
basis of the derogations written in the Treaty, such as the needs of public policy, or on the basis of 
exceptions developed in the case law, such as consumer or environmental protection. In other words, 
an attempt by a company to penetrate the market of another country may be frustrated by the 
insistence of the host state officials that local rules be obeyed because the rules of the home country do 
not in their view offer sufficient protection for non-economic interests. In the absence of actual trust, 
recognition may be denied. Whether such a requirement is lawful depends on the proportionality of the 
host country rule. This is very difficult to predict in advance and can only be tested in costly and 
lengthy litigation. As a result, for a company it may be easier just to follow the local rule than to rely 
on European rights.10 
For national governments, the mutual trust model creates at least two types of difficulty. The 
national publics expect states to protect them from environmental degradation, substandard products 
and so on. If there is a problem, for example a food scandal, the national government may get blamed. 
Yet those governments have now given up their ability to control fully products that are sold in their 
country. They might find themselves bearing the responsibility for things that they cannot affect. 
Further, the kind of competition the single market model entails may be branded unfair. National 
companies on the losing end might blame their lack of success on the various ‘unfair’ regulatory 
advantages that foreign competitors enjoy, such as lower standards or wages, and demand protection. 
Under European law such protection is likely to be illegal. This could leave the national decision 
makers between the rock of domestic public opinion that expects the government to protect local 
companies and the hard place of EU rules that outlaw it. As a result, the obligation to mutually 
recognize may convert governments to the cause of harmonisation. 
For organized interest groups, such as trade unions or environmental groups, the idea of 
mutual trust and the resulting principle of mutual recognition represents a threat. The principle 
                                                     
5 The Commission was an important intermediary between the Court and the Treaty change. See in particular Commission 
communication concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice in 20 February 1979 in Case 
120/78 (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1980] O.J. C 256/2 and Commission White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ 
COM(85) 310 final. 
6 See, e.g., Europe Economics, ‘Optimal integration in the single market: A synoptic review’ April 2013, A Europe 
Economics report for BIS and C Pacchioli, 'Is the EU internal market suffering from an integration deficit? Estimating the 
‘‘home-bias effect’’' (2011) CEPS Working Document 348. 
7 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘Extended impact assessment of the proposal for a directive on services in the 
internal market’ SEC(2004) 21. 
8 See Commission Communication, 'A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a 
European Debate' COM(2012) 777 final on the re-fragmentation of financial markets. 
9 Next three paragraphs draw heavily on J Snell, ‘The internal market and the philosophies of market integration’ in C 
Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10 J Pelkmans, 'Mutual recognition in goods: on promises and disillusions' (2007) 14 JEPP 699. 
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potentially allows regulatory competition to take place. This can undermine the labour or 
environmental standards that the groups are committed to. Even if fierce regulatory competition fails 
to start, the balance of power between organized interest groups and industry may be altered. The 
industry is provided with the ability to threaten relocation in the absence of domestic reforms. In other 
words, the industry can tell the government or trade unions that without changes, such as greater 
labour market flexibility, future investment decisions will be directed at other parts of the EU.11 
As a result of the dissatisfaction with mutual recognition, there have been attempts to move 
beyond the qualified mutual trust system in a major way. The most prominent of these was the attempt 
to liberalize the services market in one fell swoop with the Services Directive, which included the 
famous country-of-origin principle subject only to limited exceptions. This met fierce resistance, and 
the Directive was watered down.12 There was no political will to move beyond the qualified form of 
mutual trust for a broad range of service sectors, although it needs to be noted that narrower, more 
targeted initiatives have been successful.13 
In this context, the enlargement of the Union is a significant factor. The expansions of 2004 
and thereafter brought into the EU a large number of countries that were at quite a different level of 
economic development from the existing Member States. This brought heightened competition, which 
in turn resulted in economic insecurity, in particular when the labour cost differences between some of 
the new and old Member States were very substantial. Further, empirical studies showed that with 
enlargement mutual trust was at least temporarily undermined.14 
So where are we? We have an internal market that is at the most fundamental level still based 
on qualified mutual trust emerging from Cassis de Dijon. This has resulted in some economic 
integration. Is this good enough? Should we accept that the internal market is not going to be perfect, 
given the constraints, and perhaps should never be perfect, given that European countries and societies 
are still so different from one another? An argument can be put forward to the effect that diverse 
Member States need equally diverse rules, and that decentralization carries virtues, for example in 
terms of learning processes and the ability to innovate, that centralized rulemaking suppresses.15  
Despite such arguments, in my view, the current state of affairs is not acceptable. This is 
because we have decided to make the fateful decision to adopt the single currency. The euro is closely 
connected with the internal market, and some of its problems are the result of imperfections in the 
single market. The single currency has spillback effects that require the strengthening of the internal 
market.  
I will make only one point here. One of the key problems that contributed to the crisis were 
the real estate bubbles that developed in some Member States, notably Spain and Ireland. In those 
countries the combination of a low interest rate set by the European Central Bank and the high 
domestic inflation meant that the real interest rate was very low. This fuelled property booms. Since 
the real interest rate was low, it made sense for people to buy second homes, investment properties and 
so on. Now if the internal market had worked better, those economies should have automatically 
cooled down. High domestic inflation means that the products and services of local companies get 
more expensive and they lose their market position. This leads to job losses and puts a dampener on an 
overheating economy. Economists say that a real exchange channel is working. However, in the 
European reality of an incomplete single market this did not take place. Instead the real interest rate 
                                                     
11 See C Barnard, 'Social dumping and the race to the bottom: some lessons for the European Union from Delaware?' (2000) 
25 ELRev 57 
12 Directive (EC) 2006/123 of the European Parliament and Council on services in the internal market [2006] O.J. L 376/36. 
13 See, e.g., Case C-260/13, Aykul, EU:C:2015:257 paras 45-47 detailing the obligations of Member States under Directive 
2006/126/EC on driving licences [2006] O.J. L 408/18. 
14 For an empirical assessment, see J Delhey, ‘Do enlargements make the European Union less cohesive? An analysis of 
mutual trust between EU nationalities’ (2007) 45 JCMS 253.  
15 For an attempt to make such an argument, J Snell, 'Who's Got the Power? Free Movement and Allocation of Competences 
in EC Law' (2003) 22 YEL 323 
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channel proved dominant.16 As we know, the result was a boom followed by a crash. Given that we 
remain committed to the troubled single currency, it seems to me that we need to work to improve the 
internal market. It is no accident that serious proposals for resolving the eurocrisis tend to start from 
strengthening the internal market – we need to move towards a genuine economic union.17 
In fact, some of this has already taken place in the context of financial services and banking 
sectors.18 In the late 1980s and early 1990s these were the poster boys for mutual trust. Every country 
regulated and supervised its own banks and financial service providers, which were granted single 
passports that allowed them to operate within the whole EU. During the crisis, it became clear that 
mutual trust was not always warranted. Supervision had not always been sufficiently rigorous and 
sometimes domestic authorities had become much too close to the institutions they were supposed to 
supervise. Today, we have a system that is much more centralised in character. We have European 
supervisory authorities and single rulebooks. Instead of mutual trust in national authorities and rules, 
we have moved towards European authorities and rules. This is particularly pronounced in the case of 
the eurozone where, as a part of the building of the banking union, the European Central Bank has 
taken a strong role in banking supervision.19 
To sum up, my argument has been that a qualified form of mutual trust has been at the heart of 
European market integration since the 1970s, but this has resulted in an imperfect single market. If we 
wish to move to an economic union that can support the single currency, it seems to me that we may 
need to return to a system that is based more on harmonization and European rules and less on mutual 
trust, which in any event seems to be in short supply in today’s EU.20  
If the argument set above is correct, difficult questions arise given that not all Member States 
of the EU participate in the euro. If the single currency necessitates a genuine economic union, how 
does this square with the position of the countries that remain outside the Eurozone and may well 
prefer a looser internal market? Legal battles have already commenced with the UK and Sweden 
seeking to safeguard the interests of their financial sectors in the context of the deepening integration 
within the Eurozone. This is evident for EU legislation, where the adoption of certain important 
measures by the European Banking Authority now requires a double majority both of countries 
participating in the single supervisory mechanism of the banking union and of countries outside the 
single currency.21 It can also be seen in the case law, where the attempt by the European Central Bank 
to insist that central counterparties involved in certain clearing operations had to be based in the 
Eurozone was successfully contested by the UK, supported by Sweden.22 In any event, the issue is 
likely to remain prominent on the political agenda, given the stated aim of the UK government to 
obtain safeguards for British businesses in the preparation for a referendum on EU membership.23 The 
nature of European economic integration remains contested.   
                                                     
16 See H Enderlein et al, Completing the Euro: A Road Map towards Fiscal Union in Europe – Report of the ‘Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa Group’ (Paris: Notre Europe, 2012). 
17 See, e.g., H Van Rompuy et al, 'Towards a genuine economic and monetary union' 5 December 2012. 
18 See N Moloney, 'EU financial market regulation after the global financial crisis: ‘‘more Europe’’ or more risks?' (2010) 47 
CMLRev 1317.  
19 See K Alexander, ‘European banking union: a legal and institutional analysis of the single supervisory mechanism and the 
single resolution mechanism’ (2015) 40 ELRev 154. 
20 What then is the relationship between mutual trust and harmonization on a more fundamental level? On the one hand, 
Damien Gerard directed me to the argument that mutual trust is a precondition for harmonization, and that harmonization 
allows mutual trust to deliver on its potential and become effective. On the other hand, it could also be claimed that trust 
makes detailed rules unnecessary and it is the absence of trust that requires the writing of precise laws and the setting up 
of an effective enforcement mechanism. My view is that there is some truth in both assertions. Without any mutual trust, 
the process of economic integration would not have got anywhere. Yet it is the lack of complete trust that necessitates 
many of the cumbersome features of the EU. 
21 Regulation 1022/2013 [2013] O.J. L 287/5, Art 44 as amended. 
22 Case T-496/11, UK v ECB, EU:T:2015:133. 
23 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum. 
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Mutual Trust and the Limits of Abolishing Exequatur in Civil Justice 
Eva Storskrubb* 
 
 
The purpose of my contribution is to provide some reflexions on mutual trust in the context of the 
policy area ‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’1 that has been part of the broader EU project of 
creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) since the Amsterdam Treaty.2 ‘Civil justice’ 
is used to designate that policy area in this contribution.3 Mutual trust has appeared in the civil justice 
arena partly as an as adjunct concept of mutual recognition of judgments. My contribution therefore 
focuses on mutual trust in that context.4 Mutual recognition was formally introduced as a regulatory 
method and ‘cornerstone’ for civil justice in the Tampere European Council Conclusions5 and it was 
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty as a principle: ‘The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular 
through the principle of mutual recognition or judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters.’6   
After the Tampere Conclusions, the Council in 2001 developed a Programme for the 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition (the Programme).7 While the Brussels 
Convention of 1968 was the first measure to deal with recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
the EU,8 the Programme argued that mutual recognition of judgments had not yet had full effect and 
that barriers to the free movement of judgments remained, including the intermediate enforcement 
(exequatur) procedure.9 The Programme outlined a number of steps and measures to be taken in order 
ultimately to remove exequatur. With respect to measures aimed at supporting mutual recognition, the 
Programme noted:  
It will sometimes be necessary, or even essential, to lay down a number of procedural rules at 
European level, which will constitute common minimum guarantees intended to strengthen mutual 
trust between the Member States' legal systems. These guarantees will make it possible, inter alia, to 
ensure that the requirements for a fair trial are strictly observed, in keeping with the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’10 (underlining added)  
                                                     
* Marie Curie Post-doctoral Fellow, Uppsala Universitet. 
1 Art 81 TFEU. 
2 Title IV TFEU. 
3 Note though that ‘civil justice’ can be held to encompass also further and broader civil procedural developments in the EU 
such as the procedural rules for consumer or competition matters, see E Storskrubb, ‘Civil Justice – Constitutional and 
Regulatory Issues Revisited’ in M. Fletcher, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Matera (eds), The EU as an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, (Routledge, forthcoming). 
4 Another context is the case law of the CJEU on lis pendens, see X. Kramer, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-
Bis Regulation. Towards A New Balance Between Mutual Trust and National Control over Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 
NILR 60, 364-367. See also F. Blobel and P. Späth, ‘The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil 
Procedure’, ELRev., 2000, pp. 529-548 on lis pendens and anti-suit injunctions. A further context is choice of law rules, 
see M. Weller, ‘Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Union Private International Law’, Journal of Private 
International Law, 2015, pp. 75-81.   
5 European Council Conclusions No 200/1/99 para 33, available at 
      www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htma. 
6 Art 67(4) TFEU. See also Art 81(1) TFEU: ‘The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-
border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgements and of decisions in extra judicial cases.’ 
7 [2001] O.J. C 12/1, p 1.  
8 The Convention was replaced by the Brussels I-Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [2001] O.J. L 12/1, which has 
been replaced and repealed by the Brussels I-Regulation (recast), Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 [2012] O.J. L 351/1. 
9 See n 7  
10 See n 7 
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Thus, the underlying presumption was that for mutual recognition, i.e., for judgments to be 
able to circulate freely in the EU, there needs to be mutual trust between Member States based on 
some level of common procedural standards, including standards protecting fundamental procedural 
rights and fair trial.11 Many of the later policy documents adopted in the AFSJ context also refer to 
mutual trust. In the Stockholm Programme mutual trust was linked to ‘reliance’ and ‘understanding’: 
‘Ensuring trust and finding new ways to increase reliance on, and mutual understanding between, the 
different legal systems in the Member State will be one of the main challenges for the future’.12 
Subsequently, the un-named guidelines of the European Council providing the current overriding five-
year political direction for the AFSJ also refer to mutual trust and state that ‘…mutual trust in one 
another’s justice systems should be further enhanced’.13  
These documents indicate that mutual trust remains a central goal to be achieved today 
notwithstanding the existence of the ECHR and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights as well as a 
wealth of legislative instruments in civil justice enacted since the Tampere Conclusions and the 
Programme laid down in 2001. Significantly, the extract from the Programme as well as the quotes 
referred to above also imply that mutual trust goes further and deeper than simply having mutual or 
common procedural rules and legislative guarantees. Mutual trust includes a practical element, an 
assurance that procedural rights are safeguarded in practice.  
Below I touch upon the relevant legislative and case law developments to date to implement 
mutual recognition and its underlying presumption of mutual trust in civil justice, after which I revert 
to the current debate on mutual recognition and mutual trust. The purpose of these sections is to give a 
very brief account of what has happened in the context of civil justice, in order for this working paper 
to be able to highlight differences from and similarities with other fields and areas of development, in 
particular other policy fields of the AFSJ. The civil justice context is sometimes overlooked as a part 
of the AFSJ and the civil justice debate on mutual trust has emerged fairly recently. Thus, it is hoped 
that these sections will provide a useful backdrop as well as critical thoughts on the development and 
current status of mutual trust. Finally, in the conclusion I address whether civil justice is different from 
other fields of the AFSJ. 
 
Developments in legislation and case law  
It has been noted that:  
 
…the big problem…with the principle of mutual recognition or the idea of recognition is that it 
requires mutual trust’ and ‘[a] principle of recognition…requires in its extreme, that a domestic 
legal system allows for enforcement of judgments based on procedural rules and ideological 
values over which the Member State has no influence and very little knowledge.14  
 
The intermediary exequatur procedure including grounds of refusal such as public policy was 
traditionally a general safeguard against the unwanted effects of mutual recognition. Some level of 
trust has indeed always been implicit and inherent in private international law cooperation, as 
exemplified by the private international law understanding of the concept of international comity. 
                                                     
11 The cited statement in 2001 predated the Lisbon Treaty and thus was written at a time when the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights did not have binding force.  
12 [2010] O.J. C 115/1, p. 5. For the first fifteen years of development of the AFSJ the European Council elaborated every 
five years a detailed policy programme setting out priorities and the direction for the development of the AFSJ, starting 
with the Tampere Conclusions in 1999 (n 4). The Tampere Conclusions were followed by the Hague Programme in 2004, 
[2005] O.J. C 53/1, and the Stockholm Programme.  
13 EUCO 79/14, 2 June 2014, p. 5. The practice mentioned above (n 12) of elaborating a detailed policy programme was not 
subsequent to the Stockholm Programme that expired at the end of 2014. However, Article 68 TFEU obliges the 
European Council to define the strategic guidelines for the legislative and operational planning of the AFSJ. Thus, the 
European Council has set out comparatively brief and general strategic guidelines, for five years starting in 2015. 
14 T. Andersson, ‘Harmonization and Mutual Recognition: How to Handle Mutual Distrust’ in M. Andenas, B. Hess and P. 
Oberhammer (eds), Enforcement Agency Practice in Europe (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2005) 247. 
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Comity reflects an element of trust, reliance or respect; its underlying impetus historically 
transforming itself from respect for the other sovereign power to deference to private autonomy and 
adaptation to globalized markets.15 But the desire to cooperate in the private international law field has 
also historically been predicated upon checks and balances, on balancing the public policy of the 
forum against the rights of private parties.16 In the EU the debate on mutual trust in civil justice has 
arisen in connection with going further and removing such checks and balances. Specifically raising 
the question of whether and how far certification procedures, safeguards and grounds for refusal can 
be removed in cross-border recognition of judgments in the EU; i.e., whether we can abolish 
exequatur. 
In addition to the flagship regulation of civil justice, i.e., the Brussels I-Regulation (that 
replaced the above mentioned Brussels Convention),17 which pertains to civil and commercial matters 
generically, a number of other civil justice measures including those in the family law field relate to 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments. These measures, with more limited or specific scope of 
application, constituted the first arena for the attempts of the EU to further progress on mutual 
recognition. The measures in this group include the Enforcement Order Regulation and the Payment 
Order Regulation that both concern debt collection of uncontested claims, the Small Claims 
Regulation that concerns small claims and the Account Preservation Order Regulation that concerns 
interim attachment of bank accounts.18 In addition, the family law measures in this group include the 
Brussels II-bis Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation that respectively concern divorce, parental 
responsibility and maintenance decisions.19  
To further remove the intermediate procedures that exequatur traditionally encompasses, the 
specific solutions in each of these instruments have been varied and commentators have noted that this 
patchwork or fragmented approach is unsatisfactory from the perspective of the users as well as the 
credibility and functioning of the AFSJ.20 Some of the instruments abolish the exequatur procedure, 
others aim to simplify or streamline it. In addition, when removing exequatur the instruments vary in 
the way they retain some residual safeguards such as review mechanisms in the enforcement State 
with some limited and minimum grounds for refusal. Further, some of the instruments include rules on 
minimum procedural guarantees that are intended to ensure that there is no need to review a judgment 
in the enforcement State. The most far-reaching instruments in terms of automatic recognition without 
review mechanism in the Member State of enforcement is the Brussels II-bis Regulation for judgments 
concerning the return of unlawfully removed children.21 However, the presumption underlying all 
these instruments is that there is mutual trust in the procedures and actual proceedings in the Member 
State that renders judgment. As noted in the preamble of several instruments:  
Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States justifies the assessment by 
the court of one Member State that all conditions […] are fulfilled to enable a judgment to be enforced 
in all other Member States without judicial review of the proper application of the minimum 
procedural standards in the Member State where the judgment is to be enforced.’22 (underlining 
added). 
                                                     
15 J.R. Paul, ‘The Transformation of International Comity’, 2008 Duke Law and Contemporary Problems pp. 19-38. 
16 Idem.  See also M. Weller (n 4) pp. 69-71 on the development of recognition of foreign judgment and the tools for 
retaining control in traditional bilateral or multilateral private international law cooperation.   
17 See n 8. 
18 Regulations (EC) No 805/2004, [2004] O.J. L 143/15; (EC) No 1896/2006, [2006] O.J. L399/1; (EC) No 861/2007 [2007], 
O.J. L 199/1; and (EU) No 655/2014, [2014] O.J. L 189/59  
19 Regulations (EC) No 2201/2003, [2001] O.J. L 12/1; and (EC) No 4/2009, [2009] O.J. L 7/1. 
20 M. Linton, ‘Abolition of Exequatur, All the Name of Mutual Trust’ in B. Hess, M. Bergström and E. Storskrubb (eds), EU 
Civil Justice – Current Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol 7 (Hart, 2016).  
21 M. Linton, (n 20) provides a review of the varied mechanisms and schemes in the measures.  
22 See, e.g,. the Enforcement Order Regulation (n 20), recital 18.  
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The removal of exequatur has also been considered and debated in relation to the flagship 
Brussels I-Regulation and was one of the key issues in the recent reform of that regulation.23 Two 
slightly different aims have been identified behind the proposal of the Commission to abolish 
exequatur in that context. The first more practical one aimed to further simplify and reduce formal 
requirements.  The second more principled one was based on mutual trust and aimed to remove 
safeguards and grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement.24 In the new recast Regulation, 
eventually, the formal exequatur procedure was removed.25 However, it is significant that the Member 
States were not prepared to remove safeguards and in particular not the grounds for refusal. Thus, the 
reform did not go as far as the original proposal and the grounds for refusal have been retained, 
including public policy, as well as a review procedure in the enforcement State. The European 
Parliament rapporteur also noted: ‘A Member State before which proceedings are brought is entitled to 
preserve its fundamental values; therefore, equally, it must be the case for a Member State in which 
the enforcement of a judgment is sought’.26 In addition, there are other civil justice measures including 
the recently adopted Succession Regulation that still require exequatur.27  
It should also be noted that many of the civil justice instruments that have abolished or 
modified the exequatur procedure, and thus presume mutual trust, have not been applicable for a long 
time and some of them have had low or slow progress in take-up in the Member States.28 Thus, a 
significant body of domestic case law has not yet developed and there have not yet been many or any 
cases before the CJEU, an exception being the family law regulations and in particular the Brussels II-
bis Regulation.29 It is particularly interesting to note that the first cases before the CJEU that dealt with 
mutual trust in this context have concerned the Brussels II-bis Regulation (and the return of children 
decisions), which contains the most far-reaching provisions in terms of automatic recognition, i.e., in 
terms of mutual trust.30 It is also notable that mutual trust appears most difficult to accept and also 
most sensitive both legally and politically in respect of the guarantee of fundamental rights and 
potential breaches thereof.31 If another Member State does not guarantee the fundamental procedural 
rights of the parties should other Member States be bound to still accept that procedure? 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 See Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001, COM(2009) 175, and Commission Proposal, 
COM(2010) 748. See also X. Kramer (n 4), pp. 352-354, for a brief review of the proposal and the significant criticism 
thereof from numerous commentators.  
24 X. Kramer (n 4), p. 347. 
25 X. Kramer (n 4) pp. 367-370 for a review of the new provisions. See also M. Linton (n 20) calling the new proceedings a 
‘hybrid’ scheme that removes the formal part of exequatur but retains the control-function in the Member State of 
enforcement. See further E. Storskrubb (n 3) calling the result a ‘reshuffle’ rather than removal of exequatur. 
26 A7-320/2012. 
27 See M. Linton (n 20) pp. 273-275 for a table of the measures.  
28 See inter alia X. Kramer, ‘European Procedures on Debt Collection: Nothing or Noting? Experiences and Future 
Prospects’ in B Hess, M Bergström and E Storskrubb (eds), EU Civil Justice – Current Issues and Future Outlook, 
Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol 7 (Hart, 2016). 
29 See cases: C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga, EU:C:2010:828; C-195/08 PPU Rinau, EU:C:2008:406; C-211/10 PPU Povse, 
EU:C:2010:400. Cases have also been brought before the European Court of Human Rights, see case n°1473/09, 
Sneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, and M. Weller (n 4) pp. 91-92.   
30 See M. Moraru in this working paper. See also K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ The Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever Lecture, All Souls College, University of Oxford (available 
online at http://1exagu1grkmq3k572418odoooym.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/The-Principle-
of-Mutual-Recognition-in-the-area-of-Freedom-Security-and-Justice.pdf) pp. 7-8 19-21, and M. Requejo Isidro, ‘On the 
Abolition of the Exequatur’ in B. Hess, M. Bergström and E. Storskrubb (eds), EU Civil Justice – Current Issues and 
Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol 7 (Hart, 2016). 
31 See also X. Kramer, ‘Cross-border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial? Towards Principles of 
European Civil Procedure’, 2011 International Journal of Procedural Law pp. 202-230. 
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Current debate and future challenges 
The first difficult cases heard by the CJEU in the AFSJ context on mutual recognition, including civil 
justice cases, show that mutual trust and the upholding of fundamental rights must be presumed.32 
Thus, Member States must presume that other Member States guarantee inter alia fundamental 
procedural rights. This blind trust, also called the systematic approach to mutual trust, is premised on 
the assumption that all Member States are capable of providing effective protection of fundamental 
rights on an institutional level of abstraction.33 I argue that this presumption should be rebuttable and 
mutual trust should instead be linked to the actual protection of fundamental rights. In addition, it 
should be rebuttable not only when there is systematic failure in the legal system but also in individual 
cases; otherwise the system can quickly serve to feed distrust instead of trust and it is hard to imagine 
trust enduring if it is only imposed from above ‘by decree’.34 The legislative development in the field 
of civil justice supports the view that building mutual trust is a gradual process. The EU legislator has 
so far not agreed to completely remove checks and balances in all instruments because these are 
important to protect the parties’ fundamental rights. Logically, these safeguards uphold trust in the 
whole system and are not as such a sign of distrust of the other Member States. It should only be 
necessary and possible to successfully invoke such safeguards in limited and individual cases. 
Safeguards are retained to protect a party when there is a failure in an individual and actual case, in a 
way similar to extraordinary appeal or redress mechanisms in domestic procedural law. A study 
conducted by the University of Heidelberg in relation to the public policy exception in a number of 
EU civil justice instruments shows that there are not many cases where the exception is successfully 
invoked.35 Some may argue that this result demonstrates that the public policy grounds for refusal can 
be removed as redundant; an alternative position is that the result demonstrates that the grounds for 
refusal work as they should.36 One can argue that the grounds for refusal thus impede free movement 
of judgments. If an actual breach of fundamental rights has occurred and not been addressed and 
corrected in the original procedure, I would argue that this impediment is warranted and that it is 
important that enforcement of a judgment resulting from such proceedings is not possible across the 
EU.  
The problems in simply presuming mutual trust and the difficult cases that arise in the AFSJ 
can perhaps be better understood by returning to mutual recognition – mutual recognition being the 
original regulatory method and principle of the AFSJ that mutual trust was intended to support. Mutual 
recognition was imported in the AFSJ as a regulatory method that had been developed over a number 
of decades in the context of the Internal Market. The free movement of judgments has therefore been 
called the ‘fifth’ freedom. However, it is important to note that mutual recognition in the Internal 
Market sphere has never been unconditional. Restrictions to protect important rights and values have 
always been present in legislation and also introduced in the case law.37 One commentator has noted 
that in implementing mutual recognition, a fine-tuned balance must be struck between recognition and 
the constraints that must be attached to it.38 Thus, mutual recognition is not ‘pure’ but ‘managed’ and 
there is an analogous difference between ‘blind’ and ‘binding trust’. In addition, mutual recognition 
has not been the sole regulatory method in Internal Market, it has been used in parallel with inter alia 
                                                     
32 See also V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic 
Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’, 31 Yearbook of European Law 2012, 337-363. 
33 V. Mitsilegas (n 32) pp. 353-355.  
34 E. Storskrubb (n 3) and F. Blobel and p. Späth (n 4) pp. 529 and 540. See also V. Mitsilegas (n 32) pp. 355- 359. In 
contrast see K. Lenaerts (n 30) p. 24.  
35 B. Hess and T. Pfeiffer, Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as Referred to in EU Instruments of Private 
International and Procedural Law (Study PE 453.189, 2011). 
36 E. Storskrubb, ‘Ordre Public in EU Civil Justice - Lessons from Arbitration?’ in Festskrift till Gustaf Möller, JFT, 2011. 
37 See, inter alia, J. Snell, ‘The internal market and philosophies of integration’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European 
Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 307-323. 
38 K. Nicolaïdis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition’ (2007) 14 Journal of European 
Public Policy 5, pp. 683-686. 
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minimum harmonisation and other governance techniques such as administrative cooperation and 
communication structures.39  
It has also been noted that a major political driver for introducing mutual recognition as a 
regulatory strategy for the AFSJ at Tampere was the willingness of the Member States to retain 
sovereignty in the policy fields of civil and criminal justice. However, sovereignty was only 
superficially preserved because mutual recognition actually entails relinquishing sovereignty – not 
vertically to the supranational regulator but horizontally to the other national regulators.40 Mutual 
recognition is strong as a political paradigm in the EU and entails that we live with our differences and 
seek to harmonise only if such differences are illegitimate.41 In addition, mutual recognition has been 
described as a principle of tolerance, similar to multiculturalism, embodying the idea of ‘all different – 
all equal’.42  Idealism aside, it has been asked whether mutual recognition (and by implication mutual 
trust that is considered necessary to support mutual recognition) is the most appropriate regulatory 
strategy in the AFSJ and what should be done to ‘manage’ its consequences and to achieve ‘binding’ 
rather than ‘blind’ trust.43 It is clear from the quotes from the policy documents cited above that 
binding mutual trust has yet to be achieved in the AFSJ. 
One of the potential avenues for the future would be to move away from blindly removing all 
barriers to mutual recognition of judgments and, rather, examine carefully whether and where 
restrictions are still warranted and remain necessary. Such an endeavour should take into account the 
actual practice at the local level and can be done in the context of potential reform or amendment of 
the enacted civil justice instruments.44 Logically such an analysis does not have to negate 
improvements in the rules to streamline procedures and make enforcement of judgments more 
efficient. As already identified in the Programme for mutual recognition in 2001, another avenue for 
future action is to analyse whether we need further minimum or common procedural standards in the 
EU.45 At present several projects have been initiated and could contribute to such an analysis in the 
future, both at an institutional and independent level.46 A third avenue is to consider the benefit and 
impact of additional supporting governance measures, such as judicial training, networks and e-justice, 
which deserve more attention.47 The Stockholm Programme (2009) has placed greater emphasis on 
                                                     
39 D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp. 775-778. 
See also Snell (no 36) and J Snell in this working paper for a current analysis. 
40 S. Lavenex, ’Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy’ (2007) 14 Journal of    
European Public Policy 5, pp. 764-766. See also K. Nicolaïdis (n 89). 
41 K. Nicolaïdis (n 38) pp. 695-696. 
42 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (no 39) p. 777. 
43 E. Storskrubb, ‘Mutual Recognition as a Governance Strategy for Civil Justice?’ in B. Hess, M. Bergström and E. 
Storskrubb (eds), EU Civil Justice – Current Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol 7 (Hart, 
2016). See also S. Lavenex (n 40) in relation to the other policy areas of the AFSJ. 
44 Idem. See also X. Kramer, ‘Procedure Matters: Construction and Deconstructivism in European Civil Procedure’ Erasmus 
Law Lectures No 33 (Eleven International Publishing, 2013) p. 27, she notes the need for empirical research and the need 
to understand what is going on in domestic courts on a day-to-day basis. 
45 See E. Storskrubb (n 3) for a link between this avenue and the debate on procedural harmonisation.   
46 The European Law Institute (ELI) and Unidroit commenced a project in 2014 on ‘European Principles of Civil Procedure’, 
see: http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects/. The European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee has decided to 
prepare its own report on the project and has started its own debate on the need for minimum or common standards in EU 
civil procedure. The Commission has also published a call for a study on national procedural laws and practices. 
47 E. Storskrubb (n 94). H. Hartnell, ‘EUstitia: Institutionalising Justice in the European Union’ (2002) Northwestern Journal 
of International Law and Business, pp. 65-138, was one of the first contributions to realise the impact on civil justice of 
supporting structures such as networks. See also E. Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law – A Policy Area Uncovered 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 233-258. For a more general presentation of the current networks and support 
structures, see A. Molitorisová, ‘On Some Aspects of the Current State of Horizontal Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union with Special Regards to EU Law Development’ (2014) Europarättslig Tidskrift 1, 85-95. See also as an 
example the work being done by the Centre for Judicial Cooperation at the EUI 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Home.aspx. 
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such measures, which shows perhaps a certain maturity in the policy area or a realisation that mutual 
trust needs to be supported and cannot be presumed. In this context, the Justice Scoreboard are an 
interesting development. Published since 2013 by the Commission, the Scoreboards enable the EU to 
make country specific recommendations and have a dialogue with the Member States on procedural 
reforms when allocating funds.48  In addition, the recent initiatives of the EU institutions on the 
strengthening of the rule of law can be related to broader governance measures.49 
All these three avenues proposed for future development can be compared to analogous 
strategies that have evolved over time in the Internal Market to mediate the consequences of and 
support for mutual recognition. It is notable that mutual recognition is in the Internal Market context 
part of an ever-developing multi-layered regulatory strategy. Thus, the fourth and final avenue for 
future development is to debate and develop an overall regulatory strategy for civil justice.50 There 
needs to be an awareness of the fact that regulatory options and tools interact, complement and support 
each other. To find the correct mix of regulatory tools, including but not exclusively focused on 
mutual recognition, and a working balance for civil justice more work needs to be done.51 
 
Conclusion   
I have posited that mutual trust should not simply be presumed. It is furthermore essential to realise 
that mutual recognition, with mutual trust, should never be introduced in a void, but rather it should 
form part of a complex regulatory strategy, coupled with other tools and support structures. In the 
Internal Market, the appropriate level of regulation has at times even been fiercely debated and 
contested.52 In the AFSJ and particularly in civil justice we are only now starting to have such a 
debate. This debate is relevant and crucial. It should be searching, meaning that it should include 
careful and thorough analysis as well as be acutely observant and penetrating. Only then may the 
debate and potential subsequent action contribute to binding trust. 
Finally, I have been asked to consider whether civil justice could be different from the other 
policy areas of the AFSJ with respect to mutual trust. Civil justice may indeed be different in its 
original closeness to the Internal Market. Civil justice measures have originally developed in the EU to 
support cross-border commercial activity and trade.53 Historically, trade between nations and today 
globalized markets are a reason for the development of private international law cooperation. In the 
legal basis for civil justice cooperation, the Internal Market is even mentioned as an impetus for 
legislation.54 Thus, introducing mutual recognition as a regulatory strategy in civil justice may have 
been perceived as natural and it may have been presumed that it would work smoothly. In addition, 
there are civil justice developments today in the sector-specific policy arenas of the EU that also 
clearly link civil justice to the Internal Market.55 Still, there is also a reason for civil justice being part 
of the AFSJ. Even if the parties in civil proceedings are private, the courts exercise public power in 
civil adjudication. In addition, there is a public policy element to civil adjudication when the courts 
uphold mandatory elements of substantive civil law and fundamental procedural rights of the parties. 
Furthermore, in the AFSJ the relevant actors and litigants in civil justice matters are not only corporate 
and professional actors, they are also consumers, employees and family members, including children. 
Finally, in civil justice there has also been a growing awareness of fundamental rights in the field of 
                                                     
48 COM(2013) 160 final, COM(2014) 155 final and COM(2015) 116final.  See also E. Storskrubb (n 3).  
49 See inter alia: A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158final.  See also M. Weller (n 4) pp. 
95-97.   
50 E. Storskrubb (n 3).  
51 E. Storskrubb (n 43). 
52 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 39). 
53 The Brussels Convention 1968 and the Rome Convention 1980 under Article 220 of the EC Treaty. 
54 Article 81 TFEU.  
55 E. Storskrubb (n 3).  
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civil justice and a so-called constitutionalization since the Lisbon Treaty.56 Particularly when the issue 
of mutual trust arises in EU civil justice it is important to remember that market goals such as efficient 
debt collection are not the only relevant goals but should be balanced with the fundamental procedural 
rights of fair trial. Thus, civil justice may not be so different from the other policy areas of the AFSJ 
after all. Even though future instruments and fine-tuned regulatory choices involving mutual trust may 
not be identical across policy areas there can be useful cross-learning and coordination that would 
benefit the AFSJ as a whole.  
 
 
 
                                                     
56   B. Hess, ‘The Brussels I Regulation; Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Proposed Recast’, 
2012 CMLR 49, p.1087-1079 and B Hess, ‘The State of the Civil Justice Union’ in B. Hess, M. Bergström and E. 
Storskrubb (eds), EU Civil Justice – Current Issues and Future Outlook, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol 7 (Hart, 
2016). 
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Conceptualising Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law: the Evolving Relationship  Between 
Legal Pluralism and Rights-Based Justice in the European Union 
Valsamis Mitsilegas* 
 
 
Mutual recognition has been the motor of European integration in criminal matters for the past fifteen 
years. Its application in the field of criminal law was premised upon the uncritical acceptance of 
presumed mutual trust between – and in – the legal systems of EU Member States. The Union 
legislator has established (mostly in the form of third pillar law) a comprehensive system whereby 
national judicial decisions in criminal matters are recognised and executed across the EU quasi-
automatically, with a minimum of formality and with the aim of speedy execution. This model of 
mutual recognition – and its application in the sensitive sphere of criminal law – has raised 
fundamental questions on the relationship between national legal systems in the European Union, as 
well as questions on the feasibility of putting forward automaticity in mutual recognition in a system 
which may have significant negative consequences for the protection of the rights of affected 
individuals. Conceptualising mutual trust is central in addressing these questions. This paper will 
attempt to do so in three steps. Firstly, it will examine the relationship between mutual trust and 
mutual recognition in European criminal law. The use of mutual trust to establish a pluralistic system 
of recognition will be juxtaposed with the perceived moral distance of mutual recognition based on 
uncritically accepted mutual trust in this context. The second step is to examine potential limits to trust 
expressed as limits to automatic mutual recognition via the introduction of express grounds of refusal 
to recognise and execute decisions on fundamental rights grounds. The third step will be to examine 
the extent to which concerns regarding mutual recognition based on the concept of presumed mutual 
trust can be addressed by accompanying mutual recognition by the harmonisation of national systems 
of criminal procedure and the establishment of a level-playing field of protection of the individual 
across the EU. In this manner, the paper will cast light on the evolving relationship between mutual 
recognition based on the general presumption of mutual trust with the need to consider the 
implications of this system for the protection of fundamental rights on an individual basis. 
 
Mutual trust and legal pluralism: the moral distance in mutual recognition 
In order to understand the relationship between mutual recognition and mutual trust in Europe’s area 
of criminal justice it is necessary to cast light on the very design of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice as such. While a key feature of the development of such an Area is the abolition of internal 
borders between Member States and the creation thus of a single European area where freedom of 
movement is secured, this single area of movement is not accompanied by a single area of law. The 
law remains territorial, with Member States retaining to a great extent their sovereignty especially in 
the field of law enforcement. A key challenge for European integration in the field has thus been how 
to make national legal systems interact in the borderless Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Member States have thus far declined unification of law in Europe’s criminal justice area. The focus 
has largely been on the development of systems of cooperation between Member State authorities, 
with the aim of extending national enforcement capacity throughout the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice in order to compensate for the abolition of internal border controls. The simplification of 
movement that the abolition of internal border controls entails has led, under this compensatory logic, 
to calls for a similar simplification in inter-state cooperation via automaticity and speed. Following 
this logic, the construction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as an area without internal 
frontiers intensifies and justifies automaticity in inter-state cooperation.1 Automaticity in inter-state 
cooperation means that a national decision will be enforced beyond the territory of the issuing 
Member State by authorities in other EU Member States across the Area of Freedom, Security and 
                                                     
* Professor of European Criminal Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Centre at Queen Mary University of London. 
1 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. From Automatic Inter-state 
Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ in Yearbook of European Law 2012, vol.31, pp.319-372. 
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Justice without many questions being asked and with the requested authority having at its disposal 
extremely limited – if any at all – grounds to refuse the request for cooperation. The method chosen to 
secure such automaticity has been the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the fields of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Mutual recognition is attractive to Member States resisting 
further harmonisation or unification in European criminal law as mutual recognition is thought to 
enhance inter-state cooperation in criminal matters without Member States having to change their 
national laws to comply with EU harmonisation requirements.2 Mutual recognition creates 
extraterritoriality3: in a borderless Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the will of an authority in 
one Member State can be enforced beyond its territorial legal borders and across this area. The 
acceptance that such extraterritoriality requires a high level of mutual trust between the authorities 
which take part in the system is premised upon the acceptance that membership of the European Union 
means that all EU Member States are fully compliant with fundamental rights norms. It is the 
acceptance of the high level of integration among EU Member States which has justified automaticity 
in inter-state cooperation and has led to the adoption of a series of EU instruments which in this 
context go beyond pre-existing, traditional forms of cooperation set out under public international law, 
which have afforded a greater degree of scrutiny to requests for cooperation. Membership of the 
European Union presumes the full respect of fundamental rights by all Member States, which creates 
mutual trust, which in turn forms the basis of automaticity in inter-state cooperation in Europe’s area 
of criminal justice. 
Framed in this manner, mutual recognition has emerged as the motor of European integration 
in criminal matters under the third pillar. The adoption in 2001 by the Council of a detailed 
Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters4 has been followed by the adoption of a wide range of Framework Decisions putting forward a 
comprehensive system of mutual recognition in the field of criminal justice extending from the pre-
trial (recognition of Arrest Warrants5, Evidence Warrants6, Freezing Orders7, Decisions on bail8) to the 
post-trial stage (recognition of confiscation orders9, of decisions on financial penalties10, of probation 
orders11, and of decisions on the transfer of sentenced persons12). The system of mutual recognition 
was completed pre-Lisbon by a Framework Decision on judgments in absentia, which amended a 
number of the preceding Framework Decisions to specify cases when recognition of a judgment could 
                                                     
2 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’, in Common Market 
Law Review, vol.43, 2006, pp. 1277-1311. 
3 K. Nicolaidis and G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global  Government’ in 
Law and Contemporary Problems, , vol.68, 2005, pp.263-317; K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe 
through Mutual Recognition’ in Journal of European Public Policy, vol.14, 2007, pp.682-698. 
4 [2001] O.J. C 12/10. 
5 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant [2002] O.J. L 190/1. 
6 Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European Evidence Warrant [2008] O.J. L 350/72. Post-
Lisbon replaced by the Directive on the European Investigation Order- see below. 
7 Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the mutual recognition of orders freezing property or evidence 
[2003] O.J. L 196/45. 
8 Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member States of the European Union, 
of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention 
[2009] O.J. L 294/20. 
9 Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the mutual recognition of confiscation orders [2006] O.J. L 
328/59. 
10 Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the mutual recognition of judgments imposing financial 
penalties [2005] O.J. L 76/16. 
11 Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions [2008] 
O.J. L 337/102. 
12 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the transfer of custodial sentences (sentenced persons) 
[2008] O.J. L 327/27. 
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or could not be refused in such cases.13 The main features of the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters are automaticity, speed, and the execution of judicial decisions with a 
minimum of formality. Based on mutual trust, the system includes very limited grounds to refuse the 
recognition and execution of a judicial decision or to raise questions regarding the legal system of the 
Member State of the issuing authority.14 Automaticity has presented a number of challenges, most 
notably with regard to the protection of the fundamental rights of affected individuals. These 
challenges have arisen in particular in the context of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant which is emblematic of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of 
criminal law. It is the first measure to be adopted in the field and the main mutual recognition measure 
which has been implemented fully and in detail at the time of writing. Automaticity in the operation of 
inter-state cooperation under the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision has been introduced at 
three levels. Firstly, cooperation must take place within a limited timeframe, under strict deadlines, 
and on the basis of a pro-forma form annexed to the Framework Decision – this means that in practice 
few questions can be asked by the executing authority beyond what has been included in the form.15 
Secondly, the executing authority is not allowed to verify the existence of dual criminality for a list of 
32 categories of offence listed in the Framework Decision16 ‒ this means that the executing state is 
asked to deploy its law enforcement mechanism and arrest and surrender an individual for conduct 
which is not an offence under its domestic law.17 The third level of automaticity arises from the 
inclusion of limited grounds of refusal to recognise and execute a European Arrest Warrant under the 
Framework Decision. The Framework Decision includes only three, in their majority procedural, 
mandatory grounds for refusal18which are complemented by a series of optional grounds for refusal19 
and provisions on guarantees underpinning the surrender process.20 Non-compliance with fundamental 
rights is not however included as a ground to refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant. This 
legislative choice reflects the view that cooperation can take place on the basis of a high level of 
mutual trust in the criminal justice systems of Member States, premised upon the presumption that 
fundamental rights are in principle respected fully across the European Union. 
Designed in this manner, the application of the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal 
law can be seen as a system of global legal pluralism. Mutual trust is used as a tool for pluralism in 
providing a procedural system enabling the free movement of judicial decisions across the EU via the 
recognition and execution of ‘foreign’ judgments with a minimum of formality and very limited 
grounds for refusal.21 The executing authority is under a duty to enforce a ‘foreign’ judgment without 
essentially examining whether this judgment would have been issued under its own national rules. As 
Paul Schiff Berman has noted, enforcing a foreign judgment is viewed thus as being fundamentally 
different from issuing an original judgment with judgment recognition implicating an entirely distinct 
set of concerns about the role of law in a multistate world.22 In a borderless area of criminal justice, 
                                                     
13 Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, [2009] O.J. L81/24. 
14 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, Hart, 2009, chapter 3. 
15 See Articles 15, 17 and 23 of the Framework Decision. The Court has confirmed the limited role of the executing authority 
in examining the content of the European Arrest Warrant in its ruling in, Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello, 
EU:C:2010:683. 
16 Article 2(2). 
17 See the Court’s ruling in Advocaten voor de Wereld below. 
18 Article 3. 
19 Article 4. 
20 Articles 5, 27 and 28. 
21 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
p.16.According to the author, while it does not offer substantive norms, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach may favour 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that provide opportunities for plural voices. Such procedures can 
potentially help to channel (or even tame) normative conflict to some degree by bringing multiple actors together into a 
shared social space. 
22 Berman, op. cit., p.296. 
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mutual trust serves to enhance co-operation and in doing so, to address justice concerns and priorities 
of the national legal order where the judgment to be recognised has been generated. However, this 
system of managed legal pluralism based on an extreme version of presumed mutual trust poses 
significant challenges for the perception of justice in EU Member States. Key in this context is what 
Roger Cotterrell has called the problem of ‘moral distance’, defined as the frequent remoteness or 
separation of law’s normative expectations from many of those current and familiar in the fields of 
social interaction that it purports to regulate.23 In a system of mutual recognition based on 
automaticity, the problem of moral distance may appear particularly acute in the executing Member 
State where a judicial authority is required to recognise and execute a decision which is the outcome 
of the legal system of another Member State on the basis of almost blind trust. This one size fits all 
and no questions asked approach may appear too inflexible and lacking democratic legitimacy, in that 
the substantive standards to be applied (rather than the procedure for inter-state cooperation) have not 
been the subject of deliberation in the executing state. It may also raise questions of compatibility of 
recognition with the societal and legal values of the executing state.24 In the operation of the principle 
of mutual recognition in the field of EU criminal law, and in particular in the implementation of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, a number of issues of moral distance have 
arisen along these lines. Key questions in this context are whether mutual trust can justify the 
recognition of judgments which may have a detrimental effect on the protection of the fundamental 
rights of the defendant, or the recognition of requests which appear disproportionate or contrary to the 
substantive criminal law of the executing Member State. An underlying question in this context has 
been whether mutual recognition on the basis of mutual trust can operate without a parallel degree of 
harmonisation of criminal procedural standards in Member States. All these are fundamental questions 
concerning not only the limits of mutual trust, but also the transformation of justice in a Union without 
internal frontiers. 
 
The uneasy relationship between presumed trust and fundamental rights in a pluralistic 
system of mutual recognition 
A key step in conceptualising mutual trust in Europe’s area of criminal justice is to address the extent 
to which the existence of such trust must be presumed automatically in the operation of the principle 
of mutual recognition in criminal matters. A central question in this context is whether, in a system of 
inter-state cooperation based on trust, executing authorities may refuse recognition on grounds of 
concerns about fundamental rights. As seen above, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant has abolished the requirement of the verification of dual criminality for a wide range of 
categories of offences and has not included non-compliance with fundamental rights as an express 
ground of refusal to execute. The limits of recognition have since been tested by the Court of Justice. 
In its first ruling on the Framework Decision, Advocaten voor de Wereld ‒ in what has in essence been 
a test case for the legality of the system ‒ the Court upheld the legality of the structure of the mutual 
recognition system established by the Framework Decision.25 The Court found that the abolition of the 
requirement to verify the existence of dual criminality is compatible with the principle of legality as 
legality should be examined in accordance with the law of the issuing Member State which determines 
the definition of the offences and penalties included in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision.26 It is 
noteworthy in this context that Advocate General Jarabo-Colomer argues explicitly that the 
Framework Decision cannot be said to contravene the principle of legality  because it does not provide 
for any punishments or even seek to harmonise the criminal laws of the Member States but rather it is 
confined to creating a mechanism for assistance between the courts of different States during the 
                                                     
23 R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community. Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp.304-305. 
24 The problems of lack of flexibility, lack of democratic legitimacy and values conflict have all been raised by Cotterrell as 
dimensions of moral distance- p.305. 
25 Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, EU:C:2007:261. 
26 Paragraphs 52 and 53.  
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course of proceedings to establish who is guilty of committing an offence or to execute a sentence.27 
The Court added to this finding that, on the basis of Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision, the 
issuing state must respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 
6 EU and, consequently, the principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties.28 The Court 
has stressed the co-operative structure of the mutual recognition system and the need to address the 
justice needs of the issuing Member State and affirmed mutual trust by pointing out that it is for the 
issuing Member State to check on the compatibility of a request with fundamental rights. Advocaten 
voor de Wereld was the first of a series of judgments where the Court of Justice has adopted a broad 
approach to mutual recognition, embracing a teleological interpretation and stressing the need to 
achieve the effectiveness of the Framework Decision by ensuring that in principle mutual recognition 
takes place in a speedy and simplified manner.29 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 has added a further dimension to the 
question of the extent to which fundamental rights concerns should be taken into account and form 
grounds of refusal in a system of mutual recognition based on mutual trust. The Lisbon Treaty has 
signified the constitutionalisation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and it was a matter of time 
before the Court of Justice would be asked to examine the compatibility of the system of mutual 
recognition with the Charter. The first major case in this context was the case of Radu, 30 in which the 
Court of Justice was asked for the first time in such a direct manner by a national court on whether 
mutual recognition could be refused on fundamental rights grounds. In the present case, the Court 
answered in the negative. The Court reaffirmed the adoption of a teleological interpretation reiterating 
the purpose of establishing a simplified and more effective system of surrender based on mutual 
recognition.31 Such a system will contribute to the Union’s objective of becoming an area of freedom, 
security and justice by basing itself on the high degree of confidence which should exist between the 
Member States.32  On the basis of this presumption of mutual trust, the Court found that the 
observance of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter does not require that a judicial authority of a Member 
State should be able to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of 
conducting a criminal prosecution on the ground that the requested person was not heard by the 
issuing judicial authorities before that warrant was issued.33 Once again the Court placed 
considerations of effectiveness at the forefront of its reasoning. It pointed out that such an obligation 
would inevitably lead to the failure of the very system of surrender34 and added that in any event, the 
right to be heard will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to compromise 
the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system.35  Radu thus follows the Court’s earlier case 
law in two respects: it confirms that it is satisfied with the provision of fundamental rights protection 
in one of the two states which take part in the cooperative mutual recognition system ‒ here, it is the 
executing state which is under the duty to uphold the right to be heard; and it places the protection of 
fundamental rights within a clear framework of effectiveness of the enforcement cooperation system 
which is established by the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. Too extensive a 
protection of fundamental rights (in both the issuing and the executing state) would undermine the 
effectiveness of law enforcement cooperation in this context. 
                                                     
27 Opinion of Advocate General Jarabo-Colomer delivered on 12 September 2006, paragraph 103. 
28 Paragraph 53. 
29 See inter alia: Advocaten voor de Wereld, paragraph 28; Case C-388/08 PPU, Leymann and Pustovarov, paragraph 42;Case 
C-192/12 PPU, Melvin West, paragraph 56; Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F., paragraph 35. 
30 Case C-396/11, Radu, judgment of 29 January 2013. 
31 Paragraphs 33 and 34. 
32 Paragraph 34. 
33 Paragraph 39. 
34 Paragraph 40. 
35 Paragraph 41. Emphasis added. 
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The focus on the effective operation of mutual recognition was reiterated by the Court of 
Justice in the case of Melloni.36 In Melloni, the Court effectively confirmed the primacy of third pillar 
law (the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision as amended by the Framework Decision on 
judgments in absentia, interpreted in the light of the Charter) over national constitutional law, 
providing a higher level of fundamental rights protection. In order to reach this far-reaching 
conclusion, the Court followed a three-step approach. The first step for the Court was to demarcate the 
scope of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant as amended by the Framework 
Decision on judgments in absentia (and in particular Article 4a(1) thereof) in order to establish the 
extent of the limits of mutual recognition in such cases. The Court reiterated its reasoning in Radu in 
adopting a teleological interpretation of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and 
stressing that under the latter Member States are in principle obliged to act upon a European Arrest 
Warrant.37 In the light of these findings, the Court adopted a literal interpretation of Article 4a(1), 
confirming that that provision restricts the opportunities for refusing to execute a European Arrest 
Warrant.38 That interpretation is confirmed by the mutual recognition objectives of EU law.39 The 
second step was to examine the compatibility of the above system with fundamental rights and in 
particular the right to an effective judicial remedy and the right to fair trial set out in Articles 47 and 
48(2) of the Charter. By reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,40 the Court 
of Justice found that the right of an accused person to appear in person at his trial is not absolute but 
can be waived.41 The Court further stated that the objective of the Framework Decision on judgments 
in absentia was to enhance procedural rights whilst improving mutual recognition of judicial decisions 
between Member States42 and found Article 4a(1) compatible with the Charter.  
Having asserted the compatibility of the relevant provision with the Charter, the third step for 
the Court was to rule on the relationship between the secondary EU law in question with national 
constitutional law, which provided a higher level of protection. The Court rejected an interpretation of 
Article 53 of the Charter as giving general authorisation to a Member State to apply the standard of 
protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by its constitution when that standard is higher than that 
deriving from the Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority over the application of provisions of 
EU law.43 That interpretation of Article 53 would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law 
inasmuch as it would allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance 
with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s constitution.44  
Article 53 of the Charter provides freedom to national authorities to apply national human rights 
standards provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.45 In the present case, 
Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 does not allow Member States to refuse to execute a 
European arrest warrant when the person concerned is in one of the situations provided for therein.46 
The Framework Decision on judgments in absentia is intended to remedy the difficulties associated 
with the mutual recognition of decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at his trial 
arising from the differences among the Member States in the protection of fundamental rights and 
                                                     
36 Case C-399/11, Melloni, judgment of 26 February 2013. 
37 Paragraphs 36-38. 
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39 Paragraph 43. 
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Application no. 29648/03. 
41 Paragraph 49. 
42 Paragraph 51. 
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reflects the consensus reached by all the Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law 
to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons convicted in absentia who are the subject of a European 
arrest warrant.47 Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter to 
make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to 
review in the issuing Member State in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and 
the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the executing Member State, by casting 
doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that 
framework decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition which that 
decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework 
decision.48 
In Melloni, once again the Court has given priority to the effectiveness of mutual recognition 
based on presumed mutual trust. Secondary pre-Lisbon third pillar law whose primary aim is to 
facilitate mutual recognition has primacy over national constitutional law which provides a high 
protection of fundamental rights. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has interpreted fundamental 
rights in a restrictive manner. It has emphasised the importance of the Framework Decision on 
judgments in absentia for the effective operation of mutual recognition, a Framework Decision which 
as the Court admitted restricts the opportunities for refusing to execute a European Arrest Warrant. 
This aim sits uneasily with the Court’s assertion that the in absentia Framework Decision also aims to 
protect the procedural rights of the individual.  By privileging the teleology of mutual recognition and 
upholding the text of the Framework Decision on judgments in absentia and the subsequently amended 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant  –  via the adoption also of a literal 
interpretation  –  over the protection of fundamental rights, the Court has shown a great – and arguably 
undue  –  degree of deference to the European legislator.49 The Court’s reasoning also seems to 
deprive national executing authorities of any discretion to examine the compatibility of the execution 
of a European Arrest Warrant with fundamental rights in a wide range of cases involving in absentia 
rulings.50 This deferential approach may be explained by the fact that the Court was asked to examine 
the human rights implications of measures which have been subject to harmonisation at EU level, with 
the Court arguing that the Framework Decision reflects a consensus among EU Member States with 
regard to the protection of the individual in cases of in absentia rulings within the broader system of 
mutual recognition.51 It has been argued that national constitutional standards will be more readily 
applicable in cases where EU law has not been harmonised.52 The Court’s ruling in the case of Jeremy 
F53 has been cited as an example of this approach. 54 In Jeremy F, the Court found that the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant as amended by the Framework Decision on judgments in 
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48 Paragraph 63. Emphasis added. 
49 L.F.M. Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’ in European Law Review, 2014, 39(4), pp.531-
552, p.542; A. Torres Pérez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ in European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2014, 10, pp.308-331, pp.317-318. 
50 See also the Opinion of AG Bot, who linked national discretion to refuse surrender with the perceived danger of forum 
shopping by the defendant  –  paragraph 103.  
51 See also the Opinion of AG Bot, according to whom the Court cannot rely on the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States in order to apply a higher level of protection (paragraph 84) and that the consensus between Member 
States leaves no room for the application of divergent national levels of protection (paragraph 126). 
52 See K. Lenaerts and J. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The European Court of Justice and Fundamental Rights in the Field of Criminal 
Law’ in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. Konstadinides (eds.), Research Handbook of European Criminal Law, 
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which must be afforded to a fundamental right in the implementation of an action by the EU and those in which that level 
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53 Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F, judgment of 30 May 2013. 
54 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, op. cit. 
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absentia did not preclude Member States from providing for appeals with suspensive effect, provided 
that such appeals comply with the time-limits set out in the European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision. 55 The Court noted that the absence of an express provision on the possibility of bringing an 
appeal with suspensive effect against a decision to execute a European Arrest Warrant does not mean 
that the Framework Decision prevents the Member States from providing for such an appeal or 
requires them to do so.56 However, Jeremy F must be distinguished from Melloni: while Melloni 
concerned the possibility of refusing the execution of a mutual recognition request on fundamental 
rights grounds, Jeremy F did not question the essence of the mutual recognition system as 
fundamentally. Rather, the question in Jeremy F was a meta-question, concerning the specific 
procedural rules which apply in the process of the execution of a European arrest warrant. Even in this 
case, the discretion left to Member States to protect fundamental rights is limited and circumscribed by 
the deadlines set out in the mutual recognition instruments aiming at achieving the desired speed 
linked to the perceived efficiency of the system. The Court’s deferential approach gives undue weight 
to what are essentially intergovernmental choices (the choices of Member States adopting a third pillar 
measure without the involvement of the European Parliament), which sit even more uneasily in the 
post-Lisbon, post-Charter era. The emphasis of the Court on the need to uphold the validity of 
harmonised EU secondary law over primary constitutional law on human rights (at both national and 
EU level) constitutes a grave challenge for human rights protection.57 It further reveals in the context 
of EU criminal law a strong focus by the Court on the need to uphold the validity of a system of quasi-
automatic mutual recognition in criminal matters which will enhance inter-state cooperation and law 
enforcement effectiveness across the EU. 
The Court’s emphasis on the centrality of mutual trust as a factor privileging the achievement 
of law enforcement objectives via mutual recognition over the protection of fundamental rights has 
been reiterated beyond EU criminal law in the broader context of the accession of the European Union 
to the European Convention of Human Rights. Opinion 2/13 has included a specific part dealing with 
mutual trust in EU law. The Court has distilled its current thinking on mutual trust in the following 
two key paragraphs: 
 
…it should be noted that the principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of 
fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be 
created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, 
security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the 
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights 
recognised by EU law…  
Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume 
that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they 
not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State 
than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that 
other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the EU.58 
 
From the perspective of the relationship between EU criminal law and fundamental rights, this passage 
is striking. The passage follows a series of comments on the role of Article 53 of the Charter in 
preserving the autonomy of EU law, with the Court citing the Melloni requirement for upholding the 
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primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.59 The Court then puts forward a rather extreme view of 
presumed mutual trust leading to automatic mutual recognition. It thus represents a significant 
challenge to our understanding of the EU constitutional order as a legal order underpinned by the 
protection of fundamental rights. The Court deifies mutual trust and endorses a system whereby the 
protection of fundamental rights must be subsumed to the abstract requirements of upholding mutual 
trust, instead of endorsing a model of a Union whereby cooperation on the basis of mutual trust must 
be underpinned by an effective protection of fundamental rights. The Court asserts boldly that mutual 
trust is not only a principle, but also a principle of fundamental importance in EU law. However, this 
assertion seems to disregard the inherently subjective nature of trust and the difficulties in providing 
an objective definition which meets the requirements of legal certainty. It is further clear that, although 
mutual trust is viewed by the Court as inextricably linked with the establishment of an area without 
internal borders (at the heart of which is the principle of free movement and the rights of EU citizens), 
the Court perceives mutual trust as limited to trust ‘between the Member States’  –  the citizen or the 
individual affected by the exercise of state enforcement power under mutual recognition is markedly 
absent from the Court’s reasoning. This approach leads to the uncritical acceptance of presumed trust 
across the European Union: not only are Member States not allowed to demand a higher national 
protection of fundamental rights than that provided by EU law (thus echoing Melloni), but also, and 
remarkably, Member States are not allowed to check (save in exceptional circumstances) whether 
fundamental rights have been observed in other Member States in specific cases. This finding is 
striking as it disregards a number of developments in secondary EU criminal law aiming to grant 
executing authorities the opportunity to check whether execution of a judicial decision by authorities 
of another Member State would comply with fundamental rights.60 It also represents a fundamental 
philosophical and substantive difference in the protection of fundamental rights between the 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts.  
This difference has been highlighted in the Strasbourg ruling in Tarakhel, 61 a case involving 
transfers of asylum seekers under the Dublin system, where the Court stressed the obligation of states 
to carry out a thorough and individualised examination of the fundamental rights situation of the 
person concerned.62 The requirement of the European Court of Human Rights for states to conduct an 
individualised examination of the human rights implications of a removal to another state goes beyond 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ requirement set out by the Luxembourg Court in Opinion 2/13 and 
quoting both Dublin (NS) and European Arrest Warrant (Melloni) case law.63 The Court of Justice has 
limited inter-state cooperation only on the basis of a high threshold of the existence of systemic 
deficiencies in EU Member States. This threshold was set out in the case of N.S.64, which followed the 
ruling of the Strasbourg Court in the case of MSS v Belgium and Greece, 65 where the Strasbourg 
Court found for the first time that the presumption of respect of fundamental rights in the intra-EU 
inter-state cooperation mechanism set out in the Dublin Regulation was rebuttable. In NS, the Court of 
Justice translated MSS in the Union legal order via the introduction of a high threshold of systemic 
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op. cit. (The Limits of Mutual Trust). 
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deficiency which has since been translated in EU secondary law via the adoption of the so-called 
Dublin III Regulation.66 However, in Tarakhel the Strasbourg Court goes a step further. Rather than 
requiring a general finding of systemic deficiency in order to examine the compatibility of a state 
action with fundamental rights, the Strasbourg Court reminds us that the presumption of compliance 
with fundamental rights is rebuttable67 and that effective protection of fundamental rights always 
requires an assessment of the impact of a decision on the rights of the specific individual in the 
specific case before the Court.68 In Tarakhel, this reasoning has resulted in a finding of a breach of the 
Convention with regard to specific individuals even in a case where generalised systemic deficiencies 
in the receiving state had not been ascertained.69 The Strasbourg Court’s approach on the judicial 
examination of state compliance with fundamental rights in systems of inter-state cooperation in 
Tarakhel is strikingly at odds with the approach of the Court of Justice in the European Arrest Warrant 
case law and in particular in Opinion 2/13. The willingness of the Court of Justice to sacrifice an 
individualised case-by-case assessment of the human rights implications of the execution of a mutual 
recognition order in the name of uncritical presumed mutual trust is a clear challenge for the effective 
protection of fundamental rights in the European Union and runs the risk of resulting in lower 
protection of fundamental rights in systems of inter-state cooperation within the EU compared to the 
level of protection provided by the Strasbourg Court in ECHR cases. This difference in approaches 
raises the real prospect of a conflict between ECHR and EU law, especially in cases of inter-state 
cooperation between EU Member States under the principle of mutual recognition. Eeckhout has 
commented that Opinion 2/13 confirms a radical pluralist conception of the relationship between EU 
law and the ECHR.70 In the case of mutual recognition, this ‘outward-looking’, external pluralist 
approach which can be seen as an attempt to preserve the autonomy of Union law is combined with 
the parallel strengthening of an internal, intra-EU pluralist approach which stresses the importance of 
mutual trust, elevated by the Court to a fundamental principle of EU law. Both internal and external 
pluralist approaches undermine the position of the individual in Europe’s area of criminal justice by 
limiting the judicial avenues of examination of the fundamental rights implications of quasi-automatic 
mutual recognition on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Managing mutual recognition by harmonising rights: the adoption of EU measures on 
individual rights in criminal procedure 
Member States’ vision of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, 
based on unquestioned and presumed mutual trust, did not initially include a strong focus on the need 
for the EU to accompany mutual recognition with a series of parallel measures to harmonise national 
legislation on criminal procedure thus creating a level-playing field among Member States in this 
context. The Commission’s proposal for a Framework Decision on procedural rights in criminal 
                                                     
66 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), [2013] O.J. L 180/31. 
Article 3(2) of the Regulation confirms that ‘Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily 
designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in the Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining 
Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member 
State can be designed as responsible.’ 
67 Paragraph 103. 
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either in words or in practice with what Strasbourg demands or else the Dublin system violates the Convention. D. 
Halberstam, ‘It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way 
Forward’, Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Research paper Series, Paper No.432, February 2015. 
p.27: 
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proceedings tabled in 200471 was, after lengthy negotiations, eventually not adopted by Member 
States.72 The situation changed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty accepts that 
mutual recognition must be accompanied by a degree of harmonisation of criminal procedural law. 
Article 82(2)(b) TFEU confers upon the European Union competence to adopt minimum rules on the 
rights of individuals in criminal procedure. EU competence in the field is not self-standing, but 
functional: competence to adopt rules on procedural rights has been conferred to the EU only to the 
extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition (which, under Article 82(1) TFEU, is the basis of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters) and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having 
a cross-border dimension. EU competence to legislate on the rights of the defence is thus conditional 
upon the need to demonstrate that defence rights are necessary for mutual recognition. On the basis of 
Article 82(2) TFEU, a number of measures on the rights of the individual in criminal procedure have 
been adopted. These are thus far a Directive on the right to interpretation and translation;73 a Directive 
on the right to information;74 and a Directive on the right to access to a lawyer.75 The Commission has 
also published a Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of 
detention76and has tabled, in November 2013, a number of draft Directives on legal aid,77 procedural 
safeguards for children78 and the presumption of innocence.79 These proposals have been accompanied 
by Commission Recommendations on the right to legal aid80 and on procedural safeguards for 
vulnerable persons.81 
In a strategy similar to the one followed in the pre-Lisbon Framework Decision, the ensuing 
Directives on procedural rights adopted post-Lisbon have been justified by linking the adoption of EU 
measures in the field with the enhancement of mutual trust. The Preamble to the Directive on the right 
to interpretation and translation states that ‘mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters can 
operate effectively in a spirit of trust in which not only judicial authorities but all actors in the criminal 
process consider decisions of the judicial authorities of other Member States as equivalent to their 
own, implying not only trust in the adequacy of other Member States’ rules, but also trust that those 
rules are correctly applied.’82 The same wording is used in the Preamble to the Directive on the right 
to information,83 and the right to access to a lawyer.84 In this manner, it can be argued that the 
European legislator attempts to address the consequences of the perceived moral distance inherent in 
mutual recognition via the harmonisation of criminal procedural law.85 This emphasis on the need to 
                                                     
71 Framework Decision ‘on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union’,  COM (2004) 
328 final. 
72 Mitsilegas EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing, 2009, chapter 3. 
73 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, [2010] O.J. L 280/1. 
74 Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, [2012] O.J. L 142/1. 
75 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant 
proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third 
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, [2013] O.J. L 294/1. 
76 COM (2011) 327 final, Brussels, 14.6.2011. 
77 COM (2013) 824 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013. 
78 COM (2013) 822 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013. 
79 COM (2013) 821 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013. 
80 [2013] O.J. C 378/11. 
81 [2013] O.J. C 378/8. 
82 Recital 4, emphasis added. 
83 Recital 4. 
84 Preamble, recital 6.  
85 For a wider conceptualisation of mutual trust, see the Commission’s initial proposal on the Directive on access to a lawyer 
which expanded the link between defence rights and trust by stating that common minimum rules ‘should increase 
confidence in the criminal justice systems of all Member States, which in turn should lead to more efficient judicial 
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ensure effective application of human rights rules in Member States is welcome. However, the use of 
mutual trust as an element justifying the adoption of EU measures in the field is problematic in two 
respects: it fails to provide a direct and clear link between the defence rights proposed and their 
necessity for the operation of mutual recognition; and it is based on a concept (of mutual trust) which 
is too subjective for it to meet the criteria set out by the Court of Justice when ascertaining the legality 
of EU instruments, namely that the choice of legal basis must be based on objective factors which are 
amenable to judicial review, including the aim and the content of the measure.86 The concept of trust is 
inherently subjective and not objective. An alternative way forward could be to justify EU defence 
rights measures as necessary to address the effects of the operation of automatic inter-state 
cooperation, as expressed by mutual recognition, on the individual. The aim and content of the 
measures in question are the strengthening of the protection of procedural rights. The necessity 
requirement of Article 82(2) TFEU would thus be viewed from the perspective of the individual and 
not of the state or of the authorities which are called upon to apply inter-state cooperation.87 In any 
case, the functional framing of EU competence in the field of procedural rights effectively embeds 
procedural rights within Europe’s area of criminal justice, by making the effective operation of mutual 
recognition conditional on a degree of harmonisation of procedural rights at European Union level. In 
this manner, procedural rights assume a central role in an increasingly integrated area of criminal 
justice.  This legal basis has been used to establish, via EU secondary law, human rights standards 
applicable across the board, embracing not only cross-border cases involving mutual recognition, but 
also purely domestic cases. In this manner, the functional legal basis of Article 82(2) TFEU has led to 
the adoption of self-standing EU human rights standards in the field of criminal procedure. 
The adoption of EU measures harmonising national law on the rights of the individual in 
criminal proceedings has a transformative effect.88 It signals a paradigm shift from a system focused 
primarily  –  if not solely  –  on promoting the interests of the state and of law enforcement under rules 
of quasi-automatic mutual recognition to a system where the rights of individuals affected by such 
rules are brought into the fore, protected by and enforced in EU law. There are four main ways in 
which the Directives on procedural rights in criminal procedure will enhance the protection of 
fundamental rights in EU Member States. First of all, a number of key provisions conferring rights in 
the Directives have direct effect. This means that, in a system of decentralised enforcement of EU law, 
individuals can evoke and claim rights directly before their national courts if the EU Directives have 
not been implemented or have been inadequately implemented. Direct effect means in practice that a 
suspect or accused person can derive a number of key rights  –  such as the right to an interpreter or 
the right to access to a lawyer  –  directly from EU law if national legislation has not made appropriate 
provision in conformity with EU law. Secondly, this avenue of decentralised enforcement is coupled 
with the high level of centralised enforcement of EU criminal law which has been ‘normalised’ after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Commission now has full powers to monitor 
the implementation of these Directives by Member States and has the power to introduce infringement 
proceedings before the Court of Justice when it considers that the Directives have not been 
implemented adequately. In view of the Court’s approach regarding the applicability of the Charter 
which will be examined below and the broad objectives of the procedural rights Directives, the scope 
of the Commission’s monitoring exercises is broader than to check merely the provision of national 
legislation adopted to implement specifically the EU Directives in question. The Commission is also 
entitled to monitor national criminal procedure systems more broadly to ensure that effective 
implementation has taken place, as well as to ensure that rights are applied in practice and not only in 
(Contd.)                                                                   
cooperation in a climate of mutual trust and to the promotion of a fundamental rights culture in the Union COM Recital 
3, emphasis added. COM (2011) 326 final, Brussels, 8.6.2011. Council document 10467/12, Brussels, 31 May 2012. 
86 See recently Case C-540/13 European Parliament V Council, para. 30; and Joined Cases C-317/13 and C-679/13, European 
Parliament v Council para. 40.  
87 Mitsilegas, op. cit. (The Limits of Mutual Trust). 
88 V. Mitsilegas,  ‘Legislating for Human Rights After Lisbon: The Transformative Effect of EU Measures on the Rights of 
the Individual in Criminal Procedure’ in M. Fletcher, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Matera (eds.), The European Union as an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Routledge, forthcoming. 
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the books. Thirdly, national criminal procedural law must be applied and interpreted in compliance 
and conformity with the Directives. The procedural standards set out in the Directives will have an 
impact on a wide range of acts under national criminal procedure.89 Fourthly, the implementation of 
the Directives must take place in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The Charter will apply not only to national legislation which specifically implements the EU 
Directives on procedural rights, but also to all other elements of domestic criminal procedure which 
have a connection with EU law on procedural rights in criminal proceedings. In the case of 
Fransson,90 the Court of Justice adopted a broad interpretation of the application of the Charter, 
including in cases where national legislation does not implement expressly or directly an instrument of 
EU criminal law. Following Fransson, the Court of Justice ruled in Siragusa91 that the concept of 
‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, requires a certain degree of 
connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having 
an indirect impact on the other.92 In the case of the Directives on procedural rights, there are a number 
of elements in domestic criminal procedures which, although not implementing the Directives 
specifically, meet this degree of connection required by the Court’s case law and thus trigger the 
applicability of the Charter. This view is reinforced by the Court’s finding in Siragusa that it is 
important to consider the objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law, which is to ensure that 
those rights are not infringed in areas of EU activity, whether through action at EU level or through 
the implementation of EU law by the Member States.93 This transformative effect is enhanced by the 
potential for a number of key concepts included in the Directives to be interpreted by the Court of 
Justice in an autonomous manner.94 These can be concepts determining both the scope (who is a 
‘suspect’ or an ‘accused’ person) and the applicability of the defence rights Directives (in which 
proceedings and when are the rights triggered), as well as the interpretation of the content of the rights 
granted (for instance, what is the meaning of granting rights promptly or without undue delay). 
Autonomous concepts go beyond harmonisation in introducing a degree of uniformity in intra-EU 
criminal justice cooperation. By superimposing a Union meaning of key domestic law concepts, 
autonomous concepts become a mechanism of enforcement of EU law which has significant impact on 
domestic criminal justice systems and legal cultures, in changing both perceptions and practice in 
national criminal justice systems.95 Changes in domestic legal cultures which lead to the enhancement 
of fundamental rights in the criminal justice process may also serve to address the moral distance 
currently perceived in the system of mutual recognition in criminal matters. 
 
Conclusion   
The application of mutual recognition in the field of European criminal law was originally based on a 
maximalist concept of mutual trust between national criminal justice systems. The existence of trust 
was presumed, unquestioned, taken for granted. EU measures of mutual recognition have been 
designed to achieve quasi-automaticity in law enforcement cooperation across the European Union, 
with little space left to the examination of the consequences of recognition and execution for the 
affected individuals. Mutual trust meant that the system of inter-state cooperation  –  not accompanied 
                                                     
89 See Opinion of AG Bot above, in particular paragraphs 105-106. 
90 Case C-617/10,Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013. 
91 Case C-206/13, Siragusa, judgment of 6 March 2014. 
92 Paragraph 24. 
93 Paragraph 31. 
94 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Managing Legal Diversity in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice: The Role of Autonomous Concepts’ in  R. 
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by any degree of harmonisation of criminal procedural law – was not questioned. However, the 
transnational character of cooperation has generated a number of questions related to the moral 
distance of mutual recognition from the affected individuals and communities, questions which have 
become more acute by the significantly adverse consequences for fundamental rights of a system of 
recognition privileging enforcement. One way to address these concerns is to set limits to the 
automaticity of recognition by allowing executing authorities to proceed to a substantive examination, 
on a case-by-case basis, of the fundamental rights impact of recognition and execution on the affected 
individuals. This is a line of reasoning promoted by the European Court of Human Rights in its case 
law on the parallel system of mutual recognition in the field of asylum law, but it is a line currently 
vehemently resisted by the Court of Justice which has elevated the inherently subjective concept of 
mutual trust into a fundamental principle of EU law in Opinion 2/13. This deification of mutual trust 
(without attempting to define it any further) poses however significant challenges on the effective 
protection of fundamental rights which seems to be subordinated to the requirement to respect 
presumed and uncritically accepted trust. The reluctance by the Court of Justice to set limits on mutual 
recognition may be addressed to some extent by the second avenue of tackling concerns of moral 
distance, namely by accompanying mutual recognition by the harmonisation of national criminal 
procedural law, in particular measures related to the rights of the individual in criminal procedure. The 
adoption of these measures can have a transformative effect for the position of the individual in 
Europe’s area of criminal justice by triggering the application of the enforcement and interpretative 
tools of EU law. The strengthening of fundamental rights in this context, in addition to a more 
qualified approach with regard to automaticity of mutual recognition, has the potential to render 
subjective questions of mutual trust increasingly irrelevant.  
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‘Mutual Trust’ from the Perspective of National Courts 
A Test in Creative Legal Thinking 
Madalina Moraru* 
 
 
The mandate of the Member States’ national courts in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) is considerably more complex than in other fields of EU law. First of all, on top of the inherent 
complexities stemming from their common European mandate,1 they are required to step outside their 
own legal order and have an understanding of other national legal systems, when giving effect to 
foreign judgments or decisions. Secondly, EU law and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) seem to attach different meanings and effects to ‘mutual trust’ depending on the specific field 
of the AFSJ. For instance, it is not clear the extent to which national courts have to conform to a blind 
‘mutual trust’ in the conformity of the legal and judicial systems of other Member States with human 
rights for the benefit of ensuring the EU principles of unity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law, at 
the expense of securing fundamental rights protection of individuals,2 and, furthermore, whether these 
principles have similar effects across the various AFSJ areas. The fact that most of the CJEU case law 
dealing with issues related to the clarification of the meaning and effects of ‘mutual trust’ stems from 
national courts is an indication of the confusion surrounding the EU concept of ‘mutual trust’. Thirdly, 
the mandate of the national courts has become additionally complicated by the fact that they are 
increasingly placed in a position of dealing with divergent jurisprudence stemming from the CJEU and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The long-time reciprocal deference and jurisprudential 
accommodation showed by the two supranational courts seem to have been recently challenged, on the 
one hand, by the CJEU, which is more concerned with constructing an autonomous meaning of the EU 
Charter’s fundamental rights whose application should rather serve the objective of primacy and 
effectiveness of EU law than an extensive protection of  human rights,3 and on the other hand, by the 
Courts’ limited engagement with their apparent conflictual strands of jurisprudence. 
                                                     
* Scientific Coordinator and Researcher, European University Institute.  This paper’s ambition is to discuss some of the most 
interesting and salient problems concerning the implementation of the EU principles of mutual recognition and mutual 
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Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107; Case C-396/11, Radu, EU:C:2012:648; C‑491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, 
EU:C:2010:828; C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, EU:C:2008:406. 
3 AG Maduro Opinion in C-465/07, Elgafaji, EU:C:2009:94, points 19 and 20. Likewise AG Cruz Villalón, Case C- 69/10, 
Samba Diouf, EU:C:2011:524, para. 39 and Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013] nyr, para. 87; legal scholars refer 
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National courts have been increasingly faced with claims of lifting the veil of the automatic 
mutual trust in favour of ensuring concrete and individual protection of human rights.4 Faced with the 
questions of establishing the precise scope of application of mutual trust and mutual recognition and 
their effects in particular sectors within the AFSJ, the national courts’ responses have varied 
significantly, ranging from blunt disagreement with the CJEU judgments and disobeying the 
preliminary rulings5 to an innovative legal thinking meant to clarify the legal meaning and effects of 
mutual trust and reconcile jurisprudential conflicts while also safeguarding the constitutional good of 
human rights protection. Judicial dialogue, whether direct or indirect, horizontal or vertical, seems to 
have offered the source of inspiration for solutions to deal with these challenging objectives and 
difficulties concerning the application of the EU concept of mutual trust. 
This paper aims to first highlight the main problems national courts encounter when giving 
effect to the EU principles of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition’, and secondly to assess the 
national courts’ responses to these difficulties, in an attempt to find patterns of judicial behaviour. 
Finally, the paper outlines the opportunities of the strategic use of the ‘judicial interaction techniques’ 
as possible solutions to the above mentioned difficulties.6 
 
Mapping out the difficulties faced by national courts in the practice of ‘mutual trust’ 
In spite of the increasing importance of ‘mutual trust’ for the functioning of the AFSJ, and the overall 
EU legal order,7 ‘mutual trust’ remains one of the most elusive EU legal concepts. Its definition cannot 
be found in the EU Treaties8 or the 1999 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, but 
spread across the various EU secondary legislation and the CJEU jurisprudence developed on a case 
by case basis. The EU normative system in civil matters seems to describe mutual trust as a quasi-
absolute principle, experiencing an evolution towards stronger automatic application of mutual trust 
and limiting the invocation of human rights as grounds for restraining the operation of mutual trust.9 
On the other hand, in criminal matters, the EU legislator recognised a short, exhaustive list of human 
                                                     
4 For a more detailed list of case law, please consult, the Database of the Project European Judicial Cooperation in the 
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of mutual recognition, see [2004] O.J. C 310/47. 
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removing the exequatur proceedings (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
[2012] O.J. L 351/ (hereinafter Brussel I Recast) and Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] O.J. L 12/11 
(hereinafter Brussels I Regulation)); the European Payment Order and European Enforcement Order Regulations 
removed any judicial review of the minimum procedural standards applied in other Member States (Regulation (EC) No 
1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment 
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2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, [2004] O.J. L 143/15). For a detailed legal 
assessment of the evolution of mutual trust based instruments in civil matters, see the seminal article of M. Weller, 
‘Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international law’, (2015) Journal of Private 
International Law, 64-102. 
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rights based grounds for limiting the application of mutual trust,10 while the Dublin Regulation on 
transfers of asylum seekers11 leaves the Member States the discretionary power to limit the application 
of mutual trust under the sovereignty clause,12 without however expressly mentioning human rights 
among these legitimate grounds. 
In the absence of an EU primary legal provision clarifying what ‘mutual trust’ actually means, 
its relation with mutual recognition and human rights, and its effects across AFSJ fields, national 
courts did not have clear, uniform guidelines to follow when dealing with the many recurrent 
individual challenges to the blind mutual trust in other Member States’ legal orders and almost 
automatic enforcement of foreign judgments and decisions. Consequently, the CJEU was requested to 
provide clarifications to the meaning, scope and legal force of the EU autonomous concept of ‘mutual 
trust’.13 However, the CJEU jurisprudence seems to have added up to the ambiguity surrounding the 
EU secondary legislative framework. 
This paper argues that, although the Court has ruled on several occasions on the nature and 
force of the concept of ‘mutual trust’, and its relation with the principle of mutual recognition of 
national judgments in the AFSJ, filling gaps left by the EU legislator, its case law does not provide a 
clear and uniform definition of ‘mutual trust’ and of its implications across all AFSJ fields. Although 
‘mutual trust’ and mutual recognition are in a symbiotic relation,14 the CJEU does not recognise the 
same effect of ‘mutual trust’ and the principle of mutual recognition throughout the different AFSJ 
fields.  
It will be shown below that, in certain cases, the CJEU requires an absolute application of the 
principle of mutual recognition regardless of whether there is or is not ‘mutual trust’ between national 
courts,15 while, in other cases, national courts are allowed to act upon their distrust of the other legal 
systems or of the conformity of foreign judicial interpretations with fundamental rights, and decide 
whether to restrict or not the application of the principle of mutual recognition of national judgments.16 
Additionally, ‘mutual trust’ is sometimes defined as entailing a strict acceptance of the level of 
protection of fundamental rights set at the European level while, in certain circumstances, national 
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Case C-396/11, Radu, EU:C:2012:648; Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107;  C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F, 
EU:C:2013:358; C‑491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, EU:C:2010:828; C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, EU:C:2008:406. For a more 
detailed account of the CJEU stance on ‘mutual trust’ across the various AFSJ fields until 2013, see A. Kornezov,  ‘The 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the light of the EU Acession to the ECHR – Is the Break-Up Inevitable?’ (2012-
2013) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 227 – 255. 
14 ‘Mutual trust’ is qualified as the foundational premise for the operation of the principle of mutual recognition, see Opinion 
2/13, op. cit.. 
15 See, for instance, C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, EU:C:2010:828. 
16 See, for instance, C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and others, EU:C:2011:865. This judgment has to be read together with the 
M.S.S. v Greece and Belgium, Appl. No. 30696/09, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 January 2011. The application of the 
principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition of judgments under the Dublin Regulation procedure seems to still posit 
problems concerning violations of human rights for the Member States under the ECHR system, see, for instance, 
Tarakhel v Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, ECtHR, 4 November 2014. 
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courts are recognised a certain margin of discretion in adopting a different level of protection of 
fundamental rights than that recognised at the EU level.17 It seems, therefore, very difficult for 
national courts to decide in which circumstances they are allowed to restrict the application of the 
principle of mutual trust on grounds related to fundamental rights.  
 
The elusive EU concept of ‘mutual trust’ in the CJEU jurisprudence 
The definition and scope of application of the principle of ‘mutual trust’ as defined by the CJEU 
seems to vary depending on whether the principle is applied in relation to internal market issues or the 
AFSJ.18 Within the AFSJ, the scope of application of ‘mutual trust’ is also slightly different depending 
on whether the concept is applied within the field of migration, civil or criminal matters. Looking at 
only a few of the CJEU judgments in these fields, it becomes evident how difficult it is to identify 
clear, coherent and uniform guidelines on the application of the principle of ‘mutual trust’ to be 
followed by national courts. For instance, in the Zarraga judgment involving the non-return of a child, 
the Court mandated an absolute application of the principle of mutual recognition even in the absence 
of absolute mutual trust in the conformity with fundamental rights of the legal system of the issuing 
national court.19 The Zarraga judgment follows a thread of previous jurisprudence where the CJEU 
supported a similar far-reaching application of mutual trust, which sometimes resulted in a limitation 
of human rights ‒ usually fair trial and effective remedies rights20‒ within the field of the EU 
instruments on judicial cooperation in civil matters.21 The Court’s quasi-absolute application of mutual 
trust approach follows closely the EU secondary instruments’ specific conceptualisation of mutual 
trust in civil matters. 
The operational framework of mutual trust changes in the AFSJ migration related matters 
compared to the civil sector. The Dublin Regulation on transfers of asylum seekers in the Member 
States of first entry, which has so far instigated the majority of the national and European judgments 
on mutual trust in the migration field, leaves the Member States a certain discretion to decide when to 
limit the application of mutual trust. However it does not make absolute or relative human rights a 
mandatory ground for refusing application of mutual trust. The CJEU developed a less far-reaching 
approach of mutual trust in the field of Dublin transfers of asylum seekers, unlike in the civil sector of 
the AFSJ. In N.S., the Court decided in favour of a relative application of the principle of mutual 
recognition in the field of application of the Dublin Regulation, permitting national courts to act upon 
their distrust of the conformity with fundamental rights of the other Member States’ asylum procedural 
system and thus allow them to rebut the presumption of conformity with fundamental rights. However, 
the N.S. judgment of the CJEU left open certain questions regarding the scope of application of the 
principle of mutual trust and the obligations entailing upon the Member States. First of all, the ruling 
seemed to indicate that mutual recognition and ‘mutual trust’ could be limited only in cases of 
‘systemic flaws’ existing in the national asylum procedural mechanism,22 and not also in cases of 
individual violations of human rights, thus raising a problem of conflicting jurisprudence with the 
                                                     
17 See, for instance, Radu compared to Jeremy F, and compared to N.S. judgments of the CJEU. 
18 See the other contributions to this edited paper, in particular those of J. Snell and E. Storskrubb. See also, Malin T. 
Schunke, Whose Responsibility? A Study of Transnational Defence Rights and Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions 
within the EU (Intersentia Cambridge, 2013). 
19 Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, idem, ‘‘The requested court may not review the 
judgment even if it is vitiated by a serious infringement of fundamental rights’’, para. 69. 
20 For an exceptional case, where the CJEU accepted the limitation of the automatic application of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition in favour of the right to a fair hearing, see Case C-619/10, Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments, Ltd, 
EU:C:2012:531. The exceptional circumstances consist of ‘‘a manifest and disproportionate breach of the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial because of the impossibility of bringing an appropriate and effective appeal against it’’, see para. 44. 
21 See, for instance, Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v Misat Srl, EU:C:2003:657; Case C-157/12, Salzgitter 
Mannesmann Handel GmbH v SC Laminorul SA, EU:C:2013:597. For more jurisprudence, see M. Weller, ‘Mutual trust: 
in search of the future of European Union private international law’, (2015) Journal of Private International Law, 64-
102, at 85-90. 
22 See N.S. judgment, para. 86. 
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ECtHR.23 Secondly, it was not clear whether the scope of application of  ‘systemic deficiencies’ was 
to be interpreted as limited to the sector of asylum procedural law, or whether it also covered other 
areas of the AFSJ.24 Thirdly, the Court did not clarify whether, in cases of systemic flaws in the 
asylum legal framework of the Member State of first entry, the transferring Member State’s right to 
consider whether or not to take the responsibility for assessing the asylum claim, under the sovereignty 
clause (Article 3(2) Dublin Regulation), would have to be interpreted as an obligation incumbent upon 
that Member State.25 
Although the CJEU apparently clarified in N.S. the conditions when the raison d’être of the 
AFSJ – mutual trust – does not need to be followed, namely in cases of ‘systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and reception conditions’, this judgment actually opened a Pandora’s Box for the national 
courts. They were subsequently confronted with ensuing questions, such as the conditions of when 
national courts can distrust Member States other than Greece, where the existence of systemic flaws 
was not as evident,26 and establishing the obligations incumbent upon the Member States in 
circumstances where mutual trust could be rebutted.  
The CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the scope of the application of mutual trust in 
subsequent judgments dealing with cases of transfers of asylum seekers under the Dublin Regulation. 
However, neither Puid,27 nor Abdullahi28 made the mandate of the national courts less complicated. 
On the contrary, it seems that, through its rulings, the Court is testing the innovative legal thinking of 
the national courts. In Puid, the CJEU held that the right of an asylum seeker subject to a Dublin 
transfer does not transform the right of the Member States under Article 3(2) Dublin II Regulation into 
an obligation to assume responsibility for assessing his asylum application. However, at the same 
time, the Court reaffirmed the approach it previously adopted in N.S., which does not leave a margin 
of discretion to the Member States in cases of ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum systems of a Member 
State, but imposes an obligation not to transfer that asylum seeker, and consequently assume 
responsibility for assessing his claim. Therefore, it seems the Court is giving two conflicting 
indications to national courts, which can be reconciled only by way of innovative interpretational 
skills. 
Abdullahi was a good opportunity for the Court to clarify its previous N.S. ruling as regards 
the narrow scope of application of human rights based limitations to the principle of mutual trust, 
                                                     
23 This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the following sub-section - National courts between Scylla and Charybdis. 
24 Deficiencies in other sectors of the justice systems of the Member States were identified in particular Member States, see 
for instance the pre-trial detention conditions in Poland found incompatible with the ECHR (Boguslaw Krawczak v. 
Poland, Appl. 24205/06, Judgment 31 May 2005); Miroslaw Garlicki v. Poland, Appl. 36921/07, Judgment 14 June 
2006), the raising distrust of EU citizens in their national legal and judicial systems, according to 8European 
Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 385, ‘‘Justice in the EU’’, Report conducted by TNS Political & Social at the request 
of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice (DG JUST), Survey co-ordinated by the European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM ‘‘Strategy, Corporate Communication Actions and 
Eurobarometer’’ Unit), November 2013; see also European Commission, ‘‘The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard’’, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2014) 155 final. 
25 See Case C-4/11, Puid, EU:C:2013:740 and the scholarly critiques brought against the CJEU judgment in this case, M. 
Hennessy, ‘The Dublin system and the Right to an Effective Remedy– The case of C-394/12 Abdullahi’, available online 
in EDAL Journal, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/dublin-system-and-right-effective-remedy%E2%80%93-
case-c-39412-abdullahi and Daphné Bouteillet-Paquet, ‘The Dublin System and the Right to an Effective Remedy – 
Observations on the preliminary references in the cases of C-155/15 – George Karim v Migrationsverket and C- 63/15 - 
Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie’ , available online in EDAL Journal, 
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/dublin-system-and-right-effective-remedy-%E2%80%93-observations-
preliminary-references-cases-c-15515  
26 Such as Italy, see, for example, the Tarakhel v Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, ECtHR, 4 November 2014 and UK 
Supreme Court, R (on the application of EM (Eritrea)) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2014] 
UKSC 12, Judgment of 24 February 2014. 
27 See Case C-4/11, Puid, EU:C:2013:740. 
28 Case C-394/12, Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, EU:C:2013:813. 
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while also ensuring that its particular interpretation follows ECtHR specific jurisprudence. 
Unfortunately, this case was a lost opportunity for the Court to provide more general guidelines on the 
scope of application of mutual trust and bring its conceptualisation of the right to an effective legal 
remedy and more generally of human rights in line with ECtHR jurisprudence. The CJEU restated its 
famous paragraph 86 of the N.S. judgment,29 which permits a limitation to mutual trust only if the 
following strict conditions are met: there is a ‘systemic deficiency’ in the asylum procedural 
mechanism of the Member State of transfer, and these systemic deficiencies ‘must provide substantial 
grounds for believing that the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU’. The CJEU refused thus to admit individual violations of human rights of the asylum 
seekers in the Member States of transfer as legitimate grounds for limiting the operation of mutual 
trust.30 The burden of assessing whether in the specific case there were, in practice, such systemic 
deficiencies was left to the national referring court. This margin of discretion is not though capable of 
overly complicating the national court mandate, since Abdullahi, even if indirectly, concerned a 
transfer to Greece, where the existence of systemic deficiencies in ‘the Member State 
responsible within the meaning of the Dublin Regulation’ was in no doubt. A mitigating 
circumstance for the CJEU insufficient guidelines on the operation of mutual trust in 
migration matters, is the fact that N.S. and others, Puid31 and Abdullahi were all cases related 
to Dublin transfer of asylum seekers to Greece. Therefore, the CJEU did not have, thus far, 
the opportunity to clarify the scope of application of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in regard to other 
Member States, confronted with less ‘systemic’ deficiencies’ than Greece. 
If justifiable reasons can be found for the CJEU’s ambiguous definition of ‘systemic 
flaws’, the same cannot be said for its restrictive approach of allowing asylum seekers to 
contest the application of mutual trust only in the exceptional delineated circumstances set out in 
N.S., which fails to take into account the possibility of risks of inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 4 Charter or violations of other relative human rights in individual circumstances outside the 
sphere of systemic deficiencies in a Member State.  
In the field of criminal law, the CJEU has developed three different approaches to the scope of 
application of mutual trust, ranging from the most far-reaching, automatic application in Radu,32 a 
following quasi-automatic approach in Melloni,33 to a relative, balanced approach in the Jeremy F.34 
On the other hand, the national courts had a similar approach, in all these EAW related cases, 
preferring to set aside the application of mutual recognition and mutual trust, in favour of the ECHR 
and/or national levels of protection of fundamental rights, which were interpreted as setting a higher 
standard of protection of fundamental rights than that provided by the EAW Framework Decision. The 
common thread of the Court rationale in these cases is that national courts should give priority to 
mutual trust and mutual recognition of national judgments, if ensuring higher standards of protection 
of human rights endangers the effective application of the EAW Framework Decision. However, the 
Court added certain nuances to this general understanding of mutual trust and mutual recognition, 
which have gradually developed from an absolute application of the principle of mutual trust in Radu 
to a surprisingly relative application of mutual trust in Jeremy F. 
                                                     
29 N.S. and Others, para. 86: ‘‘By contrast, if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the 
asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman 
or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of 
that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that provision.’’ Similarly, paragraph 94 is also often re-
stated by the CJEU in conjunction with paragraph 86. 
30 According to Abdullahi, paragraph 60, which confirms paragraph 85 of N.S. judgment: ‘‘minor infringements would not 
suffice to release the Member States from their duties under mutual trust’’. 
31 Case C-4/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Kaveh S, EU:C:2013:740. 
32 It has to be noticed that in Radu, he CJEU developed an even more stringent approach then in its N.S. judgment. 
33 Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107. 
34 C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F, EU:C:2013:358. 
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In Radu, the CJEU gave a very short reply to the long list of preliminary questions addressed 
by the Romanian referring court, which were concerned with the question of the extent to which 
mutual trust could be limited on human rights, as enshrined in the ECHR and EU Charter, grounds. 
The CJEU left no margin of discretion to the national court, requiring it to operate an automatic 
application of mutual trust based on the limited discretion left by the EAW Framework Decision 
States on the issue of transfer of individuals without first hearing the accused.35  
In Melloni, the Court started to develop a more nuanced approach to the scope of application 
of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition within the ambit of the same EAW Framework 
Directive. Unlike Radu, the Court started first by restating the theoretical relative application of the 
principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust as established in the N.S. judgment, whereby mutual 
trust was no longer required in the case of ‘systemic deficiencies’ of the national asylum procedure, 
and then continued by introducing a general principle whereby national courts would have to ensure 
that the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law is not compromised by applying a higher standard 
of human rights protection than that ensured at the EU level.36 Therefore, unlike its approach in Radu, 
the Court does not reject from the outset the possibility of limiting mutual trust in favour of a more 
extensive protection of human rights, but permits such a limitation, as long the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law is not compromised. Although the general principle established by the Court 
seems to allow a relative application of mutual trust, its application to the actual case, re-adduces the 
Melloni judgment closer to the Radu absolute application of mutual trust, since the Court established 
that, in this case, the national higher level of human rights would in fact lead to jeopardising the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. The Court concludes that since the relevant matter (i.e., 
the transfer of individuals condemned in absentia) had been fully harmonized by Union law,37 it 
would be impossible to refuse to execute an EAW in other conditions than those exhaustively 
provided by the EAW. Although the end result in Melloni is the same as that reach in Radu, the Court 
slightly departed by way of recognising the possibility of operating a relative application of mutual 
trust, when higher standards of human rights do not imperil the unity, primacy and effectiveness of EU 
law. The judgment did not though clarify what precisely the relation is between this principle and the 
N.S. ‘systemic deficiencies’ exception to the application of mutual trust. 
Within the same field of the EAW Framework Decision, the Court seems to have again 
slightly changed its approach on the scope of application of mutual recognition and mutual trust in the 
subsequent Jeremy F case.38 In this case, the CJEU reiterated the Melloni developed principle of 
relative application of mutual trust, and then, unlike previous judgments, left the final decision to the 
referring national court. The Court recognised that the Member States retained a margin of discretion 
to apply higher fundamental rights standards, in casu the right to a fair trial and effective remedy, as 
long as the effective application of EU law is preserved. Unlike in Radu and Melloni, the CJEU also 
dedicated more space to the analysis of the jurisprudential guidelines established by ECtHR. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU then strategically used Articles 6 and 5(4) ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR to justify its own interpretation of the right to an effective remedy (Articles 47 and 48 EU 
Charter). The CJEU held that the ECtHR does not require to set up a second level of jurisdiction for 
the examination of the lawfulness of detention, and based on Article 51 EU Charter, neither will it be 
required under Article 47 of the EU Charter.  
Ultimately the determination of whether a higher level of protection of fundamental rights 
than that provided at the EU level was possible, while ensuring at the same time compliance with the 
principles of primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law, was left to the referring national court. This 
more permissive interpretation of the principle of mutual trust and mutual recognition was possible 
                                                     
35 For a detail comment of the factual and legal context of the Radu case, and the judicial dialogue patterns, see JUDCOOP 
Final Handbook, p.74-76, and the JUDCOOP Database, freely available at 
http://judcoop.eui.eu/data/?p=data&idPermanent=44  
36 Even if Article 52(3) of the EU Charter would, in principle, permit national courts to apply such more extensive human 
rights protection, Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para. 60. 
37 Melloni, para. 60. 
38 For more details on the factual and legal context in the Jeremy F, see the JUDCOOP Final Handbook, p. 63-65. 
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because ‘mutual trust’ was not, in casu, endangered. In its preliminary reference, the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel wanted to know whether the Member States maintained a certain margin of discretion 
to establish a second level of judicial review over the decision of a French court that, in casu, was the 
executing judicial authority agreeing to the amendment of the substance of the EAW.39 The French 
Conseil Constitutionnel did not therefore challenge the conformity of the issuing Member State’s legal 
system or the judicial interpretation of the issuing judicial authority with European or national 
fundamental rights. As long as the national court was able to apply its own maximalist interpretation 
of fundamental rights, without calling into question the system of mutual recognition set out in the 
EAW Framework Decision, then, according to the CJEU, national courts preserve a certain margin of 
discretion to apply a more extensive protection of fundamental rights than that set at EU level. It is not 
clear whether the national courts would recognise the same margin of discretion if an element of 
distrust of foreign judgments or legal systems was added to the Jeremy F type of case.40 
Opinion 2/13 offers the most recent view shared by the CJEU on the definition and role of 
mutual trust within the EU legal order. The Opinion confirms the CJEU vision of itself as ‘the ultimate 
guarantor of mutual trust in the AFSJ’.41 In spite of the EU Treaties lack of express referral to the 
concept of mutual trust, the Opinion confers a constitutional status to mutual trust, as a foundational 
principle of the AFSJ and overarching principle of the entire EU legal order. The Court emphasised 
the role of the mutual trust in EU law as a strong presumption of compliance with human rights 
standards, so much so that Member States are required to consider that 
 
fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only they [may] 
not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State 
than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that 
other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the EU.42  
 
The Court cites its N.S. judgment as the source of the ‘mutual trust’ definition.43 However, it is not 
clear whether, the Court replaces the previous different understandings of mutual trust in the various 
sectors of the AFSJ with one single definition of transversal application. Given the specific context 
envisaged in the Opinion,44 it could be argued that the Court only offers a general definition of mutual 
trust within the specific context of protecting the autonomy of the EU legal order from an external 
intervention,45 while within the internal EU legal context, mutual trust is still preserved as a concept of 
varied scope of application depending on the specific field of the AFSJ.46  
                                                     
39 See the commentary of the case in the JUDCOOP Final Handbook, p. 63-5. 
40 The CJEU Spasic judgment added a further facet of confusion to its approach on mutual trust. Contrary to the CJEU 
approach of far-reaching mutual trust in Radu and Melloni, in Spasic (C-129/14 PPU), the Court adopted a rather 
‘distrustful’ approach towards mutual trust within the framework of the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement. For more details on the case, see the blog comment by A. Marletta, ‘The CJEU and the Spasic case: recasting 
mutual trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?; see more at: 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2655#sthash.Xg4Hs3P4.dpuf  
41 This portrayal of the CJEU was first mentioned by A. Kornezov, idem. 
42 See Opinion 2/13, para. 192. 
43 It has to be recalled that in N.S. and Others the CJEU referred to the principle of mutual trust as ‘‘the raison d’être of the 
European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the Common European 
Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European 
Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights’’ – para. 83 [emphasis added].  
44 In Opinion 2/13, the Court dealt with the relation between the EU legal order with the ECHR as pictured by the Draft 
Accession Agreement, and with the effects of an external legal order and judgments of an external regional court. 
45 Meaning the ECHR. 
46 Mutual trust operates in various fields of the AFSJ, namely, under the judicial cooperation in civil matters, as set out, for 
instance, by the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] O.J. L 12/1; Regulation 2201/2003, Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
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Although the CJEU has clarified the important status of mutual trust within the EU legal order, 
its precise scope of application and effects are still surrounded by ambiguity. Even if we were to 
accept the N.S. judgment as the current single definition of ‘mutual trust’ to be applied throughout the 
AFSJ, the scope of application of ‘systemic deficiencies’ and whether individual violations of human 
rights falling outside the scope of systemic deficiencies can be admitted as legitimate grounds for 
limiting the operation of mutual trust have not been clarified. 47 Furthermore, although Opinion 2/13 
raises mutual trust to the constitutional status of a foundational principle of EU law, it does not clarify 
whether the specific definition of ‘systemic flaws’ in asylum procedure should be applied by analogy 
across all AFSJ fields.48 In conclusion, in spite of the constitutional aspirations of Opinion 2/13, the 
application of mutual trust and recognition has not necessarily become clearer as regards the scope, 
modus operandi and effects, thus preserving the complexity of the national courts’ European mandate. 
 
National courts following the jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR - between Scylla 
and Charybdis 
The unclear jurisprudence of the CJEU on the scope of application and effects of mutual trust is not 
the only difficulty that national courts face regarding the application of the EU principle of mutual 
trust. It was pointed out that the main issues concerning mutual trust faced by national courts relate to 
the level of human rights protection they have to secure to the individuals subject to foreign decisions 
or judgments. The CJEU is not though the sole or even the main authoritative court on human rights 
related issues in Europe. As pointed by President Skouris, ‘the Court of Justice is not a human rights 
court; it is the Supreme Court of the European Union’.49 The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is the human rights court in Europe, which has so far had the opportunity to review, on 
several occasions, the conformity of the national implementation of the EU mutual trust based 
instruments with the ECHR.50  
In spite of the two supranational courts’ willingness to ensure mutual jurisprudential 
adaptation,51 recently, they have considered each other’s decisions only to a limited degree. While 
(Contd.)                                                                   
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] O.J. L 351/1; under the judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, as set out by, for instance, Framework decision 2002/584/JAI by the Council of 13th June 2002 relative 
to the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between Member States, [2002] O.J. L 190/1; or under asylum 
and migration, see the Dublin II Regulation (Regulation 343/2003 [2003] O.J. L 50/1). 
47 See the ECtHR judgment in Tarakhel v Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, ECtHR, 4 November 2014, where the Strasbourg 
Court added an additional string to the assessment that national courts have to perform when balancing the application of 
mutual trust against human rights grounds, compare with that established by the CJEU in N.S.. See more on the judicial 
interaction between the two supranational courts in the following paragraphs of the paper. 
48 See, C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and others, EU:C:2011:865, para. 86. See also Puid (C-4/11) EU:C:2013:740, para. 30. 
This principle is now provided by Dublin III Regulation, which refers to ‘systemic flaws’, see Regulation 604/2013 
[2013] O.J. L 180/31, Article 3(2), however other EU secondary instruments do not refer to this notion. 
49 L. Besselink, ‘The CJEU as the European ‘Supreme Court’: Setting Aside Citizens’ Rights for EU Law Supremacy’, article 
available online at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/ecj-european-supreme-court-setting-aside-citizens-rights-eu-law-
supremacy/#.Vi1FyiuznQ0 . 
50 See, for example, Stapleton v Ireland, Appl. No. 56588/07, ECtHR Judgment of 4 May 2010; M.S.S. v Greece and 
Belgium, Appl. No. 30696/09, ECtHR Judgment of 21 January 2011; Ignaoua and Others v UK, Appl. 46706/08, ECtHR 
Judgment of 18 March 2014; Tarakhel v Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, ECtHR Judgment of 4 November 2014. 
51 See, for instance, the Marchx case (Appl. No. 6833/74, ECtHR Judgment of 13 June 1979) of the Strasbourg Court 
adapting its jurisprudence to the Defrenne ruling of the CJEU (Case C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56), and on its part, the CJEU 
judgments in Carpenter (C-60/00, EU:C:2002:434) and Schmidberger (Case C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333), and Connolly 
(Case C-274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127), where it closely followed the ECtHR Handyside judgment (Handyside v the United 
Kingdom, Appl. No. 5493/72, ECtHR Judgment of 7 December 1976); in P v S (Case C-13/94, EU:C:1996:170), the 
CJEU cited the ECtHR definition of transsexualism in Rees v UK, Appl. No. 9532/81, Judgment of 17 October 1986. See 
also, W. Weiβ, ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights after 
Lisbon’, European Constitutional Law Review, (2011), 64-95, 80; F. Ippolito and S. Velluti, ‘The relationship between 
the CJEU and the ECtHR: the case of asylum’ in K. Dzehtsiarou, T. Konstadinides, T. Lock, N. O'Meara (eds), Human 
Rights Law in Europe The Influence, Overlaps and Contradictions of the EU and the ECHR, Routledge Research in 
Human Rights Law (2014). 
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former AG Jacobs could not find a single solid case in which the CJEU evidently went against the 
interpretation of the ECtHR,52 following the entry into force of the Charter, it seems the number of 
cases where the two supranational courts develop different human rights’ interpretation keeps on 
increasing. This change of jurisprudence might result from the CJEU placing more and more emphasis 
on ensuring the autonomous character of the EU legal order, including by way of constructing an 
autonomous interpretation of fundamental rights within the specific framework of the structure and 
objectives of the EU.53 As long as the human rights standards established by the ECtHR do not 
jeopardise the autonomy of the EU legal order or the effectiveness, unity and primacy of EU law, then 
jurisprudential conflict is avoided. However, the peculiar application of the EU mutual trust is giving 
rise to jurisprudential conflicts between the two supranational courts, spurred mainly by the different 
specific objectives these Courts pursue when balancing the application of the principle of mutual trust 
with the individuals’ fundamental rights. While the CJEU is giving priority to the transnational aspect 
of the AFSJ instruments, the ECtHR is giving priority to human rights, without being concerned that 
this preference might lead to the possible collapse of the EU mutual trust based system. 
Furthermore, the two supranational courts have different approaches to indirectly54 assessing 
each others legal order’s conformity with their respective constitutional charters. In Kamberaj,55 the 
CJEU found that Article 6(3) TEU does not require the direct application of ECHR law and the 
disapplication of a provision of national law implementing EU legislation on the basis of the ECHR. 
In turn, the ECtHR is reviewing the conformity of the Member States’ legislation derogating from EU 
law with the ECHR,56 and furthermore assessing whether the Member States’ courts have complied 
with their EU specific obligation to address preliminary questions to the CJEU within the scope of the 
ECHR right to a fair trial.57 Therefore, the potential of developing conflicting jurisprudence from the 
CJEU and ECtHR on the legal effects of mutual trust is high, given their different judicial stances on 
the extent of judicial review of the conformity of each other’s legal orders with their respective 
constitutional charters, different rationales, objectives and guiding principles in the application of their 
respective constitutional charters. 
The CJEU gives priority to effectiveness and autonomy of EU law and to a quasi-absolute 
application of mutual trust, with some variations permitted in favour of a higher standard of protection 
of human rights in specific AFSJ sectors. On the other hand, the ECtHR will not refrain from 
generally assessing the conformity of the Member States’ EU implementing legislation with the 
ECHR, and furthermore finding a violation of the ECHR, regardless of the CJEU’s previous 
judgments on the issue.58 This approach was evident in the 2011 M.S.S v Belgium and Greece and 
2014 Tarakhel v Switzerland judgments. In both cases, the ECtHR found the Member States were in 
violation of the ECHR following the application of the EU principle of mutual trust within the field of 
Dublin transfers of asylum seekers. The CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the scope of application 
                                                     
52 F.G. Jacobs, ‘Judicial dialogue and the cross-fertilization of legal systems: the European Court of Justice’, Texas 
International Law Journal, vol. 38 (2003), 547-556. See also, J. Krommendijk, ‘The use of ECtHR Case law by the 
CJEU after Lisbon: The view of the Luxembourg insiders’, Maastricht Working Paper 2015-6. 
53 See, Case C-465/07, Elgafaji, EU:C:2009:94; Case C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de 
l’Immigration, EU:C:2011:524; Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, EU:C:2011:815; Opinion 2/13, para. 170. 
54 The EU is not yet party to the ECHR, therefore the ECtHR does not have jurisdiction to directly assess the EU measures. 
However, there are indirect ways through which the ECtHR assesses EU actions. For instance, when the challenged 
Member State action is an expression of the implementation, or derogation from EU law. 
55 Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others, 
EU:C:2012:233. 
56 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari, Appl. No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005, Michaud v France, Appl. No. 12323/11, 
Final Judgment of 6 March 2013, where it found that equivalent protection may not apply when the Member States have 
a margin of discretion in implementing the EU measure (such as in the case of directives) 
57 See, inter alia, Dhahbi v Italy, Appl. No. 17120/09, where the ECtHR confirmed that an unreasoned refusal to raise 
preliminary questions under Article 267(3) TFEU amounts to a breach of Article 6 ECHR. 
58 M.S.S. v Greece and Belgium, Appl. No. 30696/09, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 January 2011; ECtHR judgment in Tarakhel v 
Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, ECtHR, 4 November 2014. 
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and operation of mutual trust first in N.S., where the Court extensively referred to the M.S.S. judgment 
and followed the ECtHR approach by first endorsing the existence of systemic deficiencies in Greece 
and secondly holding that this situation is justifying a limitation to the application of mutual trust. 
However, the two judgments seemed to be at odds regarding the precise threshold for allowing distrust 
among the Member States.  
In M.S.S., the ECtHR seemed to indicate that systemic procedural shortcomings are a 
sufficient condition for rebutting the presumption of the Member States’ conformity with human 
rights, and consequently of refusing the application of mutual trust, while the CJEU elevated this 
condition into a necessary one for the disapplication of mutual trust in N.S.. This potential 
jurisprudential conflict could have been remedied by the CJEU in the 2013 Abdullahi case, however, 
the CJEU confirmed the previous jurisprudential tension by making ‘systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and reception conditions’ the only condition justifying the refusal of the Dublin 
Regulation principle of mutual trust.  
The 2014 Tarakhel judgment of the ECtHR did not endorse the CJEU’s limited application of 
its M.S.S. judgment to circumstances involving ‘systemic deficiencies’. The ECtHR held that the N.S. 
test for ‘systemic deficiencies’ should also include an individual examination of the case, in particular 
a ‘thorough and individualised examination of the situation of the person concerned’ in the state of 
destination.59 This second strand of jurisprudence confirmed the existence of a tension between the 
CJEU and ECtHR understanding of the scope of application and operation of mutual trust, since the 
ECtHR held that systemic procedural shortcomings are only a sufficient condition for rebutting the 
presumption of the Member States’ conformity with human rights, and consequently for refusing the 
application of mutual trust, while the CJEU elevated this sufficient condition into a necessary one. The 
ECtHR seems to challenge the scope and operation of the mutual trust principle as conceived by the 
CJEU and favours an approach of safeguarding human rights not just in cases of systemic failure, but 
also in cases of individual violations of human rights, regardless of the nature of the human right 
violated and whether these violations qualify as systemic or not.  
Given the different objectives pursued by the CJEU and the ECtHR, the individual opinions of 
the CJEU judges, AGs and reférendaires, who do not look at the Strasbourg Court judgments as 
legally binding,60 the divergent judicial opinions of the two Courts on the limitations to mutual trust 
based on fundamental rights issues will continue to exist, if not even increase in the future.61 
Even if the two supranational courts did have a common approach towards the scope of 
‘mutual trust’ in relation to human rights, there is still the problem of the CJEU case by case definition 
of the scope of application of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition’ ‒ at times absolute, while, at 
other times, relative, and the general ambiguity of the effects of mutual trust.  In this context, it is no 
surprise that national courts, which are equally bound by EU secondary legislation and ECHR, would 
first not readily favour the quasi-absolute application of mutual trust as favoured within the EU legal 
order, and secondly adopt different interpretation of what ‘mutual trust’ means and requires in 
practice.62 
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60 See J. Krommendijk, ‘The use of ECtHR Case law by the CJEU after Lisbon: The view of the Luxembourg insiders’, 
Maastricht Working Paper 2015-6. 
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National Courts’ diverse responses to the CJEU understanding of ‘mutual trust’ – 
various patterns of judicial behaviour 
The national courts of the Member States are constrained by their multiple and equally binding 
loyalties towards the EU and ECHR systems. Their action is reviewable by the ECtHR and can give 
rise to State liability for breach of EU law; furthermore, their decisions are subject to the review of the 
higher national courts.63 In the field of the AFSJ, this multiple mandate has called national judges to a 
particular delicate exercise of interpretation and application of norms that ideally would have ensured 
the unity and effective application of the AFSJ instruments, while guaranteeing extensive protection of 
human rights. This particular result, beneficial for the supranational and domestic legal orders, seems 
to be almost impossible to achieve in practice, in light of the limited grounds provided by the EU 
instruments justifying limitation to the principle of mutual recognition, the divergent jurisprudence of 
the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts, as well as the unclear jurisprudential guidelines established 
by the CJEU. In this particular context, the national courts’ decisions have varied considerably, 
ranging from full embrace of the CJEU’s particular approach of far-reaching application of mutual 
trust, with limitations only in the exceptional circumstances of ‘systemic deficiencies’, to following 
the EctHR’s narrower application of mutual trust, in favour of safeguarding individual human rights, 
to middle ground approaches choosing creative interpretations meant to reconcile the apparent 
conflicting supranational strands of jurisprudence.  
Following the M.S.S., N.S. and Abdullahi judgments, national courts were not sure how to 
interpret the scope of application of ‘systemic deficiencies’ within the migration field, in particular 
whether mutual trust was to be lifted only in cases where the violation of human rights amounted to 
systemic deficiencies, or also in individual cases of violation of human rights, and whether only 
violations of absolute human rights should be taken into account or also of relative human rights, such 
as the right to family life and fair trial and effective remedies. 
For instance, the UK courts have followed different approaches to the scope of application of 
the principle of mutual trust, either sharing the CJEU’s narrow threshold of ‘systemic deficiencies’ for 
the limitation of mutual trust, or a wider limitation approach by way of including also the EctHR’s 
individual violations threshold. The EM (Eritrea) case64 is illustrative of the divided approaches taken 
by national courts on the precise scope of application of mutual trust and choices of the different 
thresholds for the limitation of mutual trust established by the two supranational courts. While the UK 
Court of Appeal interpreted the trilogy of cases ‒ KRS v United  Kingdom, M.S.S.  v Belgium and  
Greece and N.S. and Others ‒ as requiring to follow a threshold where only ‘systemic’ and not also 
‘sporadic violations of international obligations’ should be taken into account,65 the UK Supreme 
Court adopted the wider threshold of limitation of mutual trust by taking into consideration not only 
the above mentioned trilogy of cases but also previous jurisprudence of the ECtHR, such as the 
landmark Soering case.66 The UK Supreme Court held that, should it follow the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of N.S., it would give rise ‘to an inevitable tension with the Home Secretary’s obligation 
to abide by EU law’ since under EU law, the Member States have to comply with the ECHR, and also 
the 1998 Human Rights Act which requires the Home Secretary to conform to the ECHR. In EM 
(Eritrea), the UK Supreme Court established that the legal test to be followed when determining 
whether particular violations of human rights amount to legitimate grounds for limiting mutual trust 
should be the ECtHR Soering test coupled with the M.S.S and N.S. threshold. Thereby, both 
operational, systemic failures in the national asylum systems and individual risks of being exposed to 
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treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 EU Charter should be considered as legitimate 
thresholds for the limitation of the principle of mutual trust.  
Other national courts have recently followed a similar approach of refusing transfers under the 
Dublin Regulation on grounds other than ‘systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception 
conditions’. Furthermore, not only risks of being subjected to ill-treatments in the Member State of 
transfer, but also violations of other relatives human rights, were held to be legitimate grounds for the 
limitation of the EU principle of mutual trust. For instance, the Regional Court67 chose to limit the 
application of mutual trust on grounds of violation of the applicants’ right not to be subject to inhuman 
and degrading treatment68 and their procedural rights, in particular their right to a personal interview 
under Dublin III Regulation, without arguing that these violations amounted to systemic deficiencies 
in the Member State of transfer. The Administrative Court of Nantes quashed a decision of a Dublin 
transfer in Italy based on the administration’s failure to carry out ‘a full and rigorous examination of 
the consequences of the applicant’s transfer in Italy’, and in particular of the existence of the N.S. 
conditions of ‘substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the [Italian] asylum 
procedure and in the reception conditions’.69 It has to be noticed that the high threshold of systemic 
deficiencies as defined in the N.S. judgment and established in Greece was not equally fulfilled in the 
present case. However, the French court still required the administration to give solid proof, instead of 
general motivations, of adequate assessment of the situation in Italy, which was required in light of 
‘the delicate and evolving situation in Italy, regarding migrants’ reception, every transfer decision 
under the Dublin Regulation, should be cautiously taken, after a full and rigorous examination of the 
consequences for the applicant upon transfer.’70 
Within the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the reaction of the national courts 
has been even more varied and drastic as regards the threshold for the limitation of the principle of 
mutual trust. The Spanish Constitutional Court strictly followed the ruling of the CJEU in Melloni, and 
gave up its long established doctrine of ‘indirect violations’ in favour of applying the lower level of 
protection of the right to a fair trial as ensured at the EU level,71 with the result of giving full effect to 
the principles of mutual trust, mutual recognition, primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.  
In contrast, the Romanian referring court did not strictly follow the CJEU preliminary ruling 
delivered in Radu.72 The domestic court opted to follow its proposed human rights orientated 
approach, which the CJEU refused to endorse. The referring court concluded that it resulted from the 
CJEU decision, that the judicial authority of the requested State may, in exceptional circumstances, 
refuse to surrender the person sought and the execution of a European arrest warrant in situations other 
than those exhaustively provided for in the EAW Decision and the national legislation transposing it. 
The respect of fundamental rights was considered by the referring Romanian Court of Appeal as one 
such exceptional situation. The Court based its refusal to surrender the requested person and 
enforcement of the four European Arrest Warrants on two main arguments: first, on the basis of the 
principle ‘non bis in idem’, the requested person was already convicted for the same offense in 
Romania; secondly, in regard to the other three EAWs the referring Court held that if these warrants 
were to be executed, then there would be a disproportionate interference with this person’s right to 
liberty and the right to private and family life, since the German judicial authorities’ requests were 
made after a 12 year period from the date of the alleged indictment, and, furthermore, the concrete 
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necessity to surrender the person sought was not indicated, nor was it clear how the surrender would 
contribute to finalising the case by the German judicial authorities. Hence the surrender of Mr Radu 
was no longer absolutely necessary. In addition, it was noted that the requested person was already 
detained in a prison in Romania, for the purpose of executing a sentence imposed for one of the 
offences that is the object of the German authorities’ requests. Additionally, the referring Court 
mentioned that continuing to serve the criminal sanction in the said prison in Romania would help 
maintain its family relations. Therefore, the purpose of preventing the circumvention of criminal 
liability would be better achieved by judging the requested person by the Romanian courts, on the 
basis of the principle of the ratione personae application of criminal law.73 
The referring Romanian court’s divergent approach from the CJEU preliminary ruling could 
be explained by the CJEU’s choice to ignore one of the referred questions. In reformulating the 
preliminary questions, the CJEU excluded a much disputed question regarding the application of 
mutual recognition and the presumption of ‘mutual trust’, namely whether the EU Charter would 
require to interpret the EAW Framework Decision so as to include also a form of proportionality 
check. However, given the CJEU’s strict interpretation of the grounds for non-recognition listed in the 
EAW Framework Decision, it could be inferred that the CJEU reply to this particular question would 
have been negative.74 The referring Romanian Court seems to have embraced the AG Sharpston 
Opinion rather than the CJEU preliminary ruling, since, unlike the CJEU, the AG suggested 
recognising, to the national courts, the power to exceptionally refuse to execute an EAW when the 
human rights of the individual to be surrendered were or will be infringed.75 
In Radu, the human rights orientated judgment of the referring Court was ultimately quashed 
by the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice, which asked the Court of Appeal to decide in 
favour of giving priority to the EU principles of mutual recognition and ‘mutual trust’.76 The High 
Court interpreted the CJEU preliminary ruling as requiring an absolute application of the principles of 
mutual recognition and mutual trust, thereby choosing to apply a lower protection of the rights to a fair 
trial and private and family life than the referring court, in favour of showing a complete trust in the 
decisions made by the German judicial authority.77  
Faced with issues regarding the establishment of precise conditions for refusing the 
application of mutual trust and the legal nature of lifting the veil of mutual trust in the AFSJ fields - 
right v obligation, national courts have more or less followed similar patterns of judicial behaviour: 
The (EU) strict conforming behaviour – Certain national courts have closely followed the 
CJEU absolute and automatic approach of mutual trust. For instance, the Romanian High Court of 
Cassation and Justice decided to follow a strict conforming application of the CJEU preliminary ruling 
in Radu, quashing the follow-up judgment of the referring Court of Appeal, in spite of the strong 
evidence invoked by the Court of Appeal regarding violation of the claimant’s right to a fair trial and 
family life, and the principle of proportionality. Similarly, the UK Court of Appeal in EM Eritrea 
closely conformed to the CJEU exceptional ‘systemic deficiencies’ threshold in asylum matters, 
although it noticed the possible conflict between the N.S. threshold established by the CJEU and the 
M.S.S. threshold established by the ECtHR for restraining the principle of mutual trust.  
The (EU) challenging but conforming behaviour – Other national courts attempted to 
challenge the CJEU far-reaching approach of mutual trust based on the necessity of safeguarding 
human rights as guaranteed at domestic or ECHR level. They proposed that their interpretation of the 
applicable standards of human rights should also be shared by the CJEU, on the basis of Article 52(3) 
EU Charter, even if this would mean in practice a limitation of the EU principle of mutual trust. The 
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CJEU did not entirely share their interpretation, choosing to act as the ultimate guarantor of the EU 
principle of mutual trust that would ensure the efficient transnational functioning of the AFSJ. In 
Melloni, the Spanish Constitutional Court attempted to convince the CJEU of its long established 
constitutional doctrine of conviction in absentia. Failing however to infuse its interpretation into the 
CJEU approach, the Spanish Constitutional Court conformed to the preliminary ruling and overruled 
its constitutional interpretation of the right to a fair trial regarding the surrender of persons convicted 
in absentia and dismissed the individual complaint.78 The German Oberlandesgericht Celle Court had 
a similar approach in Zarraga.79 The referring Court was of the opinion that because the child was not 
actually heard in custody proceedings, although the Spanish court gave the child this opportunity, 
should constitute a legitimate basis for refusing to recognise the Spanish judgment asking for the 
return of the child. Following the CJEU preliminary ruling holding that the recognition of judgments is 
automatic in these circumstances and that the German court cannot assess whether the Spanish court 
complied or not with the right to be heard of the child, the Oberlandesgericht Celle Court quashed the 
first instance decision and ordered the execution of the return of the child. Therefore, in spite of the 
initial challenging arguments presented in the preliminary reference by the Oberlandesgericht Celle 
Court, the latter ultimately conformed to the negative reply given by the CJEU preliminary ruling. 
The ECHR based control behaviour – Certain national courts have shown a preference for 
ensuring the higher standard of protection of human rights when the principles of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition of judgments, and the extensive protection of human rights, could not be achieved 
at the same time. This specific interpretation might be influenced not only by the humanist visions of 
the sitting national judges, but maybe more so by the specific relation between the national courts and 
the CJEU and/or ECHR. Certain national courts might show greater deference to the ECHR and the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence since their Member States have been party to the Council of Europe for a 
longer period of time than to the EU, and are more aware of their responsibilities and the 
consequences of the ECHR violations under that particular legal order. On human rights matters, the 
Romanian courts pay close attention to the ECHR, avoiding thus an increase in the already high 
number of convictions of the Romanian State before the ECtHR.80 Furthermore, Romanian courts have 
13 years less experience with the EU legal order, and therefore, on human rights matters, precedence 
is given to the ECHR standards that are considered equivalent to those ensured under the EU Charter. 
The inexperience in dealing with EU law matters, especially when there is a potential conflict between 
ECHR and EU norms, was evident in Radu. The Romanian referring court addressed several questions 
regarding the general relation between the ECHR and the EU Charter and also more specific ones as 
regards the extent to which the protection of the right to a fair trial and family life should be preferred 
against the application of the EU principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition of national 
judgments. The Advocate General dealt more extensively with these questions and showed greater 
understanding of the specific factual circumstances giving an opinion closer to that presented by the 
referring court. The Advocate General also referred extensively to the effect of Articles 52(3) on 
establishing the appropriate standard of fundamental rights protection and opined that the EU should 
set higher standards than the minimum standards of fundamental rights established at the ECHR. The 
CJEU, on the other hand, did not address the general relation between the EU Charter and ECHR, it 
rewrote the preliminary questions into a very narrow and precise question, which failed to observe the 
specific circumstances behind the questions addressed by the national court. It left no margin of 
discretion to the referring court, holding that the concerned person has no right to be heard before the 
execution of the EAW and did not refer to the Article 52 EU Charter issues. Being mute on the 
referring court’s concerns regarding situations when the ECHR has higher standards of protection of 
human rights than those ensured at the EU level, and establishing a specific automatic application of 
mutual trust and mutual recognition, it was evident, given the specific relation of the Romanian courts 
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with the ECHR, that the referring court would not easily accept the short preliminary ruling of the 
CJEU. The Romanian court chose to extract from the CJEU and the AG Opinion those arguments that 
encouraged primacy of the higher standards of fundamental rights against an automatic application of 
mutual trust and mutual recognition, and on the basis of a detailed legal and factual assessment it 
refused to execute the EAWs. 
The creative, reconciling behaviour – Following the M.S.S., N.S. and furthermore after 
Tarakhel, national courts were not sure how to interpret the scope of application of ‘systemic 
deficiencies’, in particular whether mutual trust was to be lifted only in cases when the violations of 
human rights amounted to systemic deficiencies based on the CJEU N.S. threshold, or also individual 
cases of violation of human rights could limit the application of mutual trust. The UK Supreme Court 
concluded that ‘an exclusionary rule based only on systemic failures would be arbitrary both in 
conception and in practice’, particularly since ‘gross violations of Article 3 ECHR rights can occur 
without there being any systemic failures whatsoever’.81 In attempting to reconcile the conflictual 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court found an innovative way of applying 
consistent interpretation. First, it held that an interpretation of the N.S. judgment should be that 
‘infringements of fundamental rights provide evidence of the systemic deficiency’ rather than that ‘a 
systemic deficiency had to be demonstrated before violation of a fundamental right.’82 It thus first 
provided a creative interpretation of the CJEU N.S. judgment that would then ensure conformity with 
the ECtHR Soering threshold, and avoid placing the national court in a position of choosing loyalties. 
 
‘Judicial interaction techniques’ as a possible solution to fulfil the national courts’ 
complex, pluri-dimensional mandate 
As pointed out by Garlicki, the European ‘multidimensionality of constitutional protection of HRs’ 
might be beneficial for individual rights ‘provide that all actors are moving in the same direction’.83 
When the cooperation and coordination among supranational, national supreme or constitutional and 
ordinary courts decreases, conflicts may appear. There are not many procedural mechanisms that 
could solve conflicts between courts, be they vertical (between a national supreme/constitutional 
courts and one of the European courts) or horizontal (that is, a conflict between the CJEU and the 
ECtHR). National courts have at their disposal a set of ‘judicial interaction techniques’84 that can help 
them solve such normative or jurisprudential conflicts. A first set of judicial interaction techniques 
derives from the EU legal order: consistent interpretation of national law with EU law; the power/duty 
to make a reference for a preliminary ruling; proportionality within the margin of deference afforded 
by the CJEU; mutual recognition of foreign judgments; comparative reasoning with national 
legislation and jurisprudence from another Member State; disapplication of national law due to a 
violation of EU norms. A second set of judicial interaction techniques derives from the ECHR: 
consistent interpretation; acting within margin of appreciation; proportionality test; and requests for 
advisory opinion from the ECtHR by national supreme courts on ‘questions of principle relating to the 
interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the protocols 
thereto’85 As to the horizontal relation between the CJEU and ECtHR there are no procedural direct 
mechanism for solving conflicts.86 
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Through the use of judicial interaction techniques, national courts can achieve the sometimes 
conflictual objectives of an effective and coherent application of the principles of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust as strictly prescribed by EU law, on the one hand, and a high level of protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe, as established by the ECHR or national constitutions, on the other hand.  
National judges can have recourse to the aforementioned list of ‘judicial interaction 
techniques’ for the purpose of solving normative and jurisprudential conflicts on the scope of 
application and operation of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. National courts can 
first try to use the technique of consistent interpretation, to ensure that their particular interpretation is 
consistent with the constitution, EU law and the ECHR. Careful use of consistent interpretation might 
allow ordinary courts to avoid possible conflict with EU law or ECHR. The exercise of consistent 
interpretation does not though dispel the risk of erroneous rulings or of conflicting interpretation. In 
these cases, a clarification from the CJEU, which could trigger the spill-over effect in the 28 national 
jurisdictions, could ensure the uniform application of a particular solution to balancing the principle of 
mutual trust with fundamental rights. If the legal interpretation proposed by the referring court is 
confirmed by the CJEU, its interpretation of the EU law will have to be taken into consideration by the 
other national courts, including the highest ones, which will have to ensure interpretation of national 
legislation consistent with that interpretation of EU law, or might even have the duty to set aside 
conflicting acts for which a consistent interpretation is not possible.  
Therefore, when in doubt, national courts can lodge a preliminary question asking the CJEU to 
provide an authoritative interpretation on EU law,87 or to suggest a particular remedy of a conflict with 
the ECHR. Through the preliminary reference, national courts can test the validity of their own 
preferred construction of domestic norms,88 and/or try to influence the case law of CJEU. They may 
prove successful in their influencing efforts if they appear to follow the CJEU hermeneutic lead and 
operate a reasonable balance between the primacy, coherent and effective application of EU law and 
fundamental rights.89 The unprecedented use of Article 267 TFEU by the Spanish and French 
Constitutional courts90 can be interpreted as a means to shape EU law through a bottom-up judicial 
influence. Although such a direct mechanism of dialogue does not exist between the national courts 
and the ECtHR, national courts can still shape the latter Court’s jurisprudence, by way of providing a 
sound legal reasoning that follows the interpretational hermeneutic of the Court.91 
The aforementioned Radu, Melloni and Jeremy F cases are an illustration of the strategic use 
of the preliminary reference, as one judicial interaction technique that is available to national courts 
for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a higher level of protection of the rights to a fair trial and 
effective remedy than that provided at EU level, and also ensuring consistent jurisprudential 
interpretation at the supranational level. When national courts want to challenge the specific 
understanding of the EU mutual recognition, they have the option of the preliminary reference, 
whereby they can ask for a change in the previous jurisprudence of the CJEU. In these circumstances, 
national courts have suspended the application of the ECHR standard until the CJEU has delivered its 
preliminary ruling deciding on the alleged normative conflict.92 The Radu case also offers an insight 
into the power to raise questions of law before as many courts as possible in resolving an issue at 
stake. In Radu, the Romanian court of appeal sought clarification of the legal requirement entailed by 
the mutual trust rules both at home– from the Constitutional Court, and abroad, from the CJEU. The 
(Contd.)                                                                   
mechanisms were set out in the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to ECHR, however in light of Opinion 2/13 
it is difficult to predict the future of the EU’s accession to the ECHR. 
87 According to Article 267 TFEU. 
88 See Diouf, Melloni and Jeremy F. 
89 See Jeremy F. 
90 See the Melloni and Jeremy F cases. 
91 The UK Supreme Court successfully shaped the ECtHR’s case-law on due process in criminal proceedings, see, for 
instance, the Ibrahim (ECtHR, Ibrahim and others v UK, Appls. Nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09, 
Judgment 16 December 2012); see also the influence of the UK Supreme Court judgment in EM Eritrea on the ECtHR 
judgment in Tarakhel v Swtizerland. 
92 See the English courts in N.S. and others. 
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importance of defining the EU mutual trust in accordance to the national standard sharing the highest 
denominator of human rights between the EU and the ECHR, was evident in Melloni, where the 
Spanish Constitutional Court addressed for the first time preliminary questions to the CJEU.93 
Both Romanian and Spanish courts carried out a strategic use of the preliminary reference 
technique. Both preliminary questions raised the issue of the relationship between the fundamental 
rights guarantees and the apparently exhaustive EAW refusal grounds. Whilst in Radu the issue was 
addressed in a more abstract manner demanding the decisive statement on the part of the CJEU on the 
position and importance of fundamental rights with reference to implementation of the EAW, in 
Melloni, the CJEU was called upon to determine whether a national court can apply a higher level of 
protection of a fair trial than that guaranteed by the EU law. In the latter case, preliminary reference is 
used as a way of resolving a potentially long-standing conflict between Spanish courts and the judicial 
systems of other Member States, given the unusually high level of protection granted in Spain for in 
absentia trials and the right to defence.94 Unfortunately, the national courts did not succeeded in 
having their human rights oriented interpretation of mutual trust shared by the CJEU. However, it was 
pointed out above that a slight change can be identified in the CJEU approach in Melloni compared to 
Radu,95 which could be argued to be the effect of the persuasive arguments of the national courts and 
the realisation of the CJEU that the EAW will continue to raise issues as regards the limits to mutual 
trust and mutual recognition based on human rights grounds, therefore it cannot continue to ignore 
certain questions raised by national courts.96 Although the national courts did not succeed in 
convincing the CJEU of their interpretation of the balance between the principles of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust and fundamental rights, the particular use of the preliminary reference 
technique was a good choice in order to influence the interpretation of the CJEU towards a more 
human rights orientated approach and make the Court aware of the problems existing at the national 
level with the implementation of the EAW Framework Decision. In particular the conflictual situation 
which they sometimes have to solve between the EAW norms as interpreted by the CJEU, and the 
ECHR or constitutional human rights norms. 
Interestingly, whilst the Spanish Constitutional Court closely followed the preliminary ruling 
of the CJEU in Melloni (even though it had to drop its deeply rooted preference for the extensive 
protection of the right to a fair trial), in Radu, the referring court, displeased with the CJEU choices, 
goes beyond what the CJEU decided. Its human rights orientated interpretation of the preliminary 
ruling led to disapplication of the EU law and consistent interpretation with the ECHR.97 The 
Romanian supreme court – the High Court of Cassation and Justice – did not side with the 
interpretation chosen by the referring court and opted for a strict interpretation and application of the 
CJEU judgments requiring the admission of all EAWs issued by the foreign national court in the 
specific circumstances. 
A similar strategic use of the preliminary reference technique was operated by the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel (FCC) in Jeremy F.98 First of all, the FCC found a way to solve its long 
problem regarding the use the preliminary reference, namely the long delay entailed by the suspension 
of the national case while waiting for the preliminary ruling, by using the urgent preliminary 
procedure, which permitted the FCC to comply with its obligation to deliver a judgment in a 
maximum of 3 months. When deciding on the necessity of obtaining a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU, the FCC first determined if the Member States were recognised a margin of discretion when 
implementing the EAW FD. The FCC included in the preliminary reference addressed to the CJEU its 
                                                     
93 See JUDCOOP Final Handbook, p.74. 
94 See the JUDCOOP Final Handbook for more details. 
95 The CJEU showed respect for the Spanish constitutional tradition by recognising the possibility of the Member States to 
secure a higher level of protection of the right to an effective remedy, as long as the effective application of the EAW FD 
is not frustrated; this balancing principle was not recognised in b, but only introduce in Melloni. 
96 As it was the case, for example, in Radu, where the CJEU rewrote the question addressed by the Romanian referring court. 
97 Though in the referring court opinion, their judgment was also consistent with the CJEU preliminary ruling. 
98 For more details on the case, see also the JUDCOOP Database, http://judcoop.eui.eu/data/?p=data&idPermanent=86  
Mapping Mutual Trust 
55 
own interpretation of the balance between the principle of mutual recognition of criminal judgments 
and the right to effective remedy, seemingly in favour of higher guarantees for the right to an effective 
remedy, making a strategic attempt to influence the CJEU. The FCC legal interpretation persuaded the 
CJEU to nuance its Melloni far-reaching approach of mutual trust, so as to accommodate the referring 
court’s proposed understanding of mutual trust. Following the preliminary ruling of the CJEU, the 
FCC used the discretion left by the CJEU in securing a second level of jurisdiction by opting to 
introduce an appeal, and thus a higher level of protection of the right to an effective remedy. The FCC 
declared the challenged national provision adopted for the purpose of implementing the EAW FD99 to 
be contrary to the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, and thus opting for a 
higher national standard of protection of the respective fundamental right to an effective remedy.100 
In an attempt to reconcile the two strands of conflicting jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR 
on the conformity of the specific application of mutual trust in the field of the Dublin transfers, 
national courts have also had recourse to a strategic use of the preliminary reference. A first attempt 
was made by the Austrian Constitutional Court in Abdullahi, where it asked the CJEU to clarify first 
the conditions of the limitation of the principle of mutual trust, namely whether it was limited to the 
narrow ‘systemic deficiencies’, and second, the effects of the limitations, namely whether the right of 
the individual in the specific limited circumstances led an obligation on the part of the Member State 
to exercise the asylum application assessment. It seems the reply of the CJEU did not satisfy the 
national courts, since similar questions on the scope of application of mutual trust and, consequently 
of the applicable human right – right to an effective remedy – were recently addressed by Swedish and 
Dutch administrative courts in the context of the Dublin III Regulation. In Karim101 and 
Ghezelbach,102 the Swedish, respectively Dutch court asked the CJEU whether the scope of 
application of an effective legal remedy was limited to the examination of whether there are systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in the Member States of transfer 
(according to the N.S. and Abdullahi threshold), or is extended to all criteria in Chapter II Dublin III 
Regulation. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU will change its narrow interpretation of ‘systemic 
deficiencies’ under the pressure of national courts’ increasing preliminary references on the matter. 
In EM (Eritrea), the UK Court of Appeal sided with a narrow interpretation of the scope of 
application of systemic deficiencies, while the UK Supreme Court, cognisant of the possible conflict 
of the N.S. and Abdullahi judgments with the ECHR jurisprudence, in particular with the Soering and 
M.S.S. judgments, quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal on grounds that, should it follow such 
an interpretation of the N.S. judgment, the Court would place the Secretary of State in a position to fail 
to comply with the duty to comply with the 1998 Human Rights Act and the ECHR.103 UK Supreme 
Court in EM (Eritrea) did not hold the N.S. judgment as such to be contrary to the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, but that the Court of Appeal’s strict interpretation of the N.S. judgment was contrary to 
the ECHR104 Therefore, the UK Supreme Court held that there is no incompatibility between the N.S. 
judgment of the CJEU and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR up until the M.S.S. judgment, and that an 
assessment of existence of violations of human rights within the context of the Dublin Regulation 
should be similar to the well-established test applied in human rights law, ‘which is that the removal of 
a person from a member state of the Council of Europe to another country is forbidden, if it is shown 
                                                     
99 In particular the ‘‘without recourse’’ part of the legal provision. 
100 See JUDCOOP Final Handbook, p.139, 140, 145.  
101 Case C-155/15, George Karim v Migrationsverket, pending. 
102 Case C- 63/15, Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, pending. 
103 UK Supreme Court, R (on the application of EM (Eritrea)) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2014] UKSC 12, judgment of 24 February 2014, para. 43 
104 ‘‘Court of Appeal's conclusion that only systemic deficiencies in the listed country's asylum procedures and reception 
conditions will constitute a basis for resisting transfer to the listed country cannot be upheld. The critical test remains that 
articulated in Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. The removal of a person from a member state of the 
Council of Europe to another country is forbidden if it is shown that there is a real risk that the person transferred will 
suffer treatment contrary to article 3 of ECHR’’  - EM(Eritrea), para.58. 
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that there is a real risk that the person transferred will suffer treatment contrary to article 3 of the 
ECHR.’105 
It seems that the creative interpretation of the UK Supreme Court in EM (Eritrea) might have 
influenced also the ECtHR interpretation of mutual trust, since the UK Supreme Court test for refusing 
the application of mutual trust on the basis of ‘substantial grounds for believing that he or she might 
face a ‘real risk’ of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR’106 in Italy was then endorsed by the ECtHR 
in its November 2014 Tarakhel judgment, which dealt with a Dublin transfer of asylum seekers to 
Italy.107 
Following the Tarakhel judgment, the UK Supreme Court upheld the test it previously 
developed in EM (Eritrea), as one that can ensure the supranational standards set by both CJEU and 
ECtHR, namely for the application of mutual trust and the ECHR understanding of human rights.108 
Furthermore, it indicated that the Tarakhel judgment should not be read as establishing general 
principles on the scope of application and operation of mutual trust, but the judgment should be read 
within the specific context of transfer of vulnerable persons.109 It remains to be seen whether the CJEU 
will amend its ‘systemic deficiencies’ approach, as developed in N.S., and Abdullahi, in Karim and 
Ghezelbach, on the background of increasing national jurisprudence accepting to limit the application 
of mutual trust also in individual cases of violation of absolute or relative human rights. 
 
Conclusion  
Recently, Opinion 2/13 has recognised the foundational status of ‘mutual trust’ for the entire edifice of 
the AFSJ, enjoying a transversal application across the varied fields of the AFSJ, and also more 
generally enjoying the status of a constitutional EU legal principle.110 However, more precise issues 
such as the actual scope of application and effects of ‘mutual trust’ are still unclear. The Lisbon Treaty 
missed the opportunity to define the concept of ‘mutual trust’, leaving it to the EU secondary 
legislation, which currently provides varied, sector specific application of the principle of mutual trust. 
The onus of filling the legislative gap and clarifying the application and effects of mutual trust fell on 
the CJEU. The Court contributed to a certain extent to clarifying these specific aspects of ‘mutual 
trust’, however it also added an extra layer of confusion to the understanding of the scope and effects 
of mutual trust within the EU legal order, by encouraging the sectorial definition of mutual trust and 
developing an autonomous meaning which seems to be increasingly developing in contrast with the 
ECtHR human rights standards. Several issues regarding the application and effects of mutual trust 
have still not received a clear, uniform answer, in particular: whether the general definition and 
limitations allowed to the constitutional principle of mutual trust are those laid down in N.S.; the scope 
of application of ‘systemic deficiencies’, namely whether it should be applied narrowly within the 
asylum procedure, or also across other justice areas of the Member States;111 the precise conditions 
when mutual trust can be limited, namely whether only in the exceptional narrow ‘systemic 
deficiencies’ circumstances, or also in individual cases of violation of human rights; the precise 
                                                     
105 Idem, para.58. 
106 See UK Supreme Court, judgment in EM (Eritrea), paras. 3, 52 and 58; and by the same Court, and R. (on the application 
of MS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1095 (Admin), para. 88. 
107 Such scenarios of judicial interaction are not often, namely when the inspiration of the ECtHR came from the national 
courts, adopting that court’s interpretation. A more obvious case reflecting this scenario was pointed out by L. Garlicki, 
Pretty v. the U.K., 2002-IV, the ECtHR followed the approach adopted by the House of Lords (inspired as well by the 
1993 Rodriguez judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada); see L. Garlicki, ‘Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme 
Courts’, (2007) Int'l J. Const. L., 310 – 312. 
108 See R. (on the application of MS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1095 (Admin). 
109 Idem, paras. 137–138. 
110 See, Opinion 2/13, paras. 192-194. 
111 As the Commission seems to suggest, see the European Commissioņ ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council – A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, COM (2014) 158 final of 
11 March 2014, 7. 
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responsibilities of the Member States in cases of systemic deficiencies and, if admitted, other 
circumstances where mutual trust is limited.  
If the CJEU avoided giving a clear answer to all these questions, or developed an approach 
that occasionally created tension with the ECtHR jurisprudence, national courts were required to give 
a final answer to the concerned individuals’ complaints, while ensuring that both supranational 
standards were respected. Many national courts decided to follow closely the CJEU generally far-
reaching and quasi-blind application of mutual trust However a significant number of national courts 
challenged this latter approach in an attempt to ensure an extensive protection of human rights as 
ensured under the ECHR or domestic standards, or pressed the CJEU to establish a uniform and 
coherent interpretation of the definition, application and effects of the EU principle of mutual trust 
across the various sectors of the AFSJ. 
These challenging difficulties in the application of mutual trust required from national courts a 
truly creative and innovative legal reasoning that could help them ensure the different objectives 
followed by the EU and ECHR legal orders, and their respective courts. The answer came from the 
national courts’ strategic use of judicial interactions, which were meant to ensure a bottom-up 
influence of the CJEU approach on mutual trust towards a more judicially coordinated stance. The 
complaint of national courts was not that the CJEU is disinterested or that it does not take human 
rights seriously, for the purpose of safeguarding mutual trust, but that it started to lack coordination 
and cooperation of its approach with the ECtHR in spite of the numerous national courts’ preliminary 
questions pointing out possible tensions with the Strasbourg Court jurisprudence and ECHR. 
National courts have increasingly used the preliminary reference judicial interaction 
technique, as an instrument serving the above mentioned purposes. For instance as a tool to reconcile 
conflicting supranational jurisprudence (Melloni, N.S. and others), of overruling national higher 
judgments (Radu – referring Romanian court – Romanian Constitutional Court), and re-balancing 
judicial power in favour of national constitutional standards (Jeremy F). Among the indirect judicial 
interaction techniques, consistent interpretation has been particularly useful, and used not only by 
national courts to be in line with the supranational jurisprudence, but also by the supranational courts 
themselves. The migration and asylum field of the AFSJ is illustrative of such forms of indirect 
judicial interaction. The M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR has had a great impact on national 
jurisprudence, by adopting a threshold that was also espoused by the CJEU itself.112 While the ECtHR 
was also influenced by some of the national courts judgments in its case by case assessment of 
individual circumstances.113 These direct and indirect judicial interactions have proved fruitful for 
safeguarding human rights protection (see, particularly Jeremy F)114, and increasing coordination of 
jurisprudentially developed approaches.115 
In conclusion, national courts can be true drivers of evolution and infuse clarity in the 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition and enhancing mutual trust by engaging in 
direct interactions with the CJEU on the issue of the relation between the principles of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust, on the one hand, and the level of fundamental rights protection 
applicable within the scope of EU law, on the other. It is only by way of a continuous judicial 
conversation with the CJEU and with other national courts that the principles of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust can be framed in a way that respects both fundamental rights, and coherent and 
efficient application of EU law. Nevertheless, national courts should carefully distinguish between 
cases where fundamental rights are truly under threat – e.g,. N.S. and M.E. – and cases where a 
suspected person is trying to escape legal responsibility – e.g,. Radu and Melloni. 
                                                     
112 To a certain extent, in N.S. and others. 
113 Compare the EM (Eritrea) judgment of the UK Supreme Court delivered in February 2014 with the Tarakhel judgment of 
the ECtHR delivered in November 2014. 
114 See also the Prague Regional Court, 1 July 2015, A. K. A., S. K. K., A. E. and K. B. v Ministry of the Interior, 49Az 
56/2015-41, Judgment of 1 June 2015. 
115 See the UK Supreme Court giving in EM(Eritrea) a creative interpretation of N.S. and Soering, and the same court 
ensuring consistent interpretation of both N.S. and Tarakhel in R. (on the application of MS). 
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Furthermore, in light of the CJEU’s rejection of the draft agreement on the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR,116 the strategic use of judicial interaction techniques by national courts117 seems to 
be necessary in order to avoid conflicts between the EU principles of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust and the protection of fundamental rights as provided by the partially overlapping national and 
supranational legal orders. 
                                                     
116 See Opinion 2/13, op. cit. 
117 For more examples of the strategic use of judicial interaction techniques by national courts, see Final Handbook ‘Judicial 
Interaction Techniques – Their Potential and Use in European Fundamental Rights Adjudication’, Chapter III. 
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Mutual Trust and Judicial Control in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice: 
an Anatomy of Trust 
Evelien Brouwer* 
 
 
Whether it concerns the financial future of Greece and its relationship with other Member States or the 
arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe, it is clear that an effective and 
generally accepted EU policy to solve these problems requires mutual trust between the States 
involved. The content of ‘mutual trust’ is however difficult to grasp. The EU treaties do not refer to 
‘mutual trust’ as such. As put forward by Storskrubb and Moraru in this working paper, the concept of 
‘mutual trust’ only became visible in EU policy in the Tampere Conclusions of 1999, as founding 
principle for the enforcement of mutual recognition within the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
(AFSJ). This goal of mutual recognition is included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU): according to Article 81 (1) TFEU judicial cooperation in civil matters is based on the 
principle of mutual recognition and Article 81 (2) calls for the EU legislator to adopt legislation for the 
functioning of the internal market goal in order to achieve mutual recognition of judicial decisions 
between the Member States. Furthermore, Article 82 (2) TFEU provides the basis for the 
establishment of minimum standards in order ‘to enable mutual recognition of judgements and judicial 
decisions in the field of criminal law’.  
Closely related to ‘mutual trust’ is the principle of solidarity, explicitly mentioned in Article 3 
TEU, and in the field of border, migration and asylum policy, in Article 80 TFEU. As long as mutual 
trust and solidarity are used merely as political guidelines for the Member States, underlining the need 
to make EU policies succeed and to rely or to assist in each other’s legal or operational systems, their 
‘open content’ is not a problem. However, should mutual trust be given a legal meaning, a condition to 
be presumed by national courts in individual cases, the opaque nature of these principles may hamper 
effective judicial control. Especially in the AFSJ, where the applicable laws may affect individual 
rights, the use of a vague but imperative principle of mutual trust will not help courts to decide when 
exceptions to mutual trust are possible or even necessary to protect these rights.  
Although it is difficult to give a precise definition of ‘mutual trust in the EU’, in my view a 
clearer understanding of the scope and meaning of mutual trust is necessary to ensure an effective 
judicial control. The need for clarity in this matter has become more urgent since the publication of 
Opinion 2/13 in December 2014, in which the CJEU rejected the draft proposal on the accession of the 
EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1 By framing ‘mutual trust’ as a dominant 
principle of EU law, and as such restricting the role of national courts to test the presumption of trust, 
the CJEU ignored in my view the complex and differentiated content of mutual trust. Furthermore, 
emphasizing the autonomy of EU law, also when it concerns the protection of fundamental rights, the 
opinion of the CJEU only raised more questions with regard to the scope of the supervisory role of 
national courts and the ECtHR assessing the application of mutual trust when fundamental rights are at 
stake. I submit that when dealing with the meaning of mutual trust in EU law, one must take into 
account not only the different objectives which form the basis of mutual trust, but also the different 
actors involved, the subject of trust, and the different levels where trust plays a role. Only by 
understanding this ‘anatomy of trust’, will it be possible to define conditions of trust as a basis for 
mutual recognition in the AFSJ and to decide on the exceptions to mutual trust. Finally, I argue that to 
ensure a right balance between mutual trust and fundamental rights at the national level, a further 
dialogue, rather than competition between the CJEU and the ECtHR, is necessary.  
 
 
 
                                                     
* Senior Researcher, section migration law, Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam. 
1 Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU, 18 December 2014, in particular para. 193-194. 
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Objectives of trust: internal market versus the area of freedom, security, and justice 
In general, mutual trust is considered a prerequisite for the effective implementation of measures of 
mutual recognition: sometimes it is explicitly included in the preamble of legislative instruments, for 
example in the Framework Decision on the EAW, or in the Regulation 44/2001 on enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, or it is emphasized by the CJEU to enable the 
implementation of instruments within the field of cooperation in criminal matters.2 For example, in 
Gözutok and Brügge, when dealing with the implementation of the ne bis in idem principle in Article 
54 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement (SIA), the CJEU held that this ne bis in idem necessarily 
implies that Member States have mutual trust in each others’ criminal justice systems and that each of 
them recognizes the criminal law in force in the other Member States ‘even when the outcome would 
be different if its own law were applied’.3  
Considering the role of mutual trust in the legal history of the EU integration process, it 
remains however important to consider the different angles or objectives, from which law and case law 
have been developed. First, and this is the background of the famous Cassis de Dijon case (1979), 
mutual recognition can be considered one of three mechanisms to create free movement of goods in 
the internal market, next to liberalization and approximation.4 At a stage where harmonisation of laws 
failed, the CJEU sent a clear message with the aim of enhancing legislative harmonisation ‘if Member 
States wanted to avoid judicial harmonisation by way of mutual recognition’.5 This, as pointed out by 
Weiler, resulted in the development of judicial mutual recognition before political and later ‘legislative 
mutual recognition’.6 One could also say that here, mutual recognition preceded mutual trust. 
Compared to the internal market, ‘mutual trust’ in the AFSJ has a different background. Here 
mutual trust is considered a necessary basis for the implementation of different instruments of judicial 
and law enforcement cooperation and measures of asylum and migration control. Even if presented as 
a complementary measure to prevent undesirable side-effects of the abolition of internal border 
controls, the main goal of these instruments is the cooperation between Member States and not the 
realization of the internal market or free movement or trade as such. Therefore, within these two areas 
the inherent drive behind mutual trust is different. Where the internal market aims at the development 
of an environment, a space without barriers or borders to enable freedom of trade, workers or 
movement, the concept of ‘mutual trust’ obliges Member States not to obstruct these freedoms. Within 
the AFSJ, the objective of trust is the cooperation itself and requires that participating States play a 
more active role. In order to safeguard security, prevent irregular migration, fight crime or prevent the 
abduction of children, the national authorities of these States are being provided with tools of 
cooperation and mutual recognition. This more active role for national authorities in the AFSJ 
instruments of cooperation implies they are more likely to affect the fundamental rights of 
individuals.7 In this aspect, there lies an importance difference between the application of mutual 
                                                     
2 See on the cooperation in criminal law and in civil law matters, the contributions of Mitsilegas respectively Storskrubb 
elsewhere in this Working Document.  
3 Gözutok and Brügge joined cases C-187/01 and C- 385/01, para. 33. 
4 See Jacques Pelkmans, Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective in Fiorella Kostoris Padoa 
Schioppa (Ed.) The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process Hampshire/New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan 2005, p. 85-129, see p. 87. 
5 Daniel Sarmiento, National Voice and European Loyality. Member State Autonomy, European Remedies and 
Constitutional Pluralism in EU Law, in Hans-W. Micklitz  and Bruno De Witte (eds.) The European Court of Justice and 
the Autonomy of the Member States, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012, p. 343. 
6 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Mutual Recognition, Functional Equivalence and Harmonization in the Evolution of the European 
Market and the WTO in Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (Ed.) The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European 
Integration Process Hampshire/New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2005 p. 50 ff. 
7 This does not mean that clear ‘internal market’ cases never involve fundamental rights, however these cases are rare. See 
for example case-law of the CJEU, Schmidberger C-112/00 and Omega Spielhallen, C-36/02, in which respectively the 
right to demonstration and the right to human dignity was opposed to the free movement of goods. See: Sybe de Vries, 
Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Rights According to the European Court of Justice, in: Utrecht Law 
Review, Volume 9, Issue 1 (January) 2013, p. 169 ff. 
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recognition in the AFSJ and within the internal market. Where in the latter area mutual recognition 
generally empowers the position of individuals and enterprises against the State, within the AFSJ, it is 
the State which obtains powers against individuals.8 
 
Subjects of trust: individual measures v. the general system 
Another differentiation to be made is the subject of trust, which concerns either the mutual recognition 
of an individual decision or measure, or trust in the general legal system or conditions in another State. 
This difference may be explained by comparing the Dublin System, dealing with the responsibility of 
Member States for the determination of asylum requests in one of the other States, and the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), with regard to the execution of a national arrest warrant from another State.9 
Whereas the execution of an EAW concerns the recognition of individual judicial decisions adopted 
by the authorities of the issuing State, the implementation of the Dublin mechanism requires the State, 
transferring an asylum seeker to the responsible State, to trust the procedural guarantees and reception 
conditions in that second State. Therefore, whereas in EAW cases generally requires the individual 
assessment of the arrest warrant and whether this has been issued in accordance with the applicable 
rules and EU standards, the implementation of the Dublin system, and the decision to transfer an 
asylum seeker to another Member State is generally based on trust in the asylum system of the other 
State, including reception conditions  and effective asylum procedures. Of course, in specific cases the 
implementation of the EAW may involve ‘system trust’ as well. The question whether a lack of trust 
in the general protection of fundamental rights in the issuing State may prevent the execution of an 
EAW, will be dealt with by the CJEU in the pending case Aranyosi.10 In this case, the German court 
submitted the preliminary question of whether extradition is permitted when there are ‘strong 
indications’ that the detention conditions in the issuing State infringe the fundamental rights of the 
individual as enshrined in Article 6 TEU. On the other hand, as we will see below in section 6, in the 
Tarakhel judgment, the ECtHR required in addition to general trust in the ‘asylum system’, also 
individual guarantees by the second State to allow a Dublin transfer to this State.  
The reason why I consider this differentiation between ‘system trust’ and ‘case trust’ relevant, 
is because it may affect in individual cases the assessment of evidence or proof required for the 
rebuttal of trust. Furthermore, the difference between ‘system trust’ and ‘case-trust’ might explain 
current differences with regard to the test of mutual trust in the decisions of the CJEU and the ECtHR 
dealing with the Dublin Regulation. 
   
Actors of trust: political v. functional trust 
A third level of differentiation relates to the ‘actors of trust’. When dealing with the principle of 
mutual trust, it must be clear which actors are involved or at which level this trust plays a role. In my 
view, one could differentiate between ‘political trust’ and ‘functional trust’. With ‘political trust’, I 
mean trust between the political stakeholders, the heads of States, or EU Ministers sitting in the 
different Councils, developing or amending EU instrument to reach common goals. This political level 
of trust refers to the availability (or absence) of trust between the negotiators to the effect that they, 
when developing instruments of cooperation or legislation, pursue the same objectives, and once 
adopted, that EU law is observed and fundamental rights are protected. The political level of trust 
includes trust between the national governments or negotiators of the different Member States. It may 
also concern trust between the European Commission and each Member State: when the former has 
                                                     
8 Valsamis Mitsilegas The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-
State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2012), pp. 319–
372, see  p. 319. 
9 See Dublin III Regulation 604/2013, [2013] O.J. L 180/31 and Framework Decision 2002/584, [2002] O.J. L 190/1. 
10 C-404/15, Aranyosi, preliminary question of the Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht Bremen, 24 July 2015. In its judgment of 
5 April 2016, the CJEU stated that  the judicial authority of the executing State must request all necessary information 
from the judicial authority of the requesting State with a view to determining whether the person in question would face a 
real risk of being subject to inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter, in case of surrender. 
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the role to review whether EU law has been properly implemented at the national level. In general, this 
supervisory role of the Commission is limited by giving warnings or subsequent negotiations between 
the Commission and the Member State at stake. Although the Commission does have legal 
instruments to ensure the implementation of EU laws, such as the infringement procedure or the power 
to impose fines, these measures have been rarely used until now.11  
With functional or professional trust, I mean trust or confidence between the national 
authorities or officials applying or using these EU instruments of trust: for example the judiciary that, 
when deciding on the execution of an EAW, trusts that this EAW has been issued by the first State in 
accordance with the rules of the Framework Decision, respecting fundamental rights and the principle 
of proportionality. Functional trust also includes trust between national authorities such as 
administrations or police officers when cooperating on the basis of EU law, possibly also professional 
trust. This trust may be based on general knowledge, earlier experiences from cooperation between the 
national authorities involved, or information which the executing authority has gathered in advance 
from the issuing State or court. Here, both the availability of information and previous experiences are 
important prerequisites for trust.12 This ‘professional’ trust between national authorities from different 
EU Member States may be enhanced by EU mechanisms including the exchange of best practices, the 
exchange of liaison officers, and the organization of joint operations.13  
 
The ‘truth’ of trust: formal v. material trust 
Mutual trust can be based on either formal trust (or trust in abstracto) or material trust.14 This holds 
true for both ‘political trust’ and ‘functional or professional trust’. As elaborated by the other 
contributors to this working paper, EU instruments in the AFSJ are primarily based on formal trust, 
obliging national authorities to recognize certificates or qualifications issued by other Member States, 
to enforce judgments of other national courts in criminal or civil law cases, or to decide upon 
information reported by other national authorities in shared EU databases.15 The application of formal 
trust ensures swift procedures and effective implementation of the EU instrument involved, often also 
necessary to protect the individual rights at stake. For this sake of ‘effectiveness’ of EU law, the CJEU 
tends to apply this formal approach in case law dealing with instruments in the field of civil and 
criminal law cooperation.16 The application of formal trust is based on three conditions: first, the fact 
that the EU States as members of the EU or participating in the EU framework, are bound by the same 
principles and obligations to implement the instruments at stake, in accordance with EU law. This 
condition includes the obligation to respect fundamental rights, incorporated in EU law, but also 
following from their membership of the Council of Europe and being party to the ECHR. Secondly, 
formal trust is based on the condition that specific procedural safeguards are fulfilled, for example 
time limits, an exhaustive list of acts for which recognition is sought (as for example in the EAW 
                                                     
11 In September 2015, the European Commission did start 40 infringement procedures against several member States for 
failing to implement (fully) instruments of the Common European Asylum System or CEAS. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5699_en.htm.  
12 In the words of Bacharach and Gambetta, there are two enemies of trust: either bad character or bad information, and it is 
the ‘truster dilemma’ to decide: which type am I focusing? Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, Trust in Signs, in 
Karen S. Cook, Trust in Society, New York Society: Russel Sage Foundation, 2001, p. 150.  
13 For example, the set up of ‘joint operational teams’ or joint processing teams to enhance cooperation at the external 
borders, or together with Europol, to fight crime. Of course, such measures of cooperation require clear rules on the 
powers and accountabilities of the officials, EU agencies, and the Member States involved.  
14 Hemme Battjes, Evelien Brouwer, Paulien de Morree en Jannemieke Ouwerkerk, The Principle of Mutual Trust in 
European Asylum, Migration and Criminal Law. Reconciling Trust and Fundamental Rights Utrecht: Forum Institute for 
Multicultural Affairs, 2011, p. 40. See also the contribution of Madalina Moraru in this volume, differentiating between 
an absolute and a relative application of mutual trust. 
15 Based on the use of information systems such as Eurodac, SIS, and VIS.  
16 For example with regard to the EAW in Jeremy, C-168/13 PPU, 30 May 2013 and with regard to the Brussels II bis 
Regulation 2201/2003 concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters on 
parental responsibility, in Aguirre Zarraga C-491/10 PPU 22 December 2010. 
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Framework Decision), and the availability of legal remedies in the executing State. Thirdly, the 
application of ‘formal trust’ is justified by (minimum) harmonization of law in the different Member 
States.  
In practice, the problem arises when the aforementioned ‘conditions of trust’ become 
‘assumptions of trust’ without the possibility to check the actual situation. Referring to Gambetta’s 
analysis of the ‘basic trust game’,17 I would argue that his understanding of the social mechanism of 
trust is not necessary for formal trust, but it is for the existence of material trust, both at the political 
and the functional level. Where practice and experience, exchange of information, decisions of the 
European Commission influence the level of trust at the political and functional level, they are 
irrelevant for the formal concept of trust. In July 2015, a ‘Grexit’ could be averted by renewed 
agreements between Greece and the other Member States, based on the presumption that both parties 
will fulfill their duties. However, the way in which negotiating partners presented these agreements to 
their national electorate showed a lack of material trust, even if all Member States consented to the 
newly adopted agreements, and therefore considered themselves formally bound.18  
As argued by Snell in this working paper, whether it concerns the internal market, the 
realization of a Common European Asylum System, or the stability of the financial market, these goals 
are bound to fail if the assumed pillars are absent, such as harmonization and implementation of EU 
laws or a genuine European single market in which all the Member States participate in the euro. The 
problem which may arise when the distance between formal and material trust becomes too wide, was 
underlined by Advocate General Sharpston in her opinion to the Radu-case dealing on the EAW, 
stating that trust may be undermined by ‘the systematic issuing of European arrest warrants for the 
surrender of persons sought in respect of often very minor offences which are not serious enough to 
justify the measures and cooperation which the execution of such warrants requires’.19 Formal and 
material trust are inherently linked together. Therefore mechanisms of mutual trust cannot work, if 
applied as ‘the rule’, without allowing in specific cases to check the material conditions.   
The Dublin system is another example to illustrate that formal trust cannot be disconnected 
from material trust. This system to determine the responsible State for dealing with an asylum 
application, has been criticized by many commentators and organizations.20 Generally, because it 
results in a rather arbitrary, geographically based division of asylum seekers in Europe, but also 
because it can be used by those States without (direct) external borders to transfer asylum applicants to 
the more Southern States. Already in 2011, the Commission emphasized that the ‘need to keep one's 
house in order to avoid an impact on other Member States is a key aspect of solidarity’ and that it ‘is 
fundamental to increase trust to strengthen solidarity’.21 This reasoning shows the current dilemma of 
applying the EU principle of solidarity to migration policy: one cannot expect Member States to ‘put 
their house in order’ if they know they, because of their geographical situation, continue to receive the 
largest number of asylum seekers. On the other hand, Member States will not be able to give up ‘the 
Dublin mechanism’ as long it may still be used for ‘relocation’ of asylum seekers to other States. The 
                                                     
17 Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? In D. Gambetta (ed)Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: 
Blackwell 1988, p. 213-237. 
18 For example, the Dutch prime minister Rutte told the Dutch Parliament on 16 July 2015, the day after the Greek Parliament 
accepted the new EU package of conditions ‘This does not restore my trust in the Greeks’. In February 2016, we see a 
new ‘Grexit’ proposal, now dealing with the threat to exclude Greece from the ‘Schengen area’ and its freedom of 
movement, because of the alleged failure of Greece to control its external borders (see EU press release IP/16/174, 27 
January 2016). 
19 C-396/11 Radu, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para. 60. Here she also refers to the Commission, observing ‘that there is a 
disproportionate effect on the liberty and freedom of requested persons when European arrest warrants are issued 
concerning cases in which (pre-trial) detention would otherwise be felt inappropriate’. 
20 See C. Costello and M. Mouzourakis, Is 'How Bad is Bad Enough' Good Enough? Asiel&Migrantenrecht 2014, no. 10; 
Guild, Costello, Garlick and Moreno-Lax, CEPS Paper no 83/September 2015, Enhancing the CEAS and Alternatives to 
Dublin, 2015; and ECRE, Report on the Dublin II Regulation – Lives on Hold, 2013. 
21 COM (2011) 835, 2.12.2011, on enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum An EU agenda for better 
responsibility-sharing and more mutual trust, p. 2. 
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arrival of large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe in the second half of 2015 not only 
illustrated the further deficit of Dublin, but also established the reluctance of different Member States 
to cooperate within the Common European Asylum System. The agreement of July 2015, in which the 
Council of Justice and Home Affairs decided on a relatively low – and for each Member State very 
differentiated – number of asylum seekers to receive protection, established the persisting lack of both 
trust and solidarity in this matter.22 However, without any mechanism of solidarity, the Dublin system 
itself will remain a source of mutual distrust. The formal trust which is implied in the Dublin system, 
requires complementary tools to enhance material trust.  
The aforementioned distance between formal and material trust, whether on the functional or 
political level, becomes even more problematic when, because of the historical development of the 
instrument at stake, it is unclear for the actors involved which States they are dealing with. This is 
explained in the next section.  
 
The variable geometry of trust23 
When approaching EU instruments in which mutual trust is considered a fundamental basis of 
cooperation in the EU, one should always consider: trust in whom? Between which Member States? 
Using the anatomy lesson as a metaphor: if you want to understand how the body works, you have to 
know which parts of the body are connected to which other parts. Taking a closer look, the ‘body’ of 
mutual trust consists of a ‘patchwork’ of groups of States, and within each group, different States 
cooperate for different purposes. Within this patchwork, some States are member of several groups, 
some are, for various reasons, only part of one or more groups, while other countries are completely 
disconnected. This variable geometry makes it rather complex to understand both the political and the 
functional meaning of mutual trust. 
It is clear that compared to the situation at the time of the Cassis de Dijon ruling in 1979, in 
which the CJEU emphasized for the first time the importance of mutual recognition, the geography of 
the European Community (now: Union) has completely changed. Starting with six countries, 
membership of the European Union itself has grown from 12 in 1986, to 24 in 2004, and since 1 July 
2013, to 28 Member States. Next to the membership of the EU, one has to distinguish the Schengen 
acquis ensuring the freedom of movement between the Schengen States. This (initially 
intergovernmental) legal framework started with five countries (Benelux, France, and Germany) in 
1985 and now counts 26 States in 2015, including EU and non-EU Member States.24 The Schengen 
acquis includes for example the Schengen Borders Code, the Visa Code and the use of the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) for inadmissible aliens. Where the UK and Ireland are not involved in the 
Schengen measures dealing with the free movement of persons, they do cooperate in the (former 
Schengen) instruments dealing with the European Arrest Warrant and the Dublin system. The Dublin 
system, including the use of Eurodac for the registration of the fingerprints of asylum seekers, 
involves even 32 States (all EU and four non-EU States). Furthermore, the TEU (in protocols 21 and 
36) allows for Denmark, and the UK and Ireland, for opt-ins and opt-outs with regard to different 
fields of EU law.25 These opt-out/opt-in mechanisms result, in the words of Herlin-Karnell, in 
                                                     
22 JHA Council 20 July 2015, Council Doc. 11097/15. 
23 Dealing with the same problem but within another field of EU cooperation: Thomas Beukers, Variable Geometry of the 
Euro-crisis, EUI Working paper 2015. 
24 Schengen: EU, minus UK, Ireland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Cyprus and Croatia + Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland 
= 26 
25 To make the ‘EU geography’ more complicated, based on the opt-out clause for Denmark in the Lisbon Treaty, this 
Member State does not take part in any of the rules adopted on the TFEU provisions on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters are binding or applicable in Denmark, as criminal law acts adopted (within the intergovernmental framework) 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, even if amended, continue to apply. Protocol 22 on the position of 
Denmark, [2010] O.J. C 83/299. 
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‘ergonomically designed-mini-brakes’ for different Member States, which has consequences for the 
functioning of the mutual recognition concept.26  
The variable geometry of membership is not beneficial to keep the European body of trust 
alive. Mutual trust cannot be established as the fundamental principle of EU law, as long as for each 
instrument of European cooperation one has to assess between which countries this trust has to be 
assumed. Furthermore, the variable geometry results in legal and practical inconsistencies. An 
example of legal inconsistency results from the fact that different instruments of mutual trust apply to 
both EU Member States and non EU Member States, such as Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland. As 
argued in the former section, the formal approach of mutual trust is based on the assumption that all 
Member States are bound by general principles of EU law. However, this assumption cannot be 
applied entirely to non-EU States. Even if Switzerland, when signing the Schengen agreements, 
committed itself to the obligations deriving from these agreements, when dealing with for example 
fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens, its commitments are different from those of the EU 
States participating in the Schengen Agreements.27 Although the Swiss Federal Court (Bundesgericht) 
takes into account the relevant case law of the CJEU when dealing with the interpretation of free 
movement or right to family reunion with third-country nationals of EU citizens, national courts 
cannot submit preliminary questions to the CJEU. Furthermore, the Swiss referendum on ‘mass-
immigration’ of February 2014, in which the majority of the population voted for the adoption of a 
quota to restrict the free movement of EU citizens, established the delicate balance between the 
preservation of Swiss sovereignty and its obligations under the EU-Swiss agreements. 
A second and more practical example of inconsistency involves the position of the UK and 
Ireland in the field of law enforcement. Because of their opt-out on the rules on internal free 
movement, these countries do not participate in the rules on visa and admission for non-EU citizens. 
This means that the UK and Ireland have access to the so-called Schengen Information System (SIS) 
with regard to the EAW and data for the purpose of criminal law and judicial cooperation, but not to 
records on inadmissible aliens for the purpose of refusal of entrance, as this concerns the 
implementation of the Schengen Borders Code and the SIS II Regulation, which the UK and Ireland 
do not apply. This results in the paradoxical situation that where, in general, UK authorities exchange 
information with other European States for law enforcement purposes and their law enforcement 
authorities even have access to data on asylum seekers in Eurodac, they cannot have access to data on 
non-EU citizens reported as inadmissible in the SIS because of their assumed risk to public security in 
the EU.28  
 
Opinion 2/13: dialogue or competition between the European courts? 
In the Opinion 2/13, the Luxembourg Court rejected the draft agreement on the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR, because it would not, if adopted, provide clear rules on the relationship between the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights and possible higher standards of Member States and the ECHR. 
Furthermore, the co-respondent mechanism before the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) as 
provided in the draft-agreement would give the ECtHR the power to interpret EU law when assessing 
requests by Member States to apply this procedure. Therefore, according to the CJEU, one of the 
possible consequences of the accession agreement is that this would require a Member State ‘to check 
that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an 
obligation of mutual trust between those Member States’. This would, in the words of the CJEU, 
‘upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of the EU’.29 Reading this 
                                                     
26 Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2012, p. 135. 
27 Rather than a direct effect of EU law, the implementation of EU law in the national legal order is characterised by 
‚Europarechtsfreundlichkeit‘, see Stephan Breitenmoser and Robert Weyeneth, Europarecht Unter Einbezug des 
Verhältnisses Schweiz-EU, 2. Auflage, Dike Verlag AG, Zürich/St. Gallen 2014, p. 219-221, 225. 
28 Since 15 July 2015, based on the amended Eurodac Regulation 603/2013, law enforcement authorities have access to the 
data on asylum seekers, [2013] O.J. L 180/1. 
29 See para. 191-195 of the opinion. 
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Opinion, it seems that the CJEU not only envisages a limited role for national authorities (including 
courts) to assess the level of protection of fundamental rights in other Member States in favour of the 
application of mutual trust, but also rejects the hegemony of the ECtHR when it concerns the 
protection of fundamental rights within the legal order of the EU. Whereas others have commented on 
the second issue, I consider below the approach of the CJEU with regard to the rebuttal of mutual 
trust.30  
To understand the approach of the CJEU, it is perhaps useful to refer to the fact that Opinion 
2/13 was preceded by a ‘dialogue’ between the two Courts dealing with the implementation of the 
Dublin II Regulation and the meaning of mutual trust. In the N.S. v SSHD  judgment of 21 December 
2011, the CJEU followed the earlier conclusions of the ECtHR in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece that a 
presumption of trust cannot not be absolute when dealing with Dublin transfers and the protection of 
non refoulement in Article 3 ECHR.31 However at the same time, it was clear that the CJEU developed 
in N.S. v. SSHD a more restrictive path with regard to the rebuttal of trust. According to the CJEU, not 
any infringement of EU law should result in a rebuttal of trust, as a Dublin transfer would only be 
incompatible with fundamental rights in the case of ‘substantial grounds for believing that there are 
systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions’ within the responsible Dublin 
State.32 This ‘systemic’ approach has been criticised by commentators, arguing that this would make 
too difficult for individuals to rebut proof.33 
In 2014, the ECtHR, in a new judgment dealing with the Dublin system, Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland, emphasized the necessity for a more individual approach.34 In this case, which dealt with 
the transfer of a family with minor children to Italy, the ECtHR ruled that Swiss authorities should 
have obtained ‘individual guarantees that the applicants would be taken charge in a manner adapted to 
the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.’35 The ECtHR held that the fact that 
a State participates in the Dublin system, does not exempt the State transferring an asylum seeker to 
another State, ‘from carrying out a thorough and individualized examination of the situation of the 
person concerned and from suspending enforcement of the removal order should the risk of inhuman 
and degrading treatment be established’.36 Although, the earlier M.S.S. judgment has shown that the 
general situation in the second State does play a role when assessing a Dublin transfer to that State, by 
emphasizing the necessity of an individual assessment, the ECtHR added in Tarakhel a new criterion. 
Of course this is a guess, but this individual approach to ‘mutual trust’ by the Strasbourg Court may 
have triggered the aforementioned conclusions of the CJEU on mutual trust and the autonomy of EU 
law in Opinion 2/13, one month later. 
Even if the precise concerns of the CJEU with regard to the relationship between the EU legal 
order and the guarantee of fundamental rights as protected in the ECHR remain unclear, a 
‘competition’ between the two Courts does not help define the role of national agencies or courts 
assessing the application of mutual trust. Nor does it answer the question under what circumstances 
and to what extent the presumption of trust must be ‘individualised’. In my view, the CJEU 
unnecessarily created a tension between the role of the ECtHR and of that of the CJEU with regard to 
                                                     
30 See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, The Fourth Annual 
Sir Jeremy Lever Lecture, All Souls College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, available online at 
http://1exagu1grkmq3k572418odoooym.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/The-Principle-of-
Mutual-Recognition-in-the-area-of-Freedom-Security-and-Justice.pdf, see also Mitsilegas and Moraru in this working 
paper.  
31 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgum and Greece, appl.no. 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011, and CJEU, N.S. and others, 21 
December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
32 N.S. and others, para. 86. 
33 For example Cathryn Costello, Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an End to Blind Trust cross the EU? Asiel&Migratierecht, no. 
02, p. 83-92.  See also Evelien Brouwer, Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in 
the EU and the Burden of Proof, Utrecht Law Review Vol. 9, Issue 1 January 2013. 
34 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, app.no. 29217/12, 4 November 2014. 
35 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 122. 
36 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 104. 
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the interpretation of the EU principle of mutual trust and the question of when exceptions may be 
applied to the fundamental rights involved. Both in its case law and Opinion 2/13, the CJEU considers 
mutual trust as the ‘raison d’être’ of the European Union, which is necessary to the realization of 
different instruments of the AFSJ. This emphasis on mutual trust affects one of the other pillars under 
the legitimacy of the European legal order, which is the protection of fundamental rights. As provided 
in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, and recognized many times by the CJEU itself, the level of 
this protection should not go below the protection provided by the ECHR, and its interpretation by the 
ECtHR.37 Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court also established in different judgments that it is not blind 
to the inherent goals of EU instruments and the importance of mutual recognition.38 Against this 
background, the ‘competitive’ signal of the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 is difficult to understand.  
  
Anatomy of trust: which questions are to be answered by the CJEU? 
As can be learned from the other contributions in this working paper, national courts have an 
important role in assessing the application of mutual trust in EU law and in deciding on those 
limitations necessary to protect fundamental rights. This implies the evaluation of foreign decisions or 
legal systems and a check on whether the conditions of these instruments are met and which 
exceptions can or must be allowed. To be able to perform this judicial role, national courts should 
maintain a permanent dialogue, not only by using the preliminary procedure to ask the CJEU for 
further clarification, but also by exchanging experiences with their counterparts in other Member 
States.39  
Questions which need to be clarified relate to standards of evidence to be applied when it is 
claimed that decisions are based on factual or legal errors; the availability and scope of legal remedies 
against ‘mutual trust decisions’ (Dublin transfers, execution of EAW or child custody decisions); the 
relevance of the level of harmonization in each field of law, and; considering previous case law of the 
European Courts further clarification of definitions such as ‘vulnerable groups’ or ‘systemic flaws’.  
Furthermore, the CJEU could be asked to give more clarity with regard to the relationship of the 
principle of mutual trust and the variable geometry of the instruments at stake. In Opinion 2/13, the 
CJEU seemed to acknowledge the differentiated scope of application of EU law, when it warned 
against the fact that EU Member States would have to check, on the basis of this draft agreement, 
whether fundamental rights are observed ‘not only in their relationship with non-EU Member States, 
but also between themselves’. This seems to imply that the CJEU finds a more active role for Member 
States to check the trustworthiness of non-EU States more acceptable than with regard to other 
Member States. Dealing with the instruments of mutual trust described above, this reasoning results in 
an illogical and impractical differentiation. For example, with regard to the Dublin Regulation, it 
would imply that Germany must presume that fundamental rights are protected in, for example, 
Greece or Hungary, but may apply a more critical approach towards Switzerland or Norway as non-
EU States. 
The dialogue between the European Courts, which started with the M.S.S. judgment of the 
ECtHR, could provide further tools to deal with possible claims for exception to the Dublin 
mechanism. It is to be hoped that Opinion 2/13 does not mean that the dialogue between the two 
European Courts has been converted into a competition. Finally, even if its role is limited to clarifying 
the content of EU laws, rather than judging the specific implementation by Member States, in its case 
law the CJEU could be more explicit in distinguishing formal trust from material trust. Where 
                                                     
37 In accordance with Article 51 (1) of Charter, Member States are bound by the provisions of the Charter only when 
implementing EU law. The scope of protection of the fundamental rights as included in the Charter may extend, but at the 
least must be the same of corresponding rights of the ECHR (see Article 52 (3) of the Charter). 
38 Dealing with the European Arrest Warrant, the ECtHR may even be criticized for setting a too high threshold to rebut trust 
with regard to the right of fair trial, by using the test of ‘flagrant denial’ in Stapleton v. Ireland, 4 May 2010, appl. no.  
56588/07. See further dealing with the Brussels II Regulation, the ECtHR in Sneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, 12 July 
2011, appl.no. 14737/09.  
39 See also Moraru in her contribution to this EUI working paper. 
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fundamental rights are involved, paraphrasing (in different order) Gambetta: ‘Asking too much of trust 
is just as ill-advised as asking too little’.40   
 
                                                     
40 Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? In D. Gambetta (ed)Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: 
Blackwell 1988, p. 235: ‘Asking too little of trust is just as ill-advised as asking too much’. 
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As noted in the introduction to this collective working paper, mutual trust suffers from a lack of 
conceptualization at this point even though it is widely perceived as axiomatic in nature.  Yet, as the 
previous contributions have discussed, the notion of mutual trust has grown in prominence in the EU 
political and legal arena in recent years,1 notably as the proposed foundation of the project of 
progressively establishing a common EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  In the area of 
cooperation in criminal matters, in particular, mutual trust was originally viewed with some suspicion 
as an ‘easy and palatable basis for cooperation’ designed to fit political discourses but devoid of much 
substance.2  Fueling that sense of vacuity, it is a fact that European political leaders have also 
frequently invoked trust/confidence in recent years when presenting their vision of the Union, in all 
sorts of ways.  In her Bruges speech, Chancellor Merkel rooted the ‘particular responsibility’ of 
Germany in the development of the Union in the ‘astonishingly great trust’ bestowed on Germany at 
the time of reunification.3  A few months later, President Sarkozy advocated a ‘refondation de 
l’Europe’ after the Euro-crisis, based on two pillars: ‘le choix de la convergence’ and ‘[la restauration 
de] la confiance’ – ‘c’est une question de confiance’, he added, ‘et la confiance conditionne tout’.4  
Referring to the need to ‘reason and act more in terms of strategy and interests’ when promoting 
European values in the current global environment, then European Council President Van Rompuy 
presented ‘this change of perspective’ as ‘a matter of organization’ but also as a ‘question of habit, of 
trust, and hence of time’.5  In his 2012 State of the Union Address, former European Commission 
President Barroso portrayed the crisis of the Union as a financial, economic, social crisis but also as ‘a 
crisis of confidence’ and demanded a new ‘Decisive Deal for Europe’ built on ‘a contract of 
confidence between our countries, between Member States and the European institutions, between 
social partners, and between the citizens and the European Union’.6  And references to trust in 
discussions about the Greek crisis by the likes of Euro-group President Dijsselbloem, German Finance 
Minister Schaüble or European Council President Tusk are simply innumerable.  Even though the 
above quotes seem to refer to different and diffuse realities, they generally illustrate the intuitive 
relevance of trust in articulating a narrative about the values underlying the functioning of the Union, 
or at least so is the hypothesis underlying the present contribution. 
The starting point of this paper lies in the coincidence of those loose references to trust in the 
political discourse about Europe with more specific references to mutual trust in the recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice (CJEU).  As is well known in the field of judicial cooperation, mutual 
trust has surfaced indeed from judicial accounts as a normative principle underlying secondary 
instruments providing for the mutual recognition of situations created under national law, and thus 
                                                     
* Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute, and Visiting Lecturer, University of Louvain. 
1 For illustration purposes, a survey of all (1273) hits returned when searching the terms ‘‘mutual trust’’ on the official EUR-
Lex database containing all public EU documents (see eur-lex.europa.eu) reveals that 80% thereof date from 2000 
onwards and 66% from 2004 onwards, i.e., over the past ten years.   
2 S. Alegre, ‘‘Mutual Trust – Lifting the Mask’’ in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh, Mutual Trust in the European 
Criminal Area, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005, p. 4.  See also, in the same volume, D. Flore on ‘‘La notion 
de confiance mutuelle: l’alpha et l’oméga d’une justice pénale européenne?’’ at p. 17. 
3 Chancellor A. Merkel, ‘‘Speech at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe’’, Bruges, 
November 2, 2010.  
4 President N. Sarkozy, ‘‘Discours du Président de la République à Toulon’’, Toulon, December 1, 2011.   
5 President H. Van Rompuy, ‘‘Not renationalization of European politics, but Europeanisation of national politics’’, address 
given at the invitation of ‘‘Notre Europe’’, Sciences-Po, Paris, September 20, 2010 (PCE 191/10).   
6 President J.M. Durão Barroso, ‘‘State of the Union 2012 Address’’, Strasbourg, 12 September 2012 (SPEECH/12/596).  
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equally as an interpretative principle of the provisions contained in these very same instruments.  
Conversely, mutual trust has not been endowed with the status of stand-alone general principle of law 
justifying the principled cross-border recognition of legal situations outside of any statutory 
framework, i.e., as a principle generating legal effects on its own. Still, the fact that mutual trust has 
not so far been recognized as a general principle of law does not prevent, as such, its possible 
emergence as a foundational principle of the EU legal system.  Put otherwise, even if not part of 
positive constitutional EU law, mutual trust can still be part of the context thereof.   
In Opinion 2/13, remarkably, the CJEU referred to mutual trust as one of the ‘specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol N°8 to the EU 
Treaties.  Based on ‘the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other 
Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is 
founded’, mutual trust ‘implies and justifies’ that ‘those values will be recognised and, therefore, that 
the law of the EU that implements them will be respected’.7  As such, mutual trust between Member 
States was deemed by the CJEU to be ‘of fundamental importance in EU law’, notably as it requires 
each Member State ‘save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be 
complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law’.8  In 
stating so, the CJEU paraphrased its N.S. ruling according to which ‘mutual confidence’ entails ‘a 
presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, 
fundamental rights’ as the ‘raison d’être of the European Union’.9  Why is it, then, that such a 
presumption of compliance with EU law on the part of Member States is of such fundamental 
importance and what does the formalization of mutual trust in the judicial – and not only political or 
legislative – discourse says about the specific characteristics of the contemporary Union and Union 
law?   
 That question underpins the present contribution as it seeks to comprehend the significance of 
trust for the management of the Union as a polity, i.e., not only for the design of its rules or the 
performance of its functions but also the understanding of its ends and, possibly, the definition of its 
nature.  It therefore essentially inquires into the potential of trust as a renewed EU constitutionalism.  
Admittedly, constitutionalism ‘comes in many guises’;10 for present purposes, it is understood as an 
ideational construct embodying the (often non-stated) values underlying the constitutional framework 
on the basis of which a polity builds the regulatory apparatus aimed to achieve its policy objectives 
(i.e., as a form of polity expression).  As Walker puts it, ‘we may think of constitutionalism as a 
‘condensing symbol’, a general category of thought and effect through which the concerns and 
commitments of the community with regard to the establishment and operation of just political 
institutions for that community are traditionally and commonly made sense of and expressed’,11 
though sometimes unconsciously.  For Walker, constitutionalism equally provides a ‘normative frame 
of reference to build on its symbolic power’ and thus to inform the design of legal instruments by 
‘framing […] the right questions’ to be answered by policymakers.12  As a reflection of the values 
underlying the organization of a particular social order, constitutionalism also evolves with social 
changes, though always with some delays.  ‘There are moments’, as Schütze formulated it, ‘when 
                                                     
7 Opinion 2/2013, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454, para. 168.   
8 Idem, para. 191.   
9 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 83. 
10 N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism – The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, op. cit., p. 38.  For a discussion of 
various approaches to constitutionalism, see also, e.g., P. Craig, ‘‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European 
Union’’, Eur. L. J., 2001, p. 127 and foll.  
11 N. Walker, ‘‘Postnational constitutionalism and the problem of translation’’ in Weiler J. H. H. and Wind M. (eds.), 
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003, p. 34.   
12 Idem, p. 35.   
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constitutionalism […] fails to explain or justify the existing social order’.13  The resulting tensions 
between the social reality and the prevalent register of self-understanding of the society in question 
then prompt the search for a new paradigm capable of bringing renewed stability.  Hence, could 
mutual trust be construed as such a ‘new paradigm’ and, if the answer is in the affirmative, how?   
 
Mutual trust as ‘raison d’être’: N.S. in perspective 
As noted, the CJEU has recently construed mutual trust in N.S. and Opinion 2/2013 as a presumption 
of Member States’ compliance with EU law.  It is submitted that tracing the origins of that 
presumption helps in assessing the significance thereof as a defining feature of the Union and Union 
law.  Research to that effect into the case law of the CJEU leads to a rather innocent case known as 
Bauhuis dating back to the late 1970s.  In that case, the CJEU found that Directive 64/432 on trade in 
bovine animals and swine imposing upon exporting Member States the obligation to ensure 
compliance with certain veterinary measures was ‘based on the trust which Member States should 
place in each other’.14  More specifically, the Court held that the ‘mutual confidence, which Member 
States must have in the inspections carried out, under the prescribed conditions, by the competent 
authorities of the other Member States, constitutes a basic element of the system introduced by the 
Directive, without which it would have no purpose’.15  Hence, any additional inspection requirements 
imposed unilaterally by a Member State ‘would constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction’.16  The CJEU therefore saw in mutual trust a normative justification for the 
elimination of double burdens and, de facto, for the mutual recognition of sanitary checks as 
harmonized by secondary law.17  Hence Bauhuis initiated a line of cases rooting regulatory schemes 
for the EU cross-border trade in cattle, particularly, in ‘mutual trust [between Member States] with 
regard to checks carried out on their respective territories’.18  More generally, the Court held, ‘rules 
concerning the origin of goods [are] based on mutual trust between the authorities of the importing 
Member States and those of the exporting States’,19 thereby suggesting a broader connection between 
mutual trust and the ‘home-country-control’ regulatory option.   
Some twenty years later, in Hedley Lomas, the Court relied on the ‘trust’ formula adopted in 
Bauhuis to support the opinion that Member States ‘may not unilaterally adopt, on [their] own 
authority, corrective or protective measures designed to obviate any breach by another Member State 
of rules of [EU] law’, to the extent that an EU Directive provides for the harmonization of the 
measures necessary to achieve the objective protected by the unilateral measure in question.20  As a 
result, the UK’s refusal to grant licenses for the export of live sheep to Spain based on the non-
compliance by Spain with Directive 74/577 on stunning animals before slaughter,21 was considered an 
unjustifiable impediment to the free movement of goods irrespective of the absence of procedure laid 
                                                     
13 Schütze R., From Dual to Cooperative Federalism.  The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009, 
p. 1.  
14 Case C-46/76, Bauhuis, EU:C:1977:6, para. 22; Directive 64/432 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community 
trade in bovine animals and swine [1964] O.J. 121/164. 
15 Idem, para. 38 
16 Idem, para. 40.   
17 As confirmed by Advocate-General Darmon in his Opinion in Case 73/84, Denkavit, EU:C:1985:79, para. 10: ‘‘In fact, far 
from subjecting imports to double controls, the provisions in question are based on mutual trust between Member States, 
since the German authorities accept as sufficient proof the production of a Dutch veterinary certificate’’.  See also 
Opinion of Advocate-General Mischo in Case C-162/97, Nillson, EU:C:1998:199, para. 99.  For a concurring discussion, 
see also Ch. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law, Oxford Univ. Press, 2013, p. 28.  
18 Case 102/96, Commission/Germany, EU:C:1998:529, para 22; Case C-11/95, Commission/Belgium, EU:C:1996:316, para. 
88.  See also Case C-124/95, R. v. HM Treasury and Bank of England, EU:C:1997:8, para. 49 (in relation to export 
authorization for medical supplies in the framework of the common commercial policy).     
19 Case C-409/10, Afasia Knits, EU:C:2011:843, para. 28.   
20 Case C-5/94, ex parte Hedley Lomas, EU:C:1996:205, paras. 19-20.   
21 [1974] O.J. L 316/10.  
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down for the monitoring of Spain’s compliance with its obligations.  Remarkably, trust was invoked in 
that case to interpret then Article 36 EC (now 36 TFEU), i.e., primary law.  Moreover, the Court of 
Justice operated a direct connection between trust and the ‘effectiveness of [EU] law’, otherwise 
guaranteed by the principle of loyal cooperation and the binding character of EU law instruments (i.e., 
the then ‘first paragraph of Article 5 and the third paragraph of Article 189 EC’), while denying 
Member States the right to police unilaterally each other’s compliance with obligations arising from 
EU law.  In a subsequent case, the Court of Justice further relied on the Bauhuis formula and the 
Hedley Lomas precedent to prohibit the adoption of trade sanctions in order to constrain other Member 
States to adopt higher standards of animal welfare than provided by EU law, thus equally protecting 
the effectiveness thereof under the EU Treaties’ system.22   
Arguably, one could interpret Hedley Lomas as essentially holding that the UK’s ban on live 
sheep exports to Spain was fundamentally disproportionate – because redundant and therefore 
inherently unnecessary – to achieve the animal welfare objective sought.  That interpretation would be 
consistent with other cases, such as Wurmser, where a so-called ‘general principle of mutual trust 
between the authorities of the Member States’ was said to justify the exclusion of unnecessary 
requirements for the prior approval of certain products already approved in another Member State, i.e., 
as underlying the proportionality condition attached to any public policy exception raised pursuant to 
Article 36 TFEU (then Article 36 EC).23  Yet the express link established by the CJEU in Hedley 
Lomas between the effectiveness of EU law and ‘Member States [’…] trust in each other’ supports a 
more ambitious claim.  The claim is precisely that ‘mutual confidence’ supports a ‘presumption of 
compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law’ as one of the ‘raison d’être of the 
European Union’, as the Court of Justice stated in N.S.24   
The N.S. case raised the question of the obligation to withhold the transfer of asylum seekers 
to the Member State responsible for examining their asylum application pursuant to Article 3 and 
Chapter III of the ‘Dublin Regulation’, in case of risks that their fundamental rights protected by the 
EU Charter and other minimum common standards of protection would not be complied with.25  
According to the Court, the Dublin Regulation, which sets forth a cooperative regulatory system for 
the treatment of asylum applications, was precisely built on mutual trust and the corollary assumption 
that participating States observe fundamental rights and other EU law requirements.  That general 
assumption, the Court observed, does not exclude the possibility of ‘major operational problems in a 
given Member State’.26  Still, it cannot be accepted that ‘any infringement’ of a fundamental right by 
the Member State in question could allow the other Member States to disregard their obligations to 
comply with provisions of the Dublin Regulation,27 e.g., for public policy reasons, for that would 
unduly affect the effectiveness of that cooperative legal instrument and, indeed, the ‘raison d’être of 
the European Union’.28  Nonetheless, ‘if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are 
                                                     
22 Case C-1/96, ex parte Compassion in World Farming, EU:C:1998:113, para. 47.   
23 Case C-25/88, Wurmser (also known as Bouchara), EU:C:1989:187, para. 18.   
24 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 83.   
25 See Regulation 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] O.J. L 50/1 (as 
since then recast in Regulation 604/2013 [2013] O.J. L 180/31).  The Regulation confirmed the principles underlying the 
Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States 
of the European Communities, signed in Dublin on June 15, 1990 [1997] O.J. C 254/1.  Hence it is commonly referred to 
as the ‘‘Dublin Regulation’’.  See also Directive 2003/9 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers [2003] O.J. L 31/18; Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted [2004] O.J. L 304/12 (corrigendum [2006] O.J. L 204/24); and Directive 2005/85 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] O.J. L 326/13 
(corrigendum [2006] O.J. L 236/36).   
26 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 81.   
27 Idem, para. 82.   
28 Idem, para. 83.   
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systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member 
State responsible’, the Court acknowledged, then a transfer to that Member State would be 
incompatible with the EU Charter and would therefore justify departing from the applicable 
provisions.29    
The solution adopted in N.S., since then confirmed in Kaveh Puid,30 reveals that mutual trust is 
not only a normative principle underpinning secondary law instruments but also a distinctive feature of 
the contemporary EU legal system, i.e., ‘an essential element in the development of the European 
Union’,31 inasmuch as it allows for the preservation of the unity of a system concerned with diversity.  
In effect, N.S. connects mutual trust as a guarantee of effectiveness with mutual trust as the normative 
underpinning of cooperation as a regulatory strategy underlying the Dublin Regulation but also 
numerous other instruments adopted in the fields of criminal and civil justice since the turn of the 
century.  Put otherwise, it suggests that mutual trust can also guarantee nowadays the effectiveness – 
and therefore justify the substantive validity32 – of a legal system based on the coordination of a 
diversity of domestic solutions (as opposed to the unification of rules on, e.g., sanitary checks for the 
export of cattle or rules on the stunning of animals before slaughter, as it was then the case in Bauhuis 
and Hedley Lomas), under certain conditions that are equally intrinsic to the notion of trust.  
Admittedly, that claim requires some articulation.   
As noted, the premise of the CJEU’s reasoning in N.S. was that the ‘Common European 
Asylum System’, which is a constituent part of the project of progressively establishing a European 
area of freedom, security and justice, ‘was conceived in a context making it possible to assume that all 
the participating States […] observe fundamental rights, including the rights based on the Geneva 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and on the ECHR, and that the Member States can have confidence 
in each other in that regard’.33  That position echoes general policy statements to the effect that the 
trust underpinning the cooperative regulatory strategy adopted in the sphere of criminal justice, and 
thus the choice of mutual recognition, derived from shared commitments to abide by ‘principles of 
freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’ but also 
‘legality, subsidiarity and proportionality’.34  As a result, N.S. stands for the view that cooperation as 
                                                     
29 Idem, para. 86.   
30 Case C-4/11, Kaveh Puid [2013] C:2013:740, para. 30.   
31 Opinion of Advocate General Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-187 and 385/01, Gözütök and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516, 
para. 124.  
32 The notion of substantive validity refers generally to the observance of the norms produced by a particular legal system on 
the part of the addressees thereof, which is primarily a function of the latter’s confidence in the effective (incl. equal) 
application of these norms, and therefore in the unity of the system.  Hence, the substantive validity of any legal system is 
partly guaranteed by its subjects’ confidence in that system (for a thorough discussion of the notion of 
substantive/material validity of legal systems, see, e.g., J. Raz, ‘‘The Identity of Legal Systems’’, Cal. L. Rev., 1971, p. 
795 and H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford Univ. Press, 7th ed., 1975, pp. 100-101; on the relationship between 
validity and effectiveness, see also, generally, M. Weber, Economy and Society (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.), Univ. of 
California Press, 1978, p. 311 and foll.).  However, when it comes to the EU system, the very limited means available to 
coerce, if necessary, Member States into complying with applicable rules entails that the validity thereof is particularly 
dependent on trust and effectiveness.  As a result, the cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts has 
historically proved particularly crucial in guaranteeing the effectiveness of EU law so that the Union’s legal system has 
been occasionally presented in the past as dependent on the ‘‘relationship of trust […] in which the European Court and 
Member State courts play complementary roles’’ (J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, op. cit., p. 61.  See also, 
e.g., A. Trabucchi, ‘‘L’effet ‘erga omnes’ des décisions préjudicielles rendues par la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes’’, Rev. Trim. Drt. Europ., 1974, p. 58 (referring to a relation of ‘‘confiance réciproque’’)).  For an early 
discussion of the relationship between mutual trust and Member States’ (lack of) compliance with EU obligations, in 
particular implementation duties, see G. Majone, ‘‘Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and the Evolution of Rules for a 
Single European Market’’, op. cit., pp. 8-13 and 24.   
33 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 78. 
34 See, e.g., Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters [2001] 
O.J. C 12/10, p. 10; recital 10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA; recital four of Council Framework 
Decision 2003/577/JHA; recital nine of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA.  
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an integration strategy is made possible by the pre-existence of a core of shared values resulting from 
more than sixty years of EU integration and approximation efforts, i.e., convergence at the level of 
principles governing domestic legal systems.  In that respect, the Dublin Regulation created indeed a 
cooperative regulatory system allocating jurisdiction for the examination of asylum applications,35 
containing choice of law rules,36 relying on administrative coordination mechanisms37 and implying 
the recognition of foreign applications for asylum and (only indirectly) of ensuing decisions,38 which 
was ‘designed to maintain the prerogatives of the Member States in the exercise of the right to grant 
asylum’.39  That system also entailed the organization of national authorities in network facilitated by 
IT platforms (such as ‘Eurodac’ and ‘COI Portal’) but also a European Asylum Support Office.40   
In turn, the CJEU underlined in N.S., the operation such a cooperative system requires a 
‘presumption of compliance’ on the part of all Member States with the applicable EU rules, including 
with respect to fundamental rights, ‘based on mutual confidence’.41  Generally, that presumption can 
be construed as one of ‘the raison d’être of the European Union’ as a legal system because the 
substantive validity thereof depends not only on the law being effectively and equally applied to all its 
addressees but also necessarily, in the absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms, on the mutual 
trust in each Member State’s compliance with the applicable rules and requirements.42  This is why, it 
is submitted, ‘[m]utual trust is at the heart of the European Union’ for in the absence of such trust in 
the proper application by ‘all the others [Member States]’ of the applicable rules ‘the system would 
break down’.43  However, mutual trust takes on another dimension when it is relied upon to ensure the 
effectiveness of cooperative schemes entailing the enforcement not of uniform substantive and 
procedural rules but of a diversity of domestic solutions,44 since it then requires ‘trust in the adequacy 
                                                     
35 As provided by Article 3(1): ‘‘The application [for asylum] shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall be the 
one which the criteria set out in Chapter III indicate is responsible’’.   
36 See, e.g., Article 19(3) specifying that ‘‘[t]he transfer of the applicant from the Member State in which the application for 
asylum was lodged to the Member State responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the first 
Member State’’.   
37 Chapters V and VI of the Dublin Regulation (which became, and were expanded as, chapters VI and VII in the 2013 recast 
Regulation 604/2013) determine the conditions for ‘‘taking charge and taking back’’ asylum seekers and organize the 
exchange of information among national authorities.   
38 This is because the Dublin Regulation provides that, as a residuary criterion, the first Member State with which an 
application for asylum was lodged is responsible for examining it (Article 13).  When it comes to the recognition of 
decisions granting asylum, the recognition is indirect because it is only after having acquired the status of long-term 
residents in the country that granted them asylum that refugees are entitled to reside in another EU Member State 
(pursuant to Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] O.J. 
L 16/44). 
39 Case C-394/12, Abdullahi, EU:C:2013:813:47, para. 57.   
40 Article 36 of Directive 2011/95 ([2011] O.J. L 337/9) provides for the establishment of a network of national contact 
points to facilitate ‘‘direct cooperation and an exchange of information between the competent authorities’’ (see already 
Article 35 of Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted [2004] O.J. L 304/12).  Regulation 439/2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office [2010] O.J L 
132/11.   
41 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 83.   
42 Idem.   
43 ‘‘Editorial’’, Eur. Const. L. Rev., 2006/2, p. 1.      
44 To be sure, the grant of refugee status is governed in all Member States by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol.  However, the Convention is far from having unified the law 
applicable to the treatment of asylum applications and the content of the protection granted.  As a result of tensions 
arising from the existing diversity of regimes, the EU sought to adopt minimum standards for the qualification, status and 
protection of refugees by means of a 2004 Directive (Directive 2004/83 [2004] O.J. L 304/12) that was further refined in 
2011 in view of the fact that ‘‘considerable disparities remain between one Member State and another concerning the 
grant of protection and the forms that protection takes’’ (Recital 8 of Directive 2011/95 [2011] O.J. L 337/9).  In turn, 
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of one’s partners’ rules’ in addition to ‘trust that these rules are correctly applied’.45  In that context, 
characterized by the recognition of the internal relevance of the domestic rules of other Member 
States, instead of the application of common norms, obedience does require indeed a significant pre-
existing core of convergent (actionable) principles capable of supporting a proportionally greater level 
of general trust as a prerequisite to enter into such cooperative schemes, i.e., as a ‘fundamental 
premise’ to use the CJEU’s terminology in Opinion 2/13.  Additionally, ensuring that such a high level 
of trust can last over time, and that cooperation is thus sustainable, requires the development of 
mechanisms capable of responding to the tensions caused by diversity and therefore of safeguarding 
trust.  These can include the adoption of ad hoc tools and common minimum standards but also the 
promotion of convergence efforts and, ultimately, a tolerance for public policy exceptions in case of 
‘systemic flaws’, as concluded by the Court of Justice in N.S.46 At the end, mutual trust surfaces as the 
core principle underpinning a Union resorting to cooperative regulatory schemes to pursue its 
integration aims, and as a particularly demanding one.  As these schemes grow in prominence, 
including in fields such as competition law enforcement or banking supervision,47 so does mutual trust 
as a foundational principle of the EU legal system.  Hence, the following section inquires into how a 
growing prominence of trust reveals the affirmation of a particular constitutionalism for the Union. 
 
Beyond raison d’être: mutual trust as constitutionalism 
As illustrated by other contributions, the CJEU has increasingly recognized mutual trust as a 
normative principle underlying cooperative regulatory instruments since the turn of the century, 
primarily in the area of civil and criminal justice.48  In turn, mutual trust was elevated to the status of 
raison d’être of the EU legal system and as one of the ‘specific characteristics’ of the Union and Union 
law.49  In line with its holding in Hedley Lomas to the effect that trust between Member States is 
essential to the effectiveness of EU law, the Court of Justice found in N.S. that ‘mutual confidence’ 
supported a ‘presumption of compliance’ with EU law, including fundamental rights, on the part of 
other Member States in the context of the implementation of the cooperative regulatory scheme set up 
in the area of asylum.50  However, there is a significant difference between Hedley Lomas and N.S., as 
noted, which lies essentially in an evolution in the subject-matter of trust for what is at stake in 
cooperative schemes is not trust in the correct application of unified substantive rules but trust in the 
adequacy of other Member States’ domestic solutions.  For that reason, mutual trust has can be 
considered as an ‘essential element in the development of the European Union’.51   
The filiation between trust as used by the CJEU in Hedley Lomas and mutual trust as it has 
been referred to more consistently in recent years, is valuable in one more related way, I suggest.  This 
(Contd.)                                                                   
policy areas that are not characterized by the existence of such a core body of common rules – like the criminal justice 
sphere – raise greater challenges to maintain mutual trust in cooperative regulatory schemes.  
45 Opinion of Advocate General Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-187 and 385/01, Gözütök and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516, 
para. 124. 
46 Further to the N.S. judgment, the Dublin Regulation was amended notably to provide for an ad hoc ‘‘process for early 
warning, preparedness and management of asylum crises to prevent a deterioration in, or the collapse of, asylum systems 
[…] in order to ensure robust cooperation […] and develop mutual trust among Member States with respect to asylum 
policy’’ (see Recital 22 and Article 33 of Regulation 604/2013 [2013] O.J. L 180/31).   
47 See, respectively, Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and 
[102] of the Treaty [2003] O.J. L 1/1; Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] O.J. L 287/63. 
48 See, in particular, Joined Cases C-187 and 385/01, Gözütök and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516 and Case C-303/05, Advocaten 
voor de Wereld, EU:C:2007:261.  
49 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para. 83; para. 168; Opinion 2/2013, Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
EU:C:2014:2454, para.    
50 Idem.  
51 Opinion of Advocate General Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-187 and 385/01, Gözütök and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516, 
para. 124.   
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is because, in Hedley Lomas, the Court of Justice connected the notions of trust and effectiveness with 
the principle of loyal/sincere cooperation, as enshrined formerly in Article 5 and then 10 EC.52  The 
connection between effectiveness and sincere cooperation was unsurprising because the CJEU had 
long established, by this time, a legal duty for national authorities to give full effect to EU law based 
on the loyalty principle.53  In contrast, the reference to trust was unconventional.  And yet, in recent 
years, the rare attempts at giving substance to the notion of mutual trust have suggested a direct 
connection with loyal cooperation.  Advocate-General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer in Bourquain, for 
instance, conceived of mutual trust as ‘fulfilling a role similar to that of loyal cooperation’.54  
Similarly, in Stoß, Advocate-General Mengozzi equated mutual trust with ‘Article 10 EC’, though in a 
somewhat elliptical fashion.55  These references echo earlier but unarticulated attempts by Advocates-
General to link mutual trust with loyal cooperation in cases pertaining to the cross-border recognition 
of public documents.56  They are also supported by tentative discussions in the literature, first in a 
visionary contribution by Majone and more recently by scholars of judicial cooperation.57  
Upon reflection, the proposed connection between mutual trust and loyal cooperation appears 
both inoperative and promising.  Inoperative, first, because mutual trust is not currently recognized as 
a general principle entailing positive legal effects on its own, whereas loyal cooperation has been used 
repeatedly by the CJEU throughout the years as the legal basis for some of the most important 
systemic developments of EU law,58 i.e., to ‘fill[…] many of the gaps in the Treaties’,59 as well as in 
deciding concrete cases.60  Yet, there was also a time when loyalty was considered a normative basis 
for principles specified further elsewhere, which could ‘not be relied upon in isolation’.61  This is why 
the connection is equally promising.  Indeed, the principle of loyal cooperation has since then come to 
be considered a cornerstone of the EU legal system whose ‘importance is constitutional’,62 notably as 
a foundation of the autonomy of the EU legal order.63  Hence, what if mutual trust was to become the 
                                                     
52 Article 5 and then 10 EC read as follows: ‘‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community.  They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks.  They shall abstain from 
any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty’’ ([2002] O.J. C 325/33 at 42).   
53 For an historical overview, see, e.g., J. Temple Lang, ‘‘The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of 
Cooperation of National Authorities and Community Institutions under Article 10 EC’’, Fordham Int’l. L. J., 2007-2008, 
p. 1483.   
54 Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer in Case C-297/07, Bourquain, EU:C:2008:206, para. 45.   
55 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi of 4 March 2010 in Joined Cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and 
C-410/07, Markus Stoß, EU:C:2010:109, para. 104.  
56 See Opinion of Advocate-General Gulmann in Case C-45/90, Paletta, EU:C:1991:434, para. 12; Opinion of Advocate-
General Cosmas in Case C-206/94, Paletta II, EU:C:1996:20, para. 37; Opinion of Advocate-General La Pergola in Case 
C-336/94, Dafeki, EU:C:1996:462, para. 9; Opinion of Advocate-General Geelhoed in Case C-145/03, Keller, 
EU:C:2005:17, para. 21.   
57 G. Majone, ‘‘Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and the Evolution of Rules for a Single European Market’’, EUI 
Working Paper RSC 95/1, p. 1; F. Blobel and P. Späth, ‘‘The tale of multilateral trust and the European law of civil 
procedure’’, op. cit., p. 535; E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘‘From Mutual Trust to Full Effectiveness of EU Law: 10 Years of the 
European Arrest Warrant’’, op. cit., p. 80. 
58 Suffice is to mention the principle of State responsibility for breach of EU law (Joined Cases 6/90 and 9/90, Francovich, 
EU:C:1991:428, paras. 35-36).  
59 J. Temple Lang, ‘‘The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and 
Community Institutions under Article 10 EC’’, op. cit., p. 1531.   
60 For example in relation to public restraints of competition.  For a discussion, see, e.g., D. Gerard, ‘‘EU Competition Policy 
after Lisbon: Time to Review the ‘State Action Doctrine’?’’, J.E.C.L.P., 2010, p. 202.   
61 Opinion of Advocate-General Slynn in Case 308/86, Lambert, EU:C:1988:270.  For a discussion, see E. Neframi, ‘‘The 
Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations’’, C.M.L.R., 2010, p. 
323.   
62 Idem, p. 1530.   
63 See, e.g., R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law, op. cit., pp. 308-309.   
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basis for a general duty of loyalty applicable ‘horizontally’ between Member States rather than 
‘vertically’ between Member States and the Union,64 and thus for the mutual recognition of the 
adequacy of other Member States’ domestic solutions and, by extension, as the organizational 
principle of a cooperative Union capable of ensuring ‘unity in diversity’?  That is, admittedly, an 
ambitious claim.  It is moreover a fact that loyalty has already been found applicable among Member 
States, though not in too many cases and then also in support of Member States’ obligations under 
cooperative regulatory schemes.65  Likewise, loyal cooperation has already been presented as 
underlying the principle of mutual recognition, but with the support of types of cases that have been 
otherwise – and later on – based on mutual trust.66  The question therefore appears to boil down to 
whether loyal cooperation encapsulates as such the richness of mutual trust’s virtues as a normative 
principle governing ‘horizontal’ cooperation between Member States within the Union or, rather, 
whether mutual trust usefully complements loyalty as a guarantee of the effectiveness of cooperative 
regulatory schemes, as well as a principle capable of informing the perfection of said schemes for 
future applications.   
Fundamentally, though, the core issue underlying that question is whether mutual trust could 
be construed as the legal and semantic embodiment of an evolution of the Union towards a greater 
recognition of its own diversity and complexity, reflected in a tendency to pursue integration by means 
of a greater reliance on cooperative strategies.  In that way, mutual trust would sit well under the 
loyalty umbrella, where it could find a constitutional basis, but an expanded one.  To be sure, loyalty is 
known for having evolved over time ‘from a unilaterally formulated duty of cooperation on the part of 
the Member States to a multi-sided duty of loyalty and good faith in the relationships between the 
different levels of governance that make up the Union’.  In particular, the CJEU has ‘read loyalty not 
as a one-way street but as a mutual obligation, owed by Member States to the Community and vice 
versa’.67  Mutual trust would then move that requirement one step further for cooperation requires due 
respect for Member States’ respective domestic solutions, not only for each others’ implementation of 
common substantive norms.  Interestingly, the expansion of that èthos of mutuality embedded in 
mutual trust is supported by the text of the principle of loyalty as reformulated by the failed Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe and reproduced in the Treaty on European Union following the 
amendments brought by the Treaty of Lisbon.68  Article 4(3) TEU now starts indeed with the 
following introductory sentence: ‘[p]ursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the 
Member States, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties’.  That emphasis put on mutual respect follows immediately the affirmation of the Union’s 
commitment to ‘respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’,69 which is significant 
because mutuality derives from that combination of diversity and equality. The notion of ‘mutual 
respect’ is now equally referred to as a value promoted by the Union ‘[i]n its relations with the wider 
                                                     
64 Note that the principle of loyalty is equally applicable between EU institutions (see, e.g., Case C-65/93, 
Parliament/Council, EU:C:1995:91, para. 23).   
65 See, e.g., Case C-251/89, Athanasopoulos, EU:C:1991:242, para. 57 (on the obligation of Member States to cooperate in 
good faith with the institutions of other Member States in the implementation of cooperative obligations arising under 
Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community, as codified by Regulation 2001/83 [1983] O.J. L 230/6).   
66 Verhoeven, specifically, contends that ‘‘loyalty also underlies the principle of mutual recognition, as formulated by the 
Court of Justice in its Cassis de Dijon decision’’ by referring to the Court’s decision in Vlassopoulou (Case C-340/89, 
EU:C:1991:193, para. 14; A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, op. 
cit., p. 308).  Yet, the issue in Vlassopoulou was the recognition of qualifications in order to obtain access to a profession, 
which the Court subsequently treated as a matter of mutual trust (see, e.g., Case C-274/05, Commission/Greece, 
EU:C:2008:585, para. 30; Case C-286/06, Commission/Spain, EU:C:2008:586, para. 65).   
67 A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, op. cit., pp. 305-306.   
68 See Article I-5(2) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] O.J. C 310/1.  
69 Article 4(2) TEU.  Article 6(3) EC merely stated that the ‘‘Union shall respect the national identities of its Member 
States’’ and did not refer to equality.     
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world’,70 which is also revealing as to the significance of mutuality for the Union’s current register of 
self-understanding.  
That emphasis on mutuality, it is submitted, suggests that mutual trust does embed a particular 
constitutionalism for the Union as an inherently diverse political community bound by an entrenched 
set of shared values and principles built over more than six decades which, combined with deep 
interdependencies, allows its constituent parts to recognize each others’ domestic solutions as 
equivalent to their own, different but equally valid,71 and by extension their own self as being 
intrinsically dependent on others.72  Such an acknowledgment testifies of the possibility for diverse 
communities to ‘learn to trust one another and build a sense of political community over time through 
greater cooperation and interconnectedness’.73  This is notably because it carries the ‘capacity to 
awaken the actors of one world to the values of another world […], short of their changing worlds’ 
and because it endeavours to transcend national treatment and unification alike in coping with 
collective problems by resorting instead to dynamic and complex processes of co-operation.74  In turn, 
the extraordinary ambition of mutuality in an increasingly diverse Union illustrates how resorting to 
cooperation instead of unification reveals the steadiness of the EU construct and can be viewed as a 
qualitative leap forward whereby Member States concede that they are bound less by a contract than 
by an overarching obligation ‘that neither measures nor calculates’,75 including when it comes to the 
design of rules affecting individuals.  That obligation of trust includes a commitment to ‘refrain from 
cheating in the blind spots of our commonly agreed standards’, as Nicolaïdis put it,76 but also to 
undertake convergence efforts in order to address tensions arising from encounters with diversity.  
Trust is not innate, indeed, and cannot therefore be decreed; rather, it is predicated on compliance with 
shared standards, as epitomized, e.g., by conditionality as a central element of the EU pre-accession 
process.77  Yet its stability also depends in practice on the convergence of domestic solutions, the 
possible adoption of common norms and imposition of sanctions, as well as on a tolerance for public 
policy justifications to cope with disappointments of trust, i.e., a need to preserve a degree of 
verticality as a safeguard of trust or, put otherwise, as a way to institutionalize distrust.   
In the end, these observations testify to how mutual trust as a constitutionalism is also capable 
of providing a frame of reference for policymakers.  Together with considerations of effectiveness and 
legitimacy constraints, the functioning of trust indeed requires policymakers (and courts) to pay 
attention to mechanisms promoting convergence and to reflect on the existence and design of – and 
reliance on – necessary safeguards.  Beforehand, though the decision is a matter of judgment rather 
than measurement and therefore ultimately political, comes the question of whether the prerequisites 
for trust are met in the relevant policy fields, i.e., an assessment of the existing level of (dis-)trust, 
which depends notably on the level of observable diversity between domestic solutions and Member 
States’ policy strategies.  The outcome of that analysis should then be factored into the structuring of 
the cooperative regulatory scheme being contemplated (e.g., how far recognition obligations can 
                                                     
70 Article 3(5) TEU.   
71 On the dialectic between identity and otherness and its connection with the notions of individual and collective identity and 
normative validity, see generally P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (transl. D. Pellauer), Harvard Univ. Press, 
Cambridge, 2004, 297 p.   
72 As Ricoeur puts it, ‘‘[t]he course of alterity unfolds in tandem with that of identity’’ and ‘‘[a]lterity is at its peak in 
mutuality’’ (P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, op. cit., p. 251).  
73 H.-D. Klingemann and S. Weldon, ‘‘A Crisis of Integration? The Development of Transnational Dyadic Trust in the 
European Union, 1954-2004’’, op. cit., p. 458.  
74 P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, op. cit., p. 209. 
75 Idem, p. 221.   
76 K. Nicolaïdis, ‘‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through Mutual Recognition’’, J. Eur. Publ. Pol., 2007, p. 683.   
77 For an account of the deep connections between solidarity, loyalty, trust and conditionality, see M. Cremona, ‘‘EU 
enlargement: solidarity and conditionality’’, Eur. L. Rev., 2005, p. 3.  For a discussion of the centrality of trust during the 
2004 EU enlargement process, see, e.g., E. Pitto, ‘‘Mutual Trust and Enlargement’’ in G. de Kerchove and A. 
Weyembergh, Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area, op. cit., p. 47.   
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actually be extended), including the shaping of learning tools.  Completing these steps and undertaking 
their periodic review conditions the success of cooperation as a regulatory strategy and its extension to 
other areas of economic or social regulation.  Neglecting them, to the contrary, is prone to cause 
political resistance, implementation failures and legitimacy deficits. 
 
Conclusion  
This contribution has attempted to map mutual trust as a general framework to ‘enhance our ability to 
understand the dynamics of EU law and European integration at large’.78  Since the turn of the century, 
references to trust in the EU legal context have multiplied, in political discourses but first and 
foremost in relation to legal instruments of a cooperative nature articulating the application of 
domestic solutions in the field of civil and criminal justice. The particular actuality of cooperation and 
trust has permeated the case law of the CJEU, thereby enabling the Court to connect different strands 
of case law to affirm the discreet centrality of mutual trust for the operation of the Union.  As a result, 
it is the observable intensification of references to trust since the turn of the century that supported its 
proposition as a renewed constitutionalism for the Union, i.e., as a way to make sense of the concerns 
and commitments underlying the establishment and operation of cooperative regulatory schemes as 
just political institutions.  Hence, the present contribution has attempted to trace back the origins of 
mutual trust as a specific characteristic of the Union and Union law in order to assess its significance 
and then to formulate mutual trust as a constitutionalism by identifying the values embodied therein.  
Starting from the discussion initiated on the basis of the Hedley Lomas and N.S. rulings of the 
CJEU to the effect that mutual trust can be apprehended as a guarantee of the effectiveness – and thus 
substantive validity – of a cooperative legal system implying the recognition by Member States of the 
adequacy of each other’s domestic solutions, a possible connection between mutual trust and loyalty 
was explored with a view to anchoring trust in a constitutional basis.  After all, the principle of loyal 
cooperation now enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU has been historically construed as prescribing a legal 
duty for national authorities to give full effect to EU law and, consequently, as a foundation of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order.  On that basis, mutual trust could be ascertained as a form of loyalty 
principle applicable horizontally between Member States and extending to the recognition of their 
respective domestic solutions.  The hosting of mutual trust under the loyalty umbrella appears all the 
more appropriate when considering the amendment brought by the Treaty of Lisbon to the formulation 
of that principle, notably the emphasis put on ‘mutual respect’, and its insertion in a provision – 
Article 4 TEU – underscoring the deference due to Member States’ constitutional identities and 
equality.   
In turn, these features match particularly well with the èthos of mutuality that underpins 
mutual trust, thereby supporting the idealization of a Union where its constituent parts recognize each 
others’ domestic solutions as equivalent to their own, different but equally valid, and by extension 
their own self – i.e., the exercise of their own sovereignty – as being intrinsically dependent on others. 
What emerges eventually is the picture of a society that is composite in essence and finds its unity in 
the trust-based recognition by its members of their respective diversity entailing, as a corollary, a 
commitment to trustworthiness in their own dealings and to convergence in order to address tensions 
arising from encounters with diversity.  Such an achievement is however predicated on the existence 
and maintenance of a significant core of shared values and on the existence of institutions and legal 
arrangements acting as safeguards of trust, as well as on a tolerance for justifications of domestic 
public policy when necessary.  To that extent, mutual trust as a constitutionalism also provides a frame 
of reference for policymakers (and courts) inasmuch as it highlights the need to factor ‘trust 
safeguards’ into the structuring of cooperative regulatory schemes (e.g., minimum rules, features 
prone to elicit convergence, scope for public policy exceptions) and thereby perfect the management 
of diversity in the European Union. 
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